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In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game 
binding agreements are not possible, the salution of such a game has to be self-
enforcing, i.e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951]). In general, however, a game 
may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be 
chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965] that 
notall Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified tobe selectedas the 
solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts 
of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are 
eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba-
tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the 
Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions 
for every game. 
In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. 
Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here 
for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine-
ments,to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The 
greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal 
farm games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6. 
In chapter 1, the reasans why the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined are 
reviewed and,by means of a series of examples,various refined concepts are illustrated. 
In chapter 2, we study n-person normal form games. Some concepts which are considered 
are: perfect equilibria (SELTEN [1975]), proper equilibria (MYERSON [1978]), essen-
tial equilibria (WU WEN-TSÜN AND JIANG JIA-HE [1962]) and regular equilibria (HARSANYI 
[1973b]). An important result is that regular equilibria possess all robustness prop-
erties one can hope for, and that generically allNashequilibria are regular. 
Matrix and bimatrix games are studied in chapter 3. The relative simplicity of such 
games enables us to give characterizations of perfect equilibria (in terms of undom-
inated strategies), of proper equilibria (by means of optimal strategiesin the sense 
of DRESHER [1961]) and of regular equilibria. 
In chapter 4, it is shown that the basic assumption underlying the properness concept 
(viz. that a more costly mistake is chosen with an order smaller probability than a 
less costly one) cannot be justified if one takes into account that a player actually 
has to put some effort in trying to prevent mistakes. 
In chapter 5, we study how the strategy choice of a player is influenced by his un-
certainty about the payoffs of his opponents. It is shown that slight uncertainty 
leads to perfect equilibria and that specific slight uncertainty leads to weakly 
proper equilibria. 
In the concluding chapter 6, it is investigated to what extend the insights obtained 
from the study of normal form games are also valuable for games in extensive farm. 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In this introductory chapter, it is illustrated by means of a series of examples why 
the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined. Furthermore, several possibilities 
for refining this concept are discussed. First, in section 1.1, an informal descrip-
tion of games and Game Theory is given. It is also motivated why the salution of a 
noncooperative game has to be a Nash equilibrium. In the sections 1.2- 1.4, we con-
sider games in extensive form and discuss the following refinements of the Nash equi-
librium concept: subgame perfect equilibria, sequential equilibria and perfect equi-
libria. In the sections 1.5 and 1.6, we consider refinements of the Nash equilibrium 
concept for normal form games, such as perfect equilibria, proper equilibria, essen-
tial equilibria and regular equilibria. The contents of the monograph are summarized 
insection 1.7 and, finally, insection 1.8 some notations are introduced. 
l.I. INFORMAL DESCRIPTION OF GAMES AND GAME THEORY 
In this section, an informal description of a (strategie) game and of Game Theory is 
given. For a thorough introduetion to Game Theory, the reader is referred to LUCE 
AND RAIFFA [1957], 0\-IEN [1968], HARSANYI [1977] or ROSENMÜLLER [1981]. 
Game Theory is a mathematical theory which deals with conflict situations. A conflict 
situation (game) is a situation in which two or more individuals (players) interact 
and thereby jointly determine the outcome. Each participating player can partially 
control the situation, but no player has full control. In addition each player has 
certain personal preferences over the set of possible outcomes and each player strives 
to obtain that outcome which is most profitable to him. Game Theory restricts itself 
togames with rational players. A rational player is a highly idealized person which 
satisfies a number of properties (see e.g. HARSANYI [1977] of which we mention the 
following two: 
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(i) the player is sufficiently intelligent, so that he can analyse the game com-
pletely, 
(ii) the player's preferences can be described by a utility function, whose expected 
value this player tries to maximize (and, in fact, the player has no other ob-
jective than to maximize this expected value). 
Game Theory is a normative theory: it aims to prescribe what each player in a game 
should do in order to promate his interestsoptimally, i.e. which strategy each player 
should play, such that his partial influence on the situation benefits him most. 
Hence, the aim of Game Theory is to solve each game, i.e. to prescribe a unique solu-
tion (one optimal strategy for each player) for every game. 
The foundation of Game Theory was laid in an artiele by John von Neumann in 1928 
(VON NEU11ANN [1928]), but the theory received widespread attention only after the 
publication of the fundamental book VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN [1944]. 
Traditionally, games have been divided into two classes: cooperative qames and non-
cooperative games. In this monograph, we restriet ourselves to noncooperative games. 
By a noncooperative game, we mean a game in which the players are not able to make 
binding agreements (as well as other commitments), except for the ones which are 
explicitly allowed by the rules of the game. Since in a noncooperative game binding 
agreements are not possible, the salution of such game has to be self-enforcing, i.e. 
it must have the property that, once it is agreed upon, nobody has an incentive to 
deviate. This implies that the salution of a noncooperative game has to be a Nash 
equilibrium (NASH [1950], [1951]), i.e. a strategy combination with the property that 
no player can gain by unilaterally deviatinq from it. Let us illustrate this by means 
of the game of fig. 1.1.1, which is the so called prisoners' dilemma game, probably 








Figure 1.1.1. Prisoners' dilemma. 
The rows of the table represent the possible choices Tand B for player 1, the columns 
represent the choices L and R of player 2. In each cell the upper left entry is the 
payoff to player 1, while the lower right entry is the payoff to player 2. The rules 
of the game are as follows: It is a one-shot game (each player has to make a choice 
just once), the players have to make their choices simultaneously and independently 
of each other, binding agreements are not possible. 
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The most attractive strategy combination of the game of figure 1.1.1 is (T,L). How-
ever, a sensible theory cannot prescribe this strategy pair as the solution. Namely, 
suppose the players have agreed to play (T,L). (So for the moment we assume the play-
ers are able to communicate, however, nothing changes if communication is not possible 
as we will see below). Since the game is a noncooperative one, this agreement makes 
sense only if it is self-enforcing which, however, is not the case. If player 1 expects 
that player 2 will keep to the agreement, then he himself has an incentive to vialate 
it, since B yields him a higher payoff than T does, if player 2 plays L. Similarly, 
player 2 has an incentive to vialate the agreement, if he expects player 1 to keep 
to it. Hence, the agreement to play (T,L) is self-destabilizing: each player is moti-
vated to vialate it, if he expects the other to abide it. Therefore, (T,L) cannot be 
the salution of the game of figure 1.1.1. In this game, the strategy pair (B,R) is 
the only pair with the property that no player can gain by unilaterally deviating 
from it. So, only an agreement to play the Nash equilibrium (B,R) is sensible and, 
therefore, the players will agree to play (B,R) if they are able to communicate. 
Sufficiently intelligent players will reach the same conclusion if communication is 
not possible as a consequence of the tacit principle of bargaining (SCHELLING [1960]) 
which states that any agreement that can be reached by explicit bargaining can also 
be reached by tacit understanding alone (as long as there is no coordination problem 
arising from equivalent equilibria). Hence, if binding agreements are not possible, 
only (B,R) can be chosen as the solution, whether there is communication or not. 
The discussion above clearly shows that the salution of a noncooperative game has to 
be a Nash equilibrium since every other strategy combination is self-destabilizing, 
if binding agreements are not possible. In general, however, a game may possess more 
than one Nash equilibrium and, therefore, the core problem of noncooperative game 
theory can be formulated as: given a game with more than one Nash equilibrium, which 
one of these should be chosen as the salution of the game? This core problem will not 
be solved in this monograph, but we will show that some Nash equilibria are better 
qualified tobechosen as the salution than others. Namely,wewill show that notevery 
Nash equilibrium has the property of being self-enforcing. The next 5 sections 
illustrate how such equilibria can arise and how one can eliminate them. 
1.2. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING 
There are several ways in which a game can be described. One way is to summarize the 
rules of the game by indicating the choices available to each player, the information 
a player has when it is his turn to move, and the payoffs each player receives at the 
end of the game. A game described in this way is referred to as a game in extensive 
form (see section 6.1). Usually, such a game is represented by a tree, following 
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KUHN [1953]. Another way of representing a game is by listing all the strategies 
(complete plans of action) each player has available tagether with the payoffs asso-
ciated with the various strategy combinations. A game described in this way is called 
agame innormal farm (see section 2.1). In the sections 1.2- 1.4, we confine 
ourselves to games in extensive form. Normal farm games will be considered in the 
sections1.5 and 1.6. 






Figure 1.2.1. An extensive farm game with a Nash equilibrium which is nat self-
enforcing. 
The rules of this game are as follows. The game starts at the root x of the tree, 









, has to move only after player 1 has chosen R
1
• The payoffs to the 
players are represented at the endpoints of the tree, the upper number being the 
payoff to player 1. So, for example, if player 1 chooses L
1
, then player 1 receives 
0 and player 2 receives 2. The game is played just once. 













), however, is nat self-enforcing. Namely, 




). If player 1 expects that player 2 
will keep to the agreement, then indeed it is optimal for him to play L
1
. But should 
player 1 expect that player 2 will keep to the agreement? The answer is no: since R
2 
yields player 2 a higher payoff than L
2 
does, if y is reached, player 2 will play R
2
, 
if he actually has to make a choice. Therefore, it is better for player 1 to play R
1 
and so he will also vialate the agreement by playing R
1




) is an 
equilibrium, it is nat self-enforcing and, therefore, it is nat qualified to be chosen 
as the salution of the game of figure 1.2.1. Hence, the only remaining candidate for 




). This equilibrium is indeed self-enforcing and, 






) of the game of figure 1.2.1 can be interpreted as a threat 
equilibrium: player 2 threatens player 1 that he will punish him by playing L
2
, if 
he does not play L
1
. Above we argued that this threat is not credible, since player 
2 will not execute it in the event: Facing the fait accompli that player 1 has chosen 
R
1 
it is better for player 2 to play R
2
. Note that here we use the basic feature of 
noncooperative games: no commitments are possible, except from those explicitly al-
lowed by the rules of the game. Notice that the situation changes drastically, if 
player 2 has the possibility to commit himself, befare the beginning of the game. 
In this case it is optimal for player 2 to commit himself to L
2
, thereby forcing 
player 1 to play L
1 
• 
To avoid misunderstandings, let us stress that we do not think that commitments are 
not possible in conflict situations. We merely hold the view that, if such commit-
ments are possible, they should explicitly be incorporated in the model (also see 
HARSANYI AND SELTEN [1980], chapter 1). The great strategie importance of the pos-
sihilities of committing oneself in games was first pointed out in SCHELLING [1960]. 
The game of figure 1.2.1 is an example of what we call an extensive form game with 
perfect information. A game is said to have perfect information, if the following 
two conditions are satisfied: 
(1.2.1) there are no simultaneous moves, and 
(1.2.2) at each decision point it is known which choices have previously been made. 




) in the game of figure 1.2.1 
generalizes to all games with perfect information: Since in a noncooperative game 
there are no possibilities for commitment, once the decision point x is reached, 
that part of the game tree which does not come after x has become strategically ir-
relevant and, therefore, the decision at x should be based only on that part of the 
tree which comes after x. This implies that for games with perfect information only 
those equilibria which can be found by dynamic programming (BELLMAN [1957]), i.e. by 
inductively working backwarcts in the game tree, are sensible (i.e. self-enforcing) 
(cf. KUHN [1953], Corollary 1). 
The game of figure 1.2.2 shows that this has the consequence that a sensible equi-
librium may be payoff dominated by a non-sensible one. The unique equilibrium found 






). i.e. player 1 plays L
1 
at his first decision 
point, r 1 at his second, and player 2 plays R Not th t · t f 2 . e a we requ1re a s rategy o 
player 1 to prescribe a choice at his second decision point also in the case in which 
this player chooses L
1 
at his first decision point. The significanee of this require-






y1e ds players 






l. This equilibrium yields both players a 
payoff 2. This one, however, is not sensible since player 1 cannot commit himself to 
playing t 1 at his second decision point: both players know that 1 1 ·11 1 p ayer Wl p ay r
1
, 
if this point is actually reached. Therefore, it is illusory of the players to think 
that they can get a payoff 2. If player 1 chooses R 
1' 
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Figure 1.2.2. A sensible equilibrium may be payoff dominated by a non-sensible one. 
1.3. SUBGAME PERFECT EOUILIBRIA 
For games without perfect information one cannot employ the straightforward dynamic 
programming approach, which works so well for games with perfect information. In this 
section, we will illustrate a slightly more sophisticated dynamic programming approach 
to exclude non-sensible (i.e. not self-enforcing) equilibria of games without perfect 
information. 




Figure 1.3.1. A game with imperfect information. 
5 
2 
In this game player cannot discriminate between z and z' (i.e. he does not get to 




), which is denoted by a dotted line con-
necting zand z'. The set {z,z'} is called an information set of player 1. 
The straightforward dynamic programming approach fails in this example: in z player 
1 should play ~ 1 and in z' he should play r 1 . Hence, hefaces a dilemma, since he 
- 6 -
does not know whether he is in z or in z'. For this game, the more sophisticated 
approach amounts to nothing else than going one step further backwards in the game 
tree. Namely, notice that the subtree starting at y constitutes a game of its own, 
called the subgame starting at y. Since commitments are not possible, the behavior 
in this subgame can depend only on the subgame itself and, therefore, a sensible 
equilibrium of the game has to induce an equilibrium in this subgame. Otherwise 
at least one player would have an incentive to deviate, once the subgame is actually 





Hence, player 1 should play r
1 
at his information set {z,z'} and player 2 should 
play R
2









) is the only sensible equilibrium of the game of figure 1.3.1. Notice 
that this is not the only equilibrium: (L 1 ~ 1 ,L2 ) is also an equilibrium of this game. 
This equilibrium is, however, not sensible, since it involves the incredible threat 
of player 2 to play L
2
. 
It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965] that the above argument is valid 
for every noncooperative game: Since commitments are not possible, behavior in a sub-
game can depend only on the subgame itself and, therefore, for an equilibrium to be 
sensible, it is necessary that this equilibrium induces an equilibrium in every sub-
game. Equilibria which possess this property are called subgame perfect equilibria, 
following SELTEN [1975]. 
For games with a finite time horizon and a recursive structure, the subgame perfect-
ness criterion is very powerfull in reducing the set of equilibria which are qualified 
to be chosen as the solution. To demonstrate this, we will investigate a finite repe-
tition of the game r of figure 1.3.2. 
10 0 0 
10 11 0 
11 3 1 
0 3 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
Figure 1.3.2. A normal form game r, which is a slight modification of the game of 
figure 1.1.1. 
Notice that the game r results from the game of fig. 1.1.1 by adding for each player 




) is the most attractive one, 






Now consider the game f(2), which consistsof playing r twice in succession, in which 
each player tries to maximize the sum of the payoffs he receives at tage 1 and stage 
2 and in which at the second stage the player get to hear which choices have been 
made at the first stage. 
At the second stage of f(2) everything which has happenedat the first stage had be-
come strategically irrelevant and, therefore, the behavior at stage 2 can depend only 




), the unique equilibrium of r. 





) at the first stage. Hence, there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium of 





However, f(2) has a phletora of equilibria which are not subgame perfect. An example 
of such an equilibrium is the strategy CQmbination (~ 1 .~ 2 ), where ~i (iE {1,2}) is 
gi ven by ( 1 . 3 . 1 ) : 
( 1. 3.1) ~i { 









) has been played at stage 1, 
R. , otherwise. 
l 
In this equilibrium, each player threatens the other one that he will punish him at 
the second stage, if he does not cooperate at the first stage. If both players be-




) will result at the first stage. 
This equilibrium is, however, not sensible, since a player should not belief the 
other player's threat. If player 2 plays the strategy ~ 2 of (1.3.1), then player 1, 
knowing that it is not optimal for player 2 to execute the threat, should play M
1 
at the first stage. 
In the literature a variety of examples can be found of economie situations in which 
the subgame perfectness concept severly reduces the set of eligible equilibria. \~e 
mention only a few: SELTEN [1965, 1973, 1977, 1978], STAHL [1977l, KALAI [1980] and 
KANEKO [1981]. Recently,the subgame perfectness concept received also considerable 
attention for games of infinite length, especially in relation to barqaininq problems 
(cf. RUBINSTEIN [1980, 1982], FUDENBERG AND LEVINE [1981],HOULIN [1982]). 
1.4. SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA AND PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
It was first pointed out in SELTEN [1975] that a subgame perfect equilibrium may 
prescribe irrational (non maximizing) behavior at information sets which are not 
reached when the equilibrium is played. Consequently a subgame perfect equilibrium 
need not be sensible. The 3-person·qame of figure 1.4.1, which is taken from SELTEN 

















Figure 1.4.1. A subgame perfect equilibrium need not to be sensible. The numbers at 
the endpoints of the tree represent the payoffs to the players; the 
upper number is the payoff to player 1, the second one is the payoff 
to player 2, etc. 
Since there are no subgames in the game of figure 1.4.1, every equilibrium is sub-
game perfect (for the formal definition of a subgame see (6.1.16)). One equilibrium 






). However, this equilibrium is not sensible, since player 






) in case his information set is actually 
reached. Namely, if player 2 plays L
2
, then player 3 will not find out that the 
agreement is violated (he cannot discriminate betweenzand z') and, therefore, this 
player will still play R
3
. Hence, playing L
2 
yields player 2 a payoff 4, which is 
moere than R
2 
yields and therefore, this player will play L
2 
if his information set 
is actually reached. Player 1 realizing this will play R
1 
(which yields him a payoff 
4), rather that L
1 













) is not sensible. (It 
can be shown that any sensible equilibrium has player 1 playing R
1
, player 2 playing 
R
2
, and player 3 playing L
3 
with a probability at least 3/4, see SELTEN [1975]). 
The Nash equilibrium concept requires that each player chooses a strategy which maxi-
mizes his expected payoff, assuming that the other players will play in accordance 






) in the game of fig-






) is played, the information 
set of player 2 is not reached and, therefore, the exnected payoff of this player 
does not depend on his own strategy, which obviously implies that every strategy 
maximizes his expected payoff. However, since player 2 has to move only if the point 
y is actually reached, he should not let himself be guided by his a priori expected 
payoff, but by his expected payoff after y. The a priori expected payoff is based on 
the assumption that player 1 plays L
1
, but if, y is reached, this has shown 
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to be wrong and player 2 should incorporate this is computing his expected payoff. 
The discussion above shows that, for a subgame perfect equilibrium to be sensible, it 
is necessary that this equilibrium prescribes, at each information set which is a 
singleton, a choice which maximizes the expected payoff after that information set. 
Note that the restrietion to singleton information sets is necessary to ensure that 
the expected payoff after the information set is well-defined. This restriction, 
however, has the consequence that not all subgame perfect equilibria which satisfy 









Figure 1.4.2. Un unreasonable subgame perfect equilibrium. 
2 
2 
A subgame perfect equilibrium of this game which, moreover, satisfies the above con-
dition is (A,R
2
). This equilibrium is not sensible, since it is always better for 
player 2 to play L
2 
if his information set is reached. (Note that we can draw this 
conclusion without being able to compute the expected payoff of player 2 after his 







the only sensible equilibrium of the game of figure 1.4.2. 
The examples in this section illustrate that a sensible (self-enforcing) equilibrium 
has to prescribe rational (maximizing) behavior at every information set, also at the 
information sets which can be reached only after a deviation from the equilibrium. 
The problem, however is: what is rational behavior at an information set with prior 
probability zero. In the literature two related solutions to this problem have been 
proposed, one in SELTEN [1975] (the concept of perfect equilibria) and one in KREPS 
AND WILSON [1982a] (the concept of sequential equilibria). Let us first explain the 
concept of sequential equilibria. 
The basic assumption underlying the sequential equilibrium concept is, that the 
players are rational in the sense of SAVAGE [1954], i.e. that a player who has to 
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make a choice in the face of uncertainty will construct a personal probability for 
every event of which he is uncertain and maximize his expected utility with respect 
to these probabilities. To be more precise, suppose the players in an extensive form 
have agreed to play an equilibrium ~ and assume that a player nevertheless finds 
himself in an information set which could not be reached when ~ is actually played. 
In this case, the player will try to reconstruct what has gone wrong, i.e. where a 
deviation from the equilibrium has occurred. In general, this player will not be able 
to reconstruct completely what has gone wrong and, therefore, he will not be able to 
tell in which point of his information set he actually is. He will, however, represent 
his uncertainty by a posterior probability distribution on the nodes in this infor-
matión set (his so called beliefs at the information set) and having constructed these 
beliefs, he will take a choice, which maximizes his expected utility with respect to 
these beliefs, assuming that in the remainder of the game the players will play ac-
cording to ~- A sequential equilibrium is then defined as an equilibrium ~ which has 
the property that, if the players behave as indicated above, no player has an incen-
tive to deviate from ~at any of his information sets. To be more precise: a strategy 
combination is a sequential equilibrium if there exist (consistent) beliefs such that 
each player's strategy prescribes at every information set a choice which is optimal 
with respect to these beliefs (see Definition 6.3.1). 




) is a sequential equilibrium. 
No, matter which beliefs player 2 has, it is always optimal for him to play L
2
. 
Note that for an equilibrium to be sequential it is only necessary that it is optimal 
with respect to ~ beliefs, and that it does not have to be optimal with respect to 
all beliefs or even with respect to the most plausible ones. We will return to the 
role of the beliefs in chapter 6, also see KREPS AND WILSON [1982a, 1982b] and 
FUDENBERG AND TIROLE [1981]. 
In SELTEN [1975] a somewhat different approach is followed to eliminate unreasonable 
subgame perfect equilibria. Selten assumes, that there is always a small probability, 
that a player will take a choice by mistake, which has the consequence that every 
choice will be taken with a positive probability. Therefore, in an extensive form 
game with mistakes (a so called perturbed game) every information set will be reached 
with a positive probability, which implies that an equilibrium of such a game will 
prescribe rational behavior at every information set. The assumption that mistakes 
occur only with a.very small probability, leads Selten to define a perfect equilib-
rium as an equilibrium which can be obtained as a limit point of a sequence of equi-
libria of disturbed games in which the mistake probabilities go to zero. Hence, an 
equilibrium is perfect if each player's equilibrium strategy is not only optimal 
against the equilibrium strategies of his opponents, but is also optimal against 
some slight perturbations of these strategies (see Definition 6.4.2). 




) is perfect. Namely, in a 
perturbed game associated with this game,player 1 will take the choices L1 and R1 
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with a positive probability (if only by mistake) and, therefore, the information set 
of player 2 will actually be reached, which forces player 2 to play L
2
. 
It can be proved that every game possesses at least one perfect equilibrium (Theorem 
6.4.4) and that every perfect equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium (see Theorem 
6.4.3). However, not every sequential equilibrium is perfect. To illustrate the dif-
ference between the two concepts, consider the following slight modification of the 
game of figure 1.4.2: Player 1 receives 3 if he plays A, all other payoffs remain as 
in figure 1.4.2. As before, one can see that player 2 has to play L
2
. For player 1, 
both L
1 
and A are best replies against L
2 
and, therefore, in a sequential equilibrium 
player 1 can play any combination of L
1 
and A. The only perfect equilibrium, however, 
is (A,L
2
). The reason is that, if player 1 plays A he is sure of getting 3, whereas 
if he plays L
1 
he can expect only slightly less than 3, since player 2 will with a 
small probability will make a mistake and play R
2
. 
In KREPS AND WILSON [1982a] it is shown that there is not much difference between the 
solutions generated by the sequential equilibrium concept and the solutions generated 
by the perfectness concept. They proved that almost all sequential equilibria are 
perfect (KREPS AND WILSON [1982a] Theorem 3; for a more exact formulation of this 
result, see Theorem 6.4.3). It is, however, much easier to verify that a given equi-
librium is sequential than that it is perfect. 
Two questions concerning the concepts of sequential and perfect equilibria remain to 
be answered: 
(i) Don't we exclude any sensible equilibria by restricting ourselves to sequential 
(resp. perfect) equilibria? 
(ii) Is every sequential (resp. perfect) equilibrium sensible? 
In our view, the first question certainly has to be answered affirmatively for se-
quential equilibria: if an equilibrium is not sequential, then at least one player 
has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium at some of his information sets 
and, therefore, this equilibrium is not self-enforcing. Whether this question should 
be answered affirmatively for perfect equilibria depends on one's personal viewpoint 
of how seriously the possibility of mistakes should be taken. 
The second question, however, has to be answered negatively: many perfect (and, hence, 
sequential) equilibria are not sensible. Loosely speaking this is caused by the fact 
that some sequential (resp. perfect) equilibria are sustained only by implausible 
beliefs (resp. implausible mistake probabilities). Therefore, the equilibrium concept 
has to be refined further in order to yield sensible solutions for every game. In 
chapter 6, we will return to the question of why a perfect equilibrium of an exten-
sive form game need not be sensible and how the equilibrium concept can be refined 
further. 
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l.S. PERFECT EOUILIBRIA AND PROPER EOUILIRRIA 
If we have a game in which each player has to make a choice just once and if, more-
over, the players make their choice simultaneously and independently of each other, 
then we speak of a normal form game. An example of such a game is the prisoners' 
dilemma game of figure 1.1.1. A normal form game can be considered as a special kind 
of extensive form game, but, on the other hand, with each extensive form game, one 
can associate a game in normal form {VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN [1944], KUHN [1953]). 
In the next two sections,it will be shown that also for normal form games it is 
necessary to refine the Nash equilibrium concept in order to obtain sensible solutions 
and in several examples the refinements which have been proposed for this class of 
games will be illustrated. These refinements will be of a slightly different kind 
than the ones we considered for games in extensive form. Namely, for extensive form 
games, the basic reason why one has to refine the equilibrium concept is, that a Nash 
equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. 
In a normal form game, however, every player has to make a choice, so that there are 
no unreached information sets. Yet, we will see that it is necessary to refine the 
equilibrium concept for normal form games, due to the fact that an equilibrium of 
such a game need not be robust. As an example of an equilibrium, which is not robust, 









) is not robust. 








). In our 
view, the latter equilibrium is nota sensible one. This strategy combination satis-
fies Nash's equilibrium condition only since this condition presumes that each player 
will completely ignore all parts of the payoff matrix to which his opponent's strategy 
assigns zero probábility. We feel, however, that a player should not ignore this in-
formation and that he, therefore, should play L. To be sure, if player 2 plays R
2
, 
then player 1 cannot gain by playing L
1
. However, by doing so, he cannot lose either 
and, as a matter of fact, if player 2 by mistake would play L
2
, then player 1 is ac-
tually better off by playing L
1
. Similarly, we have that player 2 can only gain by 
playing L
2




), both players 






is self-destabilizing and, therefore, this equilibrium is not sensible. The only 





If the players have agreed to play this equilibrium, no player has an incentive what-
ever to vialate the agreement. 
If one takes the possibility of the players making mistakes seriously, then, for 
normal form games, one can only consider perfect equilibria as being reasonable. If 
an equilibrium failstobe perfect, it is unstable with respect to small perturbations 
of the equilibrium and, therefore, at least one player will have an incentive to 
deviate from it. 
By restricting oneself to perfect equilibria, however, one may eliminate equilibria 





Figure 1.5.2. A perfect equilibrium may be payoff dominated by a non-perfect one. 













both players the highest payoff. The game of figure 1.5.2 has exactly the same struc-
ture as the game of figure 1. 5.1 (each player can only gain by playing L) and, there-




) is as unstable as it is in the game of 
figure 1.5.1. If the players expect mistakes to occur with a small probability, then 
no player can really expect a payoff 10: the only stable (perfect) equilibrium is 
It was first pointed out in MYERSON [1978] that the perfectness concept does not 
eliminate all intuitively unreasonable equilibria. The game of figure 1.5.3, which 
is a slight modification of the example given by Myerson, can serveto demonstrate 
this. Notice that this game results from the game of figure 1.5.1 by adding for each 
player a strategy A. One might argue that, since A is strictly dominated by both L 
and R, this strategy is strategical·ly irrelevant and that, therefore, the games of 





) is the only reasonable equilibrium of the game of figure 1.5.1, this 
equilibrium is also the unique reasonable equilibrium of the game of figure 1.5.3. 
However, the sets of perfect equilibria do not coincide forthese games: in the 




) is perfect. Namely, if the players 
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) and if each player expects that the mistake A will occur 
with a greater probability than the mistake L, then it is indeed optimal for each 
player to play R. Hence, adding strictly dominated strategies may change the set of 
perfect equilibria. 
1 0 -1 
1 0 -2 
0 0 0 
0 0 -2 
-2 -2 -2 
-1 0 -2 
Figure 1.5.3. A perfect equilibrium need not be reasonable. 
Myerson considers it to be an undesirable property of the perfectness concept, that 
adding strictly dominated strategies may change the set of perfect equilibria and, 
therefore, he introduced a further refinement of the perfectness concept: the proper 
equilibrium (MYERSON [1978], see Definition 2.3.1). The basic idea underlying the 
properness concept is, that a player will make his mistakes in a more or less rational 
way, i.e. that he will make a more costly mistake with a much smaller probability 
than a less costly one, as a consequence of the fact that he will try much harder to 
prevent a more costly one·. 
According to the philosophy of the properness concept, in the game of figure 1.5.3, 
the players should not expect the mistake A to occur with a greater probability than 
the mistake L: since A is strictly dominated by L, each player will try harder to 
prevent the mistake A, than he will try to prevent the mistake L and as a result A 
will occur with a smaller probability than L (in Myerson's view, the probability of 
A willeven be of smaller order than the probability of L (cf. Definition 2.3.1)). 




) is self-destabilizing: each player will prefer 




) is not proper. The only proper equilibrium 









no player has an incentive whatever to deviate from the equilibrium. 
Myerson has shown that every normal form game possesses at least one proper equilib-
rium and that every proper equilibrium is perfect (11YERSON [1978], see Theerem 2.3.3). 
A problem concerning this concept is, that it is not clear that the basic assumption 
underlying it (a more costly mistake is chosen with a probability which is of smaller 
order than the probability of a less costly one) can be justified. Myerson himself 
did not give a justification for this assumption. In the chapters 4 and 5, we will 
investigate whether this assumption can be justified. 
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Figure 1.5.4. Notall proper equilibria are equally robust. 

















) is not perfect: if mistakes might 








) are bath 














long as mistakes occur with a probability smaller than ~' each player is still will-




), then each 
player is willing to keep to the agreement only, if he expects that the mistake R 
will occur with a probability at least as big as the probability of the mistake L. 
In OKADA [1981] a refinement of the perfectness concept, the strictly perfect equi-
librium, is introduced, which is based on the idea that a sensible equilibrium should 
be stable against arbitrary slight perturbations of the equilibrium (see Definition 




) is a strictly 




) is not strictly perfect. At first sight, it does 
not seem to be unreasonable to require that the salution of a game should be a strict-
ly perfect equilibrium. The game of figure 1.5.5, shows that this cannot always be 
required, since there exist games without strictly perfect equilibria. 
1 1 0 
1 0 0 
1 0 1 
1 0 0 
Figure 1.5.5. A game without strictly perfect equilibria. 
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Every strateqy pair in which player 2 plays L
2 
is an equilibrium. None of these equi-
libria is strictly perfect: if player 1 expects that the mistake M
2 
will occur more 
often than the mistake R
2
, he should play L
1
; if he expects this mistake to occur 
with a smaller probability, he should play R
1
. 
We close this section by noting that recently Kalai and Sarnet have introduced another 
refinement of the perfectness concept: the persistent equilibrium (KALAI AND SAMET 
[1982]). This concept will not be considered in this monograph. 
1.6. ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA AND REGULAR EQUILIBRIA 
In the previous section, we considered refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept 
which are based on the idea that a sensible equilibrium should be stable against 
slight perturbations of the equilibrium strategies. One could also argue that a sen-
sible equilibrium should be stable against slight perturbations in the payoffs of 
the game. Namely, one can maintain that these payoffs can be determined only some-
what inaccurately. A refinement of the equilibrium concept, based on this idea is 
the essential equilibrium concept, introduced in WU WEN-TSUN AND JIANGJIA-HE [1962]. An 
equilibrium ~ of a game r is said to be essential, if every game near to r has an 
equilibrium near to ~- Intuitively, it will be clear that an essential equilibrium 
is very stable. This indeed will be proved in chapter 2, where we will, for instance, 
show that every essential equilibrium is strictly perfect. Notice that, therefore, 
not every game possesses an essential equilibrium. Indeed the payoffs in the game 




is the unique 
best reply against L
2 
and, therefore, this game does not have an essential equilibrium. 
Hence, we cannot always require a sensible equilibrium to be essential. Moreover, 
even in games which posses essential equilibria, it is not always true than an essen-
tial equilibrium should be preferred to a non-essential one, as is illustrated by 
the game of figure 1.6.1. 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 2 2 
0 2 2 
0 2 2 
0 2 2 
Figure 1.6.1. An essential equilibrium is not necessarily preferable toa non-essen-
tial one. 
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). However, if each player 





) by both players. Therefore, rational players will indeed agree 
to play some combination of M and R: once such an agreement is reached no player has 
an incentive to deviate. Once again we conclude that a sensible equilibrium need not 
be essential. However, from a theoretical point of view, the essential equilibrium 
concept will prove to be very useful. 
In this chapter, it was forcibly argued, that the salution of a noncooperative game 
has to be self-enforcing and, therefore, a Nash equilibrium. In many examples we have 
however seen that not all Nash equilibria are self-enforcing: there exist equilibria 
at which at least one player has an incentive to deviate. Now suppose we have an 
equilibrium at which no player has an incentive to deviate. Is this equilibrium nec-
essarily self-enforcing? The answer is no: although no player may have an incentive 
to deviate, it may be the case that no player has an incentive to play his equilib-
rium strategy either. This situation occurs for equilibria in mixed strategies as 





Figure 1.6.2. Instability of equilibria in mixed strategies. 
This game has a unique equilibrium, and it is in mixed strategies. The equilibrium 









). The equilibrium yields player 1 a payoff 10/3 and player 2 a payoff 




) , then 
player 1 receives a payoff of 10/3, no matter what he does and, therefore, he can 
shift to any other strategy without penalty. So, what is his incentive to play his 
equilibrium strategy? The same remark applies to player 2: if player 1 plays his 
equilibrium strategy, player 2 receives 5/3 no matter what he does and, therefore, 
he can also shift to any strategy without penalty. 
One could even argue (as is done in AUMANN AND MASCHLER [1972], section 2) that, in 
the game of figure 1.6.2, the players could have an incentive to deviate from their 
equilibrium strategies. Namely, if the equilibrium is played, player 1 receives 10/3, 
which is just the maximin value of this game for player 1, i.e. the payoff which 
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player 1 can guarantee himself. However, the equilibrium strategy of player 1 does 
not guarantee 10/3, it only yields 10/3 if player 2 plays his equilibrium strategy. 





). So, if player 1 knows that he cannot obtain more that 10/3, why should 
not he play his maximin strategy which guarantees 10/3? The same remark applies to 
player 2 and so he also could have an incentive to play his maximin strategy, rather 
than his equilibrium strategy. 
It should be noted that Aumann and Maschler do not know what to recommend in this 
situation, since the maximin strategies are not in equilibrium, but that they prefer 
the maximin strategies (AUMANN AND MASCHLER [1972], section 2). In HARSANYI [1977] 
(especially in section 7.7.) it is argued that the players indeed should play their 
maximin strategies in this game (also see VAN DAMME [1980a]), but Harsanyi has changed 
his position in favour of the equilibrium strategies (HARSANYI AND SELTEN [1980], 
chapter 1). 
From the discussion above it will be clear that the instability of equilibria in 
mixed strategies poses serieus problems. This problem is serious indeed, since many 
games possess only equilibria in mixed strategies. In HARSANYI [1973al it is shown 
that this instability, however, is only a seeming instability. Harsanyi argues that 
in a game a player can never know the payoffs (utilities) of some other player exactl~ 
since these payoffs are subject to random disturbances, due to stochastic fluctuations 
in this player's mood or taste. Therefore, a conflict situation, rather than by an 
ordinary game, is more adequately modelled by a so called disturbed game, i.e. a game 
in which each player, although knowing his own payoffs exactly,knows the payoffs of 
the other players only somewhat inexactly. Harsanyi shows that for such a disturbed 
game every equilibrium is essentially in pure strategies and is, therefore, stable 
(also see Theorem 5.4.2.) • Harsanyi, moreover, shows that almast every equilibrium 
of an ordinary game (whether in pure or in mixed strategies) can be obtained as the 
limit of equilibria of disturbed games, in which the disturbances go to zero, i.e. 
in which each player's information about the other players' payoffs beoomes better 
and better and also for almast all equilibria in mixed strategies the instability 
disappears if we take account of the actual uncertainty each player has about the 
other players' payoffs. Upon acloser investigation (see Theorem 5.6.2) it turns out 
that the equilibria which are stable in this sense are the regular equilibria, which 
have been introduced in HARSANYI [1973b]. A regular equilibrium is defined as an 
equilibrium which has the property that the Jacobian of a certain mapping associated 
with the game evaluated at this equilibrium is nonsingular (see Definition 2.5.1). 
These regular equilibria will play a prominent role in the monograph. It will be 
shown that regular equilibria possess all robustness properties one reasonably can 
expect equilibria to possess: they are perfect, proper and even strictly perfect and 
essential. 
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Unfortunately not all normal form games possess regular equilibria, but it can be 
shown that for almost all normal form games all equilibria are indeed regular 
(Theorem 2.6.2). These results indicate that for generic normal form games there is 
actually little need to refine the Nash equilibrium concept. For extensive form games, 
however, the situation is quite different,as we will see in chapter 6. 
1.7. SUMMARY OF THE FOLLOHING CHAPTERS 
We have seen that, to obtain sensible solutions for noncooperative qames, the Nash 
equilibrium concept has to be refined, both for games in extensive form and for games 
in normal form. In this monograph a systematic study of the refinements of the equilib-
rium concept which have been proposed in the literature is presented and also some 
new refinements are introduced. Our objective is to derive characterizations of these 
refinements, to establish relations between them and to discuss the plausibility of 
the assumptions underlying them. 
In chapter 2, we consider n-person games in normal form. Among the refinements we 
consider for this class there are: perfect equilibria (SELTEN [1975]), proper equi-
libria (MYERSON [1978]), strictlyperfectequilibria (OKADA [1981]) and essential 
equilibria (WU WEN-TSUN AND JIANG JIA-HE [1962]). All these refinements require an 
equilibrium to satisfy some particular robustness condition. It is shown that an 
essential equilibrium is strictly perfect, which means that an equilibrium which is 
stable against slight perturbations in the payoffs of the game is also stable against 
slight perturbations in the equilibrium strategies. It turns out that the concept of 
regular equilibria (HARSANYI [1973b]) is very important, since a regular equilibrium 
possesses all robustness properties one can hope for. Furthermore, it is shown that 
generically all Nash equilibria are regular. 
In chapter 3 we specialize the results of chapter 2 to 2-person games, i.e. matrix 
and bimatrix games. The reiative simplicity of 2-person games enables us to give 
characterizations of various refinements, which elucidate their basic features. For 
instanee, i t is shown that an equilibrium of a bimatrix game is perfect if and only if 
both equilibrium strategies are undominated, a result which implies that verifying 
whether an equilibrium is perfect can be executed by solving a linear programming 
problem. Also several characterizations of regular equilibria are derived. For 
instance, an equilibrium is regular if and only if it is isolated and quasi-strong, 
which implies that all equilibria of a game which is nondegenerate in the sense of 
LEMKE AND HOWSON [1964] are regular. Furthermore, it isshown that an equilibrium of 
a matrix game is proper if and only if both equilibrium strategies are optimal in 
the sense of DRESHER [1961]. 
In chapter 4, we elaborate the idea that the reason that the players make mistakes 
lies in the fact that it is too costly to prevent them. The basic idea is that a 
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player can reduce the probability of making mistakes by being extra careful, but that 
being extra careful requires an effort which involves some costs. This conception is 
modelled by means of a so called game with control costs, i.e. a game in which 
each player, in addition to receiving his ordinary payoff, incurs costsdepending on 
how well he wants to control hi's strategy. The control costs in an ordinary game are 
infinitesimally and, therefore, we view an ordinary game as a limiting case of a game 
with control costs, and we investigate which equilibria of an ordinary game can be 
approximated by equilibria of games with control costs, as these costs goto zero. 
It turns out that the basic assumption underlying the properness concept cannot be 
justified if control costs are incorporated in the model and that only very specific 
control costs will force the players to play a perfect equilibrium. 
In chapter 5, it is investigated how the strategy choice of a player is influenced 
by slight uncertainty about the payoffs of his opponents. Following HARSANYI [1973a], 
we model the situation in which each player knows the payoffs of his opponents only 
somewhat imprecisely by a so called disturbed game, i.e. a game in which there are 
random fluctuations in the payoffs. An ordinary game is viewed as a limiting case of 
a disturbed game, and it is investigated which equilibria of an ordinary game can 
be approximated by equilibria of disturbed games, as the disturbances go to zero, 
i.e. if the information each player has about the other players' payoffs becomes 
better and better. Such equilibria are called stable equilibria and it is shown that, 
if disturbances occur only with a small probability, every stable equilibrium is 
nerfect. Moreover, if the disturbances have an additional property, then every stable 
equilibrium is weakly proper, which shows that the assumption that a considerably 
more costly mistake occurs with an order smaller probability can be justified. 
In chapter 6, extensive form games are considered. We study the relation between 
sequential equilibria (KREPS AND WILSON [1982a]) and perfect equilibria (SELTEN 
[1975]), as wellas the difference between perfectnessin the extensive form and 
perfectness in the normal form. Furthermore, it is shown that a proper equilibrium 
of the normal form of a game induces a sequential equilibrium in the extensive form 
of this game. Several examples in this chapter illustrate that all refinements of 
the Nash equilibrium concept which have been proposed for extensive form games still 
do not exclude many intuitively unreasonable equilibria. 
1.8. NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
This introductory chapter is concluded with a number of notations and conventions. 
As usual ~ denotes thesetof the positive integers {1,2, ... } (positive will always 
mean strictly greater than 0). When dealing with an n-person game we will frequently 
write N for {1, ... ,n}. 
ffi denotes the set of real numbers and ffim is the m dimensional Euclidean space. For 
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m 
x,y E ~ , we write x s y if xi s yi for all i. Furthermore, x < y means xi < yi for 
all i. we wri te ~m+ for the set of all x E ~m which satisfy 0 s x and ~m for the 
++ 
set of all x E ~m for which 0 < x. Euclidean distance on ~m is denoted by p and À 
denotes Lebesgue measures on ~m 
Thesetof all mappings from A toB is denoted by F(A,B). If f E F(~:+'~~), then 
"y is a limit point of a sequence { f (x) } x+o" is used as an abbreviation for "there 
exists a sequence {x(t)}tE~ such that x(t) converges to 0 and f(xt) converges to 
y as t tends to inf in i ty" . 
If A is a subset of some Euclidean space, then conv A denotes i ts convex hull and 2A 
denotes the powerset of this set. 
Let A and B be subsets of Euclidean spaces. A correspondence from A to B is an element 
of F(A,2B). The correspondence F from A toB is said to be upper semi-continuous if 
it has a closed graph, i.e. if {(x,F(x)); x E A} is closed. 
The number of elements of a fini te set A is denoted by I A I. If A is fini te, and 
f E F(A,~) then f (A) := ï f(a). 
aEA 
Indices can occur as subscripts or superscripts. Lower indices usually refer to 
players. Upper indices usually stem from a certain numbering. For instance, when 
k 
dealing with an n-person normal form game,we write si for the probability which the 
mixed strategy si of player i assigns to the kth pure strategy of this player. To 
avoid misunderstandings between exponents and 
power between brackets. Hence, (s~) 2 denotes 
~ 
indices,we will write the basis of a 
the square of s~. 
~ 
Definitions are indicated by using italics. The symbol := is used to define quantities. 
The symbol D denotes the end of a proof. 
For more specific notation concerning normal form games, we refer to section 2.1. 




GAMES IN NOID4AL FORM 
For normal farm games the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined, since a Nash 
equilibrium of such games need nat be robust, i.e. may be unstable against small 
perturbations in the data of the game. In this chapter, we will consider various 
refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for this class of games, all of which 
require an equilibrium to satisfy some particular robustness condition. 
In section 2.2, perfect equilibria (SELTEN [1975]) are considered. These are equi-
libria which are stable against some slight perturbations in the equilibrium strat-
egies. It is shown that every normal farm game possesses at least one perfect equi-
librium and several properties of such equilibrium are derived. In this section also 
strictly perfect equilibria (OKADA [1981]), i.e. equilibria which are stable against 
arbitrary slight perturbations in the equilibrium strategies, are considered. 
In section 2.3, the concepts of proper equilibria (MYERSON [1978]) and weaklv proper 
equilibria are studied. These concepts require an equilibrium to be stable against 
perturbations of the equilibrium strategies which are more or less rational, i.e. 
which assign the preponderance of weight to the better strategies. Bath concepts are 
refinements of the perfectness concept. Furthermore, the concept of strictly proper 
equilibria is introduced. This concept is a refinement of the strict perfectness 
concept. 
In section 2.4, we consider essential equilibria (WU WEN-TSUN AND JIANG JIA-HE [1962]), 
i.e. equilibria which are stable against arbitrary slight perturbations in the payoffs 
of the game and we show that every essential equilibrium is strictly perfect. 
Insection 2.5, the concept of regular equilibria (HARSANYI [1973b]) is introduced and 
it is shown that every regular equilbrium possesses all robustness properties one 
possibly could hope for. 
The main result of section 2.6 states that for almast all normal farm games all equi-
libria are regular, which means that for "nondegenerate" normal farm games all equi-
libria possess all robustness properties one can hope for. 
This chapter is based upon the references mentioned above and on VAN DAMME [1981c]. 
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2.1. PRELIMINARIES 
A finite n-person normal form game is a 2n-tuple r = (~ , ... ,~ ,R , ... ,R J, where ~. 
n 1 n 1 n l 
is a fini te nonempty set and R. is a mapping R. .ll ~. ->- lR, for i E N (={1, ... ,n}). 
l l ]=1 J 
The set ~i is the set of pure stra·tegies of player i and Ri is the payoff funct?:on 
of this player. 
Usually, we will just speak of a normal farm game, rather than of a finite normal 
farm game, Next, let us introduce the notation and terminology which will be used 
throughout the chapters 2-5 with respecttothese games. Let r = (~ 1 •... ,~n'R1 , ... Rn) 
be fixed. We write: 
(2. 1. 1) m. 
l 





* 1T m. m m. l 
i=1 
l 
A generic element of ~. will be denoted by ~·. We assume that the elements of ~. are 
l l th l 
numbered and, consequently, we will speak about the k pure strategy of player i. 
Therefore, and even more aften, a generic element of ~i will also be denoted by k. 
A mixed strategy si of player i is a probability distribution on ~i. We denote the 
probability which sl. assigns to the pure strategy k of player i by sk and write S. 
l l 
for the set of all mixed strategies of player i, hence 
(2 .1. 2) s. 
l 
{ s . E F ( ~ . ' lR) 
l l 
1, sk 2 0 for all k E ~. }. 
l l 
If s. E s. , then C ( s. ) denotes the CarP?:er of s. , i.e. 
l l l l 
(2. 1. 3) C(s.) 
l 
{k E ~.; sk > 0}. 
l l 
si is said to be completely mixed if C(si) =~i. The pure strategy kof player i is 
identified with the mixed strategy which assigns probability 1 to k. 
We define the sets ~ and S by: 
n 






~ (resp. S) is the set of pure (resp. mixed) strategy combinations of r. A generic 
element of ~ (resp. S) is denoted by ~ (resp. s). In a normal form game, the players 
make their choices independently of each other, therefore, the probability s(~) that 
~ = (k
1
, ... ,kn) occurs if s = (s
1













(2 .1.6) C(s) := {cp; s (cp) > O} 
and s is said to be completely mixed, if C(s) = ~-
If s is played, the expected payoff Ri (s) for player i is given by: 




, ... ,sn) ES and let s. ES .. We denote by s/ s. (or simply by s/s.) that 
l l i l l 
strategy combination which results from s by replacing the strategy si of player i 







, ... ,sn). We say that si is a best reply of player i against s if 
(2 .1.8) R. (s/s. l 
~ ~ 
max R. (s/s~) 
sI ES l l 
i i 
The set of all pure best replies of player i against s (i.e. the best replies of 
player i which are in ~i) is denoted by Bi (s). It is easily seen, that si is a best 
reply against s if and only if we have 
(2 .1. 9) if R. (s/k) < R. (sjJè), then s~ 
~ i ~ ~ ~ 
0 for all k,Jè E ~i' 
which is equivalent to 
(2 .1. 10) c (s. l c B. (s) 
~ ~ 
Hence, si is a best reply of player iagainst s if and only if si assigns a positive 
probability only to the pure best replies of player i against s. 
In this monograph,the expression R. (s/k) will occur only with i 
~ J 
j (and, hence, with 
k E ~.) and, therefore, we can simplify our notation by writing R. (s/k) forR. (s/k). 
l l l i 
Let s,s E S. We say that s is a best reply against s if si is a best reply against s 
for all i, and we denote the set of all pure best replies against s by B(s), hence 
n 
(2.1.11) B(s) :=TI B. (s) 
~=1 l 
A strategy combination s is a Nash equilibrium (NASH [ 1950, 1951]) of r, if s is a 
best reply against itself. It follows from (2.1.10) that s is a Nash equilibrium if 
and only if 
(2.1.12) C(s) c B(s) . 
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Usually, we will speak of equilibria instead of Nash equilibria. We denote the set 
of equilibria of r by E(f). Nash has shown that every finite normal form game pos-
sesses at least one equilibrium (NASH [ 1950, 1951]). 
Formula (2.1.12) expresses that in an equilibrium each player only uses best replies. 
By requiring that each player should use all his best replies, a refinement of the 
Nash equilibrium concept the so called quasi-strong equilibrium (HARSANYI [ 1973a]). 
is obtained. Hence, formally a quasi-strong equilibrium is defined as a strategy 
combination s whichsatisfies C(s) = B(s). Insection 3.4 (figure 3.4.1), we show 
that not every game possesses a quasi-strong equilibrium. The game of figure 2.1.1 
illustrates another drawback of the quasi-strongness concept: a quasi-strong equi-
librium may be unreasonable: 
2 
2 
Figure 2.1.1 A quasi-strong equilibrium need nat be reasonable (the rows represent 
player l's choices, the columns those of player 2, in each cell the 
upper leftentry is the payoff to player 1, while the lower right entry 
is the payoff to player 2) . 






}. All equilibria are quasi-
strong, except for (1, 1), but this latter equilibrium is the most stable one, since 
the first strategy of player 1 dominates all his other strategies. 
In HARSANYI [ 1973a] the concept of quasi-strong equilibria is introducedas a gener-
alization of the concept of strong equilibria. A strong equilibrium
1
) is a strategy 
combination s which is the only best reply against itself, i.e. it satisfies { s} = B (s) . 
Hence, a strong equilibrium is a quasi-strong equilibrium in pure strategies. This 
nomenclature might give the impression that quasi-strong equilibria possess similar 
properties as strong equilibria. This, however, is nat true. As one can expect, strong 
equilibria possess all nice properties one can hope for, but, as the example in this 
section shows, quasi-strong equilibria need nat be nice at all. In this chapter, it 
will be shown that regular equilibria (section 2.5) possess similar robustness prop-
erties as strong equilibria. 
1) This notion of strong equilibrium is different from the notion of strong equilib-
rium as it occurs in AUMANN [ 1959]. 
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Let G(~ 1 , ... ,~n) be thesetof all games r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R1 , .•. ,Rn), with pure strate-
gy spaces ~ 1 , ... ,~n· For r c G(~ 1 , ... ,~n), let ri be the collection of all payoffs 
player i can get in r, i.e. 
(2.1.13) r. 
~ 
qJ E ~} • 
m* 
We càn view r i as an element of lR where m * = I~ I. Therefore r i is called the payoff 
vector of player i in r. The payoff vector of the game r is the vector 
(2.1.14) r E lR 
* nm 
Hence, by imposing a fixed ordering on ~. we obtain a one-to-one correspondence be-
nm * 
tween G(~1 , ... ,~n) and lR . We will denote the game rE G(~1 , •.. ,~n)which corresponds 
tor E lRnm* by f(r). So we can view G(~ , ... ,~) as an nm*-dimensional Euclidian 
1 n 
space and we can speak about the distance p(f,f') between two games (we just write 
p(f(r), f(r')) p(r, r')) and about the Lebesgue measure of a set of games. LetS 
be a statement about normal farm games. We say that Sis true for almost all games, 
if for any n c N and any n-tuple of finite nonempty sets ~ 1 , ... ,~n' we have that 
(2.1.15) 0, i.e. 
that the Lebesgue measure of the closure of the set of games, for which S is false, 
is zero. Notice that, if Sis true for almast all games, then for any n-tuple 
~1 , ..• ,~n' thesetof games in G(~1 , ... ,~n), for which Sis true contains an open 
and everywhere dense set (and, hence, the subset for which Sis false is nowhere 
dense) . 
In this monograph, we are mainly interested in finite normal farm games, however, at 
some instances such games will be approximated by infinite normal farm games. An 
infinite normal farm game is a 2n-tuple f = (s
1
, ... ,S ,R
1
, ... ,R), where S.is an 
m n n 1 
infinite set and R. is a mapping S ..,. lR, for i E N, where S denotes .ll S .• We will 
~ ~=1 ~ 
only be dealing with concave infinite games, i.e. infinite games which satisfy the 
conditions of Theorem 2.1.1 below. In such games, there is noneed for the players 
to randomize and, consequently, an equilibrium of such a game is a strategy combina-
tion s ES which is a best reply against itself. We denote thesetof equilibria of 
f by E(f). Rosen has proved the following generalization of Nash's theorem on the 
existence of equilibria: 




, ... ,Rn) be an infinite n-person 
normal farm game such that the following 3 conditions are satisfied for each i E N: 
- 27 -
i) S. is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of some finite dimensional Euclidian 
l 
space, 
ii) the mapping Ri is continuous, and 
iii) for fixed s E S, the mapping si~ R. (s/s~) 
l l 
Then f possesses at least one equilibrium. 
2.2 PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
is concave. 
In chapter 1 we saw that, to obtain sensible solutions for every game, the Nash equi-
librium concept has to be refined. In this section we will consider one such refine-
ment, the perfect equilibrium, which has been introduced in SELTEN [1975] . It will be 
provedthat every normal form game possesses at least one perfect equilibrium and some 
properties of such equilibria will be derived. 
The basic idea behind the perfectness concept is, that each player with a small proba-
bility makes mistakes, which has the consequence that every pure strategy is chosen 
with a positive (although possibly small) probability. Mathematically, this idea is 
modelled via a perturbed game, i.e. a game in which each player is only allowed to 
use completely mixed strategies. 
DEFINITION 2.2.1. Let f = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R1 , ... ,Rn) be an n-person normal form game. For 
i E N, let ni and Si (ni) be defined by: 
(2. 2.1) f(cp. 'JR) 
k 
all and I k 1 ' n. E with n. > 0 for k E <P. ni < l l l l k 
s. (n. l { s. 
k k 
for all ~ } E s.; s ? ni k c l l l l i l 
(2. 2. 2) 
n 
Furthermore, let n = (n
1
, ... ,nn) and S(n) = ig
1 
si (ni). The perturbed game (f,n) is 




) , ... ,Sn(nn) ,R
1
, ... Rn). 
It is easily seen that a perturbed game (f,n) satisfies the conditions of Theorem 
2.1.1 and so such a game possesses at least one equilibrium. It is clear that in 
such an equilibrium a pure strategy which is not a best reply has to be chosen with 
a minimum probabili ty. Therefore, 'tie have ( cf. ( 2. 1 . 9) ) . 
LEMMA 2.2.2. A strategy combination s E S(n) is an equilibrium of (f,n) if and only 
if the following condition is satisfied: 
(2. 2. 3) if R. (s/k) 
l 






for all i,k,L 
The fact that rational players make mistakes only with a very small probability, 
motivates the following definition: 
DEFINITION 2.2.3. Let r be a normal form game. An equilibrium s of r is a perfect 
equilibrium of r, if sis a limit point of a sequence {s(n)}n+o' with s(nl E E(f,nl 
for all n, i.e. sis perfect if there exist sequences {s(t)} and {n(t)} 
tEID tEN 
with s(t) E E(f(n,t)) for all t E N, and such that s(t) converges tos and n(t) con-
verges to zero, as t tends to infinity. 
Note that for an equilibrium s of r to be perfect it is sufficient that some perturbed 
games (f,n) with n close to zero possess an equilibrium close to s and that it is 
not required that all perturbed games (f,n) with n close to zero possess an equilib-
rium close to s. Hence, requiring that an equilibrium is perfect is a weak requirement 
and, consequently, if an equilibrium fails to be perfect, it is very unstable. 
Let {(f,n(t))} beasequence of perturbed games, for which n(t) converges to zero, 
tEN 
ast tends to infinity. Since every game (f,n(t)) possesses at least one equilibrium 
s(t), and since each s(t) is an element of the compact setS, there exists at least 
one limit point of {s(t) }t~· It easily follows from (2.2.2) that such a limit point 
is, in fact, an equilibrium of f. Hence, we have proved: 
THEOREM 2.2.4. (SELTEN [1975]). Every normal farm game possesses at least one perfect 
equilibrium. 
By consictering the game of figure 1.5.1, it is seen that notevery Nash equilibrium is 




) of that game is not perfect), and so 
we have that the perfectness concept is a strict refinement of the Nash equilibrium 
concept. 
Next, two characterizations of perfect equilibria will be derived. One of these charac-
terizations uses the concept of s-perfect equilibria, which has been introduced in 




, ... ,Rn) be a normal form game and let s > 0. 
A strategy combination s E S is an e-perfect equilibrium of r, if it is completely 
mixed and satisfies: 
(2. 2 .4) if R. (s/k) 
~ 
for all i,k,t. 
An e-perfect equilibrium of r need not be an equilibrium of r, but if s is small, 
then an s-perfect equilibrium is close to an equilibrium (Theorem 2.2.5). An s-perfect 
equilibrium is another way of rnadelling the idea that rational players make mistakes 
(choose non-optimal strategies) only with a small probability (viz. a probability of 
at most s) and, therefore, one expects that an equilibrium is perfect if and only if 
it is a limit point of s-perfect equilibria. In Theorem 2.2.5 we prove that this is 
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indeed the case. The second characterization of perfect equilibria given in Theorem 
2.2.5 has first been obtained in SELTEN [ 1975]. This characterization is the most 
advantageous one from the viewpoint of mathematical simplicity. 
THEOREM 2.2.5. Let f = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R1 , ... ,Rn) be an n-person normal farm game and let 
s E S. The following assertions are equivalent: 
(i) sis a perfect equilibrium of r, 
(ii) s is a limit point of a sequence {s(E) }E+o' where s(E) is an E-perfect equilib-
rium of f, for all E, and 
(iii) s is a limit point of a sequence {s(E) }E+o of completely mixed strategy combi-
nations, with the property that sis a best reply against every element s(E) 
in this sequence. 
PROOF. (i) ->- (ii). Let s be a limit point of a sequence {s(n)} , with s( 11 ) E E(r, 11 ) 
n+o 
for all 11. Define E(ll) 








Then s(ll) is an c(n)-perfect equilibrium of r, which establishes (ii). 
(ii) ~ (iii). Let {s(E) }E+o be as in (ii) and, withoutlossof generality, assume 
s(c) converges tos, as E tends to zero. It immediately follows from (2.2.4) that 
every element of C(s) is a best reply against s(E) if E is sufficiently small. There-
fore, s is a best reply against s(E), if E is sufficiently small. 
(iii) ->-(i). Let {s(E) }E+o be as in (iii) and withoutlossof generality assume that 
s is the unique limit of this sequence. Define 1l ( E) E JR:+ by: 
(2 .2. 5) if k i C(s.) l 
otherwise 
for all i,k. 
Then ll(E) converges to zero, as E tends to zero and so, for sufficiently small E, 
the perturbed game (f,n(E)) is well-defined. For E sufficiently small we have that 
s(E) S(ll(E)) and it follows from (2.2.3) that in this case s(E) is actually an 
equilibrium of (f,ll(E)). 
In the examples of section 1.5 we saw that the equilibria in dominated strategies 
were eliminated by the perfectness concept. For a normal farm game 
r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R 1 , ... ,Rn) we say that the strategy si of player i is dominated by 
the strategy s~ if 
(2 .2 .6) 
R. (s/s~) <: R. (s/s'.') 
l l l l 
for all sE s, and 
R. (s/s~) < R. (s/s~') for some s E S. 
l l l l 
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0 
Notice that, to check whether s: is dominated by s'.', it is sufficient to check whether 
l l 
(2.2.6) is satisfied for all ~ E ~. rather than for all s c s. We say that si is 
strictZy dominated by si if all inequalities in (2.2.6) are strict, and we say that 
s ~ is undominated, if there is no strategy s '.', which dominates it. Finally, we say 
l l 
that a strategy combination s E S is undominated if every component si of s is un-
dominated. 
It easily follows from the characterization of perfect equilibria given in Theorem 
2.2.5 (ii), that we have: 
COROLLARY 2.2.6. Every perfect equilibrium is undominated. 
The reader might wonder whether the converse of this Corollary is true, i.e. whether 
an undominated equilibrium is perfect. We will prove that this is indeed correct for 
2-person normal form games (Theorem 3.2.2). For games with more than 2 players, how-
ever, the converse is not true, as the game of figure 2.2.1 shows. 
2 2 
1 1 0 
1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
1 0 0 
2 1 0 2 0 
1 1 I 0 0 
I 
Figure 2.2.1. An undominated equilibrium is not necessarily perfect. (player 1 chooses 
a row, player 2 a column and player 3 a matrix; in each cell the upper 
leftentry is the payoff to player 1, the entry in the middle the payoff 
to player 2, etc.). 
The strategy combination (2,1,1) is an undominated equilibrium of this game, which 
is not perfect. The only perfect equilibrium of this game is (1,1,1). 
We close this section by giving the definition of a strictly perfect equilibrium. 
This concept has been introduced in OKADA [1981]. 
DEFINITION 2.2.7. ·Let r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R1 , ... ,Rn) be an n-person normal form game. For 
fi E lR:+' let Ufi := {n E lR:+; 11 < fi}. s is a strictly perfect equilibrium of r if 
there exists some 11 E lRm and for each ncu" some s(n) E E(f,n) such that ++ ,, 
lim s(n) = s. 
n+o 
Obviously, each strictly perfect equilibrium is perfect, but, as we have seen in 
section 1.5, there exist games without strictly perfect equilibria. In the next 
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section we will consider another refinement of the perfectness concept: the properness 
concept. Contrary to the strict perfectness concept, this concept generates a nonempty 
set of solutions for every normal form game. 
2.3. PROPER EQUILIBRIA 
In chapter 1 (particularly insection 1.5), we saw that a perfect equilibrium may be 
unreasonable. In order to exclude these unreasonable perfect equilibria, Myerson has 
introduced arefinement of the perfectness concept: the proper equilibrium (MYERSON 
[ 1978]). In this section we will consider this concept, as well as the closely re-
lated conceptsof weakly proper equilibria and strictly proper equilibria. 
The basic idea underlying the properness concept is that a player, although making 
mistakes, will try much harder to prevent the more costly mistakes than he will try 
to prevent the less costly ones, i.e. that there is some sort of rationality in the 
mechanism of making mistakes. As a result of this a more costly mistake will (in 
Myerson's view) occur with a probability which is of smaller order than the proba-
bility of a less costly one. The formal definition of a proper equilibrium is in the 
same spirit as the characterization of perfect equilibria given in Theorem 2.2.5 (ii): 
DEFINITION 2.3.1. Let r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R 1 , ... Rn) be an n-person normal form game, let 
f: E JR++ and s(E:) ES. We say that s(E:) is an E-proper equilibriwn of rif s(E:) is 
completely mixed and satisfies: 
(2 0 3 0 1) if R. (s(E)/k) < R. (s(E)/9.), then s~(E:) s: 
~ ~ ~ 
E:S~(E) for all i,k,Q.. 
~ 
sE Sis a proper equilibriwn of r, if sis a limit point of a sequence {s(E:)}E:io' 
where s(E:) is an E-proper equilibrium of r. 
Notice that, if s is a proper equilibrium of L then for every f: > 0 there exists some 
E-proper equilibrium of r such that actually s = lim s(E:), due tothefact that an 
E:iO 
E-proper equilibrium is E:'-proper for E' ~ E. Furthermore, it is clear that a proper 
equilibrium is perfect, since an E-proper equilibrium is E:-perfect, and from the 
proof of Theorem 2.2.5. we deduce: 
LEMMA 2.3 • .2. Lets be a proper equilibrium of a normal form gamerand for E > 0, 
let s(E:) be an E-proper equilibrium of r, such that lim s(E:) = s. Then sis a best 
Eio 
reply against s(E:) for all E which are sufficiently close to zero. 
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By consictering the game of figure 1.5.3, we see that the properness concept is a 




) is a perfect equilibrium 
of this game, which is not proper). Obviously we would like that a refinement of the 
Nash equilibrium concept generates a nonempty set of solutions for every normal form 
game. It will now be shown (as in MYERSON [1978]) that this is indeed the case for 
the properness concept. 
THEOREM 2.3.3. (MYERSON [1978)). Every normal form game possesses at least one proper 
equilibrium. 
PROOF. Let f = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R 1 , ••. ,Rn) be a normal form game. It suffices to show 
that, for E > 0 sufficiently close to zero, there exists an E-proper equilibrium of 
r. Let E E (0' 1). For i E N, de fine ll. 
l 




for all k ~ .. ll. E 
l ilii l 
Furthermore, let n, S. (n.) and S(ll) be as in Definition 2.2.1. For i c N, define the 
l l 
correspondence F. from S(n) tos. (ll.) by: 
l l l 
F. (s) 
l 
{er. E s. (n.) if R. (s/k) 
l 
< R. (s/1), then er~ s 1 sa i, for all k,1}. 
l l l l l 
Then Fi (s) 7 0, for all s E S(ll). Namely, let s E S(ll) and define 
v(s,k) 1{1 E ~.; R. (s/k) < R. (s/1)}1 





for k E ~i' and 
for k E <!>., 
l 
Th en er i E F i ( s) . Furthermore, we have that F i ( s) is a closed and convex set, for 




, •.. ,Fn). Then F satisfies the conditions of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theerem 
(KAKUTANI [ 1941 )) and, therefore F has a fixed point. Since every fixed point of F 
is an E-proper equilibrium of r, the proof is complete. 0 
One of Myerson's m~tives for introducing the properness concept is, that the perfect-
ness concept has the drawback, that adding strictly dominated strategies may enlarge 
thesetof perfect equilibria. By means of the game of figure 2.3.1. we show that the 
properness concept suffers from the same drawback. In this game the second strategy 
of players 3 is strictly dominated and, therefore, one could consider this strategy 
as being strategically irrelevant. If one holds this view, then one can consider only 
(1,1,1) as being reasonable, since it is the unique perfect (proper) equilibrium of 
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the game in which player 3 is restricted to his firststrategy. However, this equilib-
rium is nat the only proper equilibrium of the game of figure 2.3.1: also (2,2,1) is 
a proper equilibrium. 
2 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 1 




Figure 2.3.1. Adding strictly dominated strategies may enlarge the set of the proper 
equilibria. 
Another aspect of proper equilibria which the reader might consider as being undesir-
able is, that the properness concept requires a more costly mistake to be chosen with 
a probability which is of smaller order than the probability of a less costly mistake, 
even if this mistake is only a little bit more costly. Let us, therefore, introduce 
the concept of weakly proper equilibria. This concept requires only, that a consider-
ably more costly mistake should be chosen with a probability which is of smaller 
order. Formally, we define: 
DEFINITION 2.3.4. Let r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R 1 , ... ,Rn) be an n-person normal farm game and 
let s E s. We say that s is a weakly proper equilibrium of r, if there exists a 
sequence {s(E) }E~o of completely mixed strategy combinations with limit s, such that 
s is a best reply against every element in this sequence and such that 
(2. 3. 2) if R. (s/k) < R. (s/1), then sk(E) 
l l l 
for all i,k,1,E . 
From the characterization of perfect equilibria given in Theorem 2.2.5 (iii), it is 
clear that every weakly proper equilibrium is perfect. The weakly properness concept 





) of the game of figure 1.5.3. is nat weakly proper. Furthermore, it is clear 
from lemma 2.3.2 that every proper equilibrium is weakly proper. By means of the 
game of figure 2.3.3, we show that a weakly proper equilibrium is not necessarily 
proper. The unique proper equilibrium of this game is (1,1), since accordinq to this 
concept player 2 chooses his third strategy with an order smaller probability than 
his second one. According to the weakly properness concept, player 2 does nat have 
to choose his third strategy with a much smaller probability than his second one, 
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since the third strategy is only a little bit worse (player 1 chooses his third 
strategy only with small probability). Consequently also the equilibrium (2,1) is 
weakly proper. 
2 3 
2 1 1 
2 1 1 
2 0 3 
2 
2 1 1 
0 0 0 
3 
2 1 0 
Figure 2.3.2. A weakly proper equilibrium need nat be proper. 
From the above discussion, it follows that we have: 
THEOREM 2.3.5. Every proper equilibrium is weakly proper and every weakly proper 
equilibrium is perfect. Both inclusions may be strict. 
Furthermore, we have: 
THEOREM 2.3.6. Every strictly perfect equilibrium is weakly proper. 





, ... ,Rn). For E > 0, define Jl(E) by 
V, (k) 
l 
{9, E <P.; R,(s/k) ~ 
l l 
(s) vi (k) 
R. (s/ 9.) } 
l 
for i f N, k E <!>,. 
l 
If Eis small, n(s) is close to zero, which implies that(f,Jl(E)) has an equilibrium 
s(s) which is close to s. It follows from (2.2.3) that s(s) satisfies (2.3.2) and 
that sis a best reply against s(s) if t.. is sufficiently small. Hence, sis a weakly 
proper equilibrium. 
The reader might conjecture that every strictly perfect equilibrium is even proper. 
In trying to prove this conjecture, the author has run into difficulties, caused by 
the fact that the correspondence ll ~ E(f,n) may (possibly) be ill-behaved in the 
0 
neighborhood of ll = 0. To circumvent these difficulties, we will introduce a refine-
ment of the strictly perfectness concept, the strict properness concept and we will 
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prove that every strictly proper equilibrium is proper. 
DEFINITION 2.3.7. Let f = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R 1 , ... ,Rn) be a normal form game. For n f m:+' 
let Un be as in Definition 2.2.7. sis a strictly proper equilibrium of f, if there 
exists some n r m:+ and for each n E Un some s(n) E E(f,n) such that the mapping 
n-+ s(n) is continuous and satisfies lim s(n) = s. 
n+o 
Clearly, every strictly proper equilibrium is strictly perfect, but the author does 
not know whether the converse is also true. We will now show, that the strict proper-
ness concept is indeed a refinement of the properness concept: 
THEOREM 2.3.8. Every strictly proper equilibrium is proper. 
PROOF. Let r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n,R1 , .•. ,Rn) be an n-person normal form game and assume sis 
a strictly proper equilibrium of f. Let n and s (n) (for n E Un) be as in Definition 
2.3.7. Let E and V be given by: 
0 < E < min { 1 , min n ~} 
i,k ~ 
' V 




F(s) {n c V; if R. (s/k) < R. (s/9.), then n~ .Q. <; En. 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
for all i,k}, 
for all i,k,O. 
As in the proof of Theorem 2.3.2, one can show that F(s) is a nonempty, compact and 
convex set, for every s E S, and that F is upper semi-continuous. Define the corre-
spondenee G from V to V by G(n) = F(s(n)), where s(n) E E(f,n) is as in Definition 
2.3.7. Then G satisfies the conditions of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem (KAKUTANI 
[ 1941 ]l and, therefore, G possesses a fixed point. Let n(E) be such a fixed point 
and write s(E) for s(n(E)). We have 
(2. 3. 3) if R, (s(E)/k) < R. (s(E)/.Q.), then ll~(E) 
~ ~ ~ 
for all, i, k, .Q.. 
Since s(E) is an equilibrium of (f,n(E)) we, moreover, have 
(2. 3. 4) for all i,.Q., and 
(2 .3. 5) if R, (s (E) /k) < R. (s (E) j.Q.), then l (E) 
~ ~ ~ 
11~ (E) 
l 
for all i,k,.Q.. 
Hence, by combining the formulae (2.3.3) - (2.3.5), we see that s(E) is an E-proper 
equilibrium of r. Since E can bechosen arbitrarily smalland since s(E) is close to 
s if E is close to zero, we have that s is a proper equilibrium of r. D 
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2.4. ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 
In the previous sections of this chapter, we considered refinements of the Nash equi-
librium concept which are based on the idea that a reasonable equilibrium should be 
stable against slight perturbations in the equilibrium strategies. In this section, 
we will consider a refinement of the equilibrium concept, the essential equilibrium 
concept,which is basedon the idea that a reasonable equilibrium should be stable 
against slight perturbations in the payoffs of the game. The concept of essential 
equilibria has been introduced in WU WEN-TSÜN AND JIANG JIA-HE [ 1962]. The main re-
sult proved in this section is, that every essential equilibrium is strictly perfect. 
DEFINITION 2.4.1. Let r be an n-person normal form game. An equilibrium s of r is an 
essential equilibrium of r, if for every E > 0 there exists some ö > 0, such that 
for every game r• with P(f,f') < ö there exists some s' E E(f') with P(s,s') < E. 
In chapter 1, we have already seen that there exist James without essential equilib-
ria (the game of figure 1.5.5. is such a game). Wu Wen-Tsün and Jiang Jia-he, however, 
showed that such games are more or less exceptional. They proved: 
THEOREM 2.4.2. (WU WEN-TSÜN AND JIANG JIA HE [ 1962], Theorems A and B). 
(i) For any n-tuple ~ 1 , ... ,~n of finite sets, thesetof games in G(~ 1 , ... ,~n), for 
which all equilibria are essential, is open and densein G(~ 1 , ...• ~n). 
(ii) If a game has finitely many equilibria, then it has at least one essential equi-
librium. 
The proof of Theorem 2.4.2, given by Wu Wen-Tsün and Jiang Jia-He, is basedon the 
theory of essential fixed points for continuous mappings (cf. FORT [ 1950]). For the 
special case of a bimatrix game a different proof of Theorem 2.4.2, only using game 
theoretic arguments, was given in JANSEN [ 1981b]. Jansen's proof of part (ii) of the 
theorem can easily be generalized to the n-person case, but his proof of the first 
part essentially uses the 2-person character of the game. In section 6 of this chap-
ter, we will prove a slightly stronger assertion than the one of Theorem 2.4.2. (i), 
by using properties of regular equilibria. 
In the remainder of this section, it is proved that stability against perturbations 
in payoffs implies stability against perturbations in strategies: 
THEOREM 2.4.3. Every essential equilibrium is strictly perfect. 
PROOF. Let r ~ (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R1 , ... ,Rn) be an n-person normal form game and assume s 
is an essential equilibrium of r. Let n ~ (n
1
, ... ,nn) be such that (2.2.1) is satis-
fied. We will construct a normal form game rn whose equilibria induce equilibria in 
(f,n). If n is small, rn will be close to zero and therefore rTl has an equilibrium 
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close to s. In this case, the equilibrium induced in (f,n) will also be closetos 
and this will establish the proof. 
It will be convenient to denote a generic element of ~i by ~i rather than by k. If 
si E Si, then we write si (~i) for the probability which si assigns to ~i· We also 
write ni (~i) for the minimum probability of ~i in the perturbed game (f,n). For i 
and s. E S., define À. E (0,1) and s. * n. by 
1 l l l l 
À. 
l 
and s. * n. 
l l 
( 1 - À. l s. + n. 
l l l 
Notice that si * ni can be viewed as a mixture of mixed strategies: si is chosen 
with probability - À and n~ is chosen with probability À .• The interpretation 
i Ai l 
E N 
the mistake of s. * n. is: if 
l l 
probabilities of player i are determined by ni' then 
this player will actually play si* ni if he intends to play si. ForsE S, let s * n 
be defined by: 
(s * nl. 
l 
s. * n. 
l l 
for i E N, 
rn = n n and let the game (~ 1 , ... '~n,R1 , ... ,Rn} be defined by 
(2 .4 .1) Ri (~ * nl for i E N, ~ E ~. 
Hence, R~(~) is the expected payoff to player i, if the players intend to play ~ 
l 
and make mistakes according to n. We claim that 
(2 .4. 2) for all i E N and s E S. 
Namely, for i ( N and s E S,we have 
I s(~)Ri (~ * nl = I I s (~) (qJ 
~ ~ ~· 
z: li s (~) (~ * nl (~') JRi (qJ') 
~· ~ 
R. (s * nl, 
l 
* n)(~')Ri(~'l 
(~) I (s * nl (~' l R. (~' l 
~· 
l 
where the equality marked with (*) follows from the fact that for all i E N: 
and the fact that the players choose their strategies (and make their mistakes) in-






(1- À.)R. (s * 11/1o:l + L Tl. (cp.lR. (s * 11/cp;l 
l l l l l l ~ 
epi 
which implies 




(s/q;:l iff R. (s * 11/(/J.) < R. (s * 11/qJ:) 
l l l l l l l L 
Next, let 11 be close to zero. For q; c ~. we have that q; * 11 is close to q; which im-
plies, since R. is continuous, that R
11
(q;) is close toR. (q;). Hence, if 11 is close 
~ ~ ~ 
to zero, r 11 is close to f. Therefore, in this case, r 11 has an equilibrium 
Tl Tl Tl s (s
1
, ... , sn) which is close to the essential equilibrium s of r. \·Ie have 
0 
from which it follows, by using (2.4.3), that for all i E N and cp • , cp ~ 
~ ~ 
if R.(s
11 * n/q;.l < R.(s11 *11/q;:l, then (s 11 * lll,(q;,l 
l l l l ~ ~ 
E ~.' 
~ 
which implies that s
11 * n is an equilibrium of (f,ll). Since s 11 * n converges tos as 
n tends to zero, we have that s is a strictly perfect equilibrium of r. ll 
2.5. REGULAR EQUILIBRIA 
In this sectien we introduce the most stringent refinement of the Nash equilibrium 
concept which will be considered: the concept of reqular equilibria. This concept 
has been introduced in HARSANYI [1973b]. It is shown that regular equilibria possess 
all robustness properties one can hope for: they are bath essential and strictly 
proper. 
It should be noted that also in JANSEN [1981b] a concept of regular equilibria has 
been introduced. Jansen's results, however, should not be confused with ours: what 
he calls a regular equilibrium is what we have called a quasi-strong equilibrium, 
and althougil every regular equilibrium is quasi-strong (Corollary 2.5.3), it is 
definitely not true that every quasi-strong equilibrium is regular (as fellows e.g. 
from the game of figure 2.1.1). 
Befare defining the concept of regular equilibria, let us introduce some notational 
conventions. Let (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R 1 , •.. ,Rn) be an n-person normal form game. 
For i c N, we write X. for F(~. ,JR.), the set of all mappings from ~; to :IR. We have 
~ ~ ~ 
S. c x,. A generio element of x, is denoted by x. and xk denotes the value of x. at 
1 ~ ~ 1 1 n 1 
k. We identify Xi with JRmi, where mi is given by (2.1 .1). X denotes i~ 1 xi and a 
generio element of X is denoted by x. The set X can be identified with mm, where m 
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, ... ,xn) · 
By means of the formulae (2.1.5) and (2.1.7), we have extended Ri from <!>toS. \<Ve 
can extend R. from S to X by means of the formulae 








n k. rr x. J 
j=1 J 
if Ijl 
In the next two sections, it will be convenient to think of Ri as a mapping which is 
defined on llim Notice that Ri is a polynomial and, hence, is infinitely often dif-
ferentiable. 
Let r = (1>
1
, ... ,~n'R 1 ... ,Rn) be an n-person normal form game. From (2.1.11) we see 
that a strategy combination s é S is an equilibrium of r if and only if the following 
condition is fulfilled: 





Hence, s c m:+ is an equilibrium of r if and only if s is a salution to the following 
set of equations: 
(2. 5. 2) xk[R. (x/k) - ma x R. (x/~) ] 0 for all i EN, k E ~- and 
]_ ]_ Q,c<P ]_ ]_ 
(2.5.3) I k x. - 1 0 for all i E N. 
k 
]_ 
In (2.5.2) and (2.5.3) we have m + n equations in m unknowns, but, since for each i 
at least one equation in (2.5.2) is trivially fulfilled, we actually have m equations 
in m unknowns. However, the system possesses the undesirable property that the map-
ping defined by the left hand side of (2.5.2) - (2.5.3) is not differentiable. There-
fore, we will consider a slightly different system of equations. Namely, let 
IJl= (k
1
, ... ,kn) c <!> be fixed, and consider the system: 
(2 .5.4) x~[R. (x/k) - Rl. (x/kl.)] 
]_" ]_ 
0 for all i E N, k E 4 i' k " ki , 
(2.5.5) 0 for all iE N. 
If s is an equilibrium of r with Ijl E C(s), then s is a salution to the system (2.5.4) 
- (2.5.5) and, furthermore, the mapping defined by the left hand side of these equa-
tions is infinitely often differentiable. The price we have to pay for gaining this 
differentiability is, that not every positive salution of this system is an equilib-
rium and that not every equilibrium of r need to be salution of the system. Never-
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theless, it turns out to be more convenient to work with the system (2.5.4) - (2.5.5) 
than to work with the system (2.5.2) - (2.5.3). Let F(. I~) be the mapping defined by 
the left hand side of (2.5.4) - (2.5.5). More precisely: 
(2 .5.6) l(xl~) /CR. (x/k) R. (x/k.)] 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 








for i E N. 
Let J(s I~) be the Jacobian (i.e. the matrix of first order partial derivatives) of 
F(. I~) evaluated at s, i.e. 
(2. 5.8) J(s I~) <lF (x I p) I 
dX X = S 
If sis an equilibrium of r with ~ E C(s), then F(si~) = 0. One can expect that an 
equilibrium s with ~ E C(s) will have nice properties if F(. i~) is locally invertible 
at s, i.e. if J(sl~) is nonsingular. Therefore, we define: 
DEFINITION 2.5.1. An equilibriums of ris a regular equilibrium of rif J(sl~) is 
nonsingular forsome ~ E C(s). An equilibrium is irregular, if it is not regular. 
By considering the game of figure 1.5.5, it can easily be verified that there exist 
games without regular equilibria (this also follows from Corollary 2.5.6). However, 
in HARSANYI [1973b],it has been proved that games without regular equilibria are 
exceptional (also cf. Theorem 2.6.1). It should be noted that Definition 2.5.1 is 
slightly different from the definition of regular equilibria given by Harsanyi. 
Harsanyi defines a regular equilibrium as an equilibrium s for which the Jacobian 
J(sl~l is nonsingular, where ~is the strategy combination (1, .•. ,1). To illustrate 
the difference between these definitions, consider the game of figure 2.5.1: 
2 
tE 2 1 1 
Figure 2.5.1. An example to illustrate the role of the reference point ~ in the 
definition of a regular equilibrium. 
This game has two equilibria, viz. ~ = (1,1) and 0 = (2,2). The equilibrium~ is not 
a reasonable one, but the equilibrium ~ possesses all nice properties one possibly 
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could ask for. Therefore, the definition of a regular equilibrium should be such 
that ~ is irregular and ~ is regular. Our definition of regular equilibria satisfies 
this condition, howeve4 according to Harsanyi's definition both equilibria are irreg-
ular. This is the reason why we have modified Harsanyi's definition as in Definition 
2.5.1. Actually, in the proofs in HARSANYI ll973b] it is implicitly assumed that 
every equilibriums satisfies ~ c C(s) and so in his proofs Harsanyi actually works 
with our definition of regularity. Therefore, the results of HARSANYI L1973b] are 
correct if regularity is defined as in Definition 2.5.1. 
Next, we will show that, if sis a regular equilibrium of r, then J(s[~) is nonsin-
gular, for all ~ c C(s). First we prove: 
LEMMA 2.5.2. Let r ( q, 1 ' · · · 'q, n 'Rl' · · · 'R n ) be an n-person normal form game, let 
s c E (f) and let ~ (k1, ... ,kn ) E C (s). For x E 
m 
JR, let F(x[~) and J (x I~) be de-
fined as before and let J(x[(jl) be the Jacobian which results from J(s[(jl) by crossing 
out the rows and columns corresponding to the pure strategies which do not belong 
to C(s). Then we have 11 
(2.5.9) i3<s I (jl) I lT lT 
iEN k,ÉC(si) 
[R. (s/k) - R. (s/k.)]. 
l l l 






for all E N, Q, E <!Jj' Q, ~ k, 
J 
3F~(xl (jl) I 
R. (s/k) R. (s/k.), a k l l l 
X, S 
l 
which immediately implies (2.5.9) 
If sis a strong equilibrium of r, then the right hand side of (2.5.9) is nonzero 
and, hence, a strong equilibrium is regular. On the other hand, if an equilibrium 
is not quasi-strong, then the right hand side is zero, and so we have: 
COROLLARY 2.5.3. Every strong equilibrium is regular; every regular equilibrium is 
quasi-strong. 
) For a matrix A, we denote by [A[ the determinant of A. 
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0 
LEMMA 2.5.4. Let r = (~ 1 , .•. ,~n'R 1 , ... ,Rn) be an n-person normal form game, let 
s é E(f:i and let CjJ (k
1
, ... ,kn) and CjJ' = (\•···•~n) be in the Carrier of s. Then 
J(sl<jJ) is nonsingular if and only if J(sl<jJ') is nonsingular. 
PROOF. It follows from Lemma 2.5.2. that it suffices to show, that IJ(sl<jJ)I = 0 if 
and only if IJ(sl<jJ') I= 0. By writing out the formulae, the reader can verify that 
for any i c N: 
k· ~· I 
élF, ~ (xl Cjl) élF ~~(x I '1'') I ~ 
él a X. s élx. s 
J J 
k ~ 
élFi (XI<jJ) élF. (xl CjJ ') 
~ 
élxa s a/~ s 
~ ~ 
al(xl<jJ) élFk(xl 'Jl') 
k 
S, 
for all éN,a.cc(s.), 
J 
élFki (x I CjJ') for all k 
E C (s.), 
~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
EN, C (s .) , a E 
k· élx~ s élx~ s 
J J 
élxa s ~ s 
k k. j ,. ~ J ,. ' ~ 
Therefore, J(sl<jJ) results from J(sl<jJ') by elementary algebraic operations, which 




In the remalnder of this section, we will prove two important properties of regular 
equilibria, namely that a regular equilibrium is essential and that a regular equilib-
rium is strictly proper. The fundamental result in proving these properties is the 
following Theorem 2.5.5. Reeall that, via (2.1.12) - (2.1.13), we identify a game 
rEG(~ , ... ,~) with a vector r = 
1 n 
( ) IRnm* , where m* 's r
1
, ... ,rn E ~ given by (2.1.1), 
so that we view G(~ 1 , ... ,~n) as an nm*-dimensional Euclidian space. 
THEOREM 2.5.5. Let r = (~ 1 , ... ,~ ,R1 , ... ,R) be an n-person normal form game and as-n n ·* 
sume s is a regular equilibrium of f. Then there exist neighborhoods U of f in JRnn, 
and V of s in JRm , such tha t 
(i) I E ( f) n V I = 1 , for all r E u, and 
(ii) the mapping s: U~ V defined by {s(f)} E(f) n V is continuous. 
PROOF. Let us denote the payoff vector of r by r. Let co 
nm* m 
fixed and de fine the mapping F : JR x JR by: 
Fk(r,x) k [R. (x/k) - R. (x/k.)] X, 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
for i E N, k E ~i' k ,. k
1
, and (2. 5. 10) 
( 2. 5. 11) 
k· I k F .~(r ,x) x - 1 
~ 
k i 
for i c N. 
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Since sis an equilibrium of f and ~ E C(s), we have F(r,s) 
s is a regular equilibrium of r, we have 
0. Furthermore, since 
(2. 5 .12) J(r ,sl :lF(r ,x) I :lx (r,s) is nonsingular. 
By the implicit function theorem (DIEUDONNE [1960],p.268) there exist neighborhoods 
U of i:' and V of s and a differentiable mapping s : U ~ V such that 
(2. 5. 13) {(r,x) EU x V F(r,x) O} {(r,s(r)) r E U} . 
By choosing U and V sufficiently small, we can provide that, for all i 
(2. 5.14) if sk > 0, then x~ > 0 for all x E V, 
l l 
E N and k E <!J.: 
l 
(2. 5 .15) if R.. (s/k) < R. (s/k.), then R. (x/k)· < R. (x/k.) for all (r,x) Eu x V. 
l l l l l l 
From (2.5.13) - (2.5.15) and the fact that s is a quasi-strong equilibrium of f 
(Corollary 2.5.4), we can conclude, that for all i E N and r E U: 
sk(r) > 0 for all k E c(s. l, 
l l 
R.(s(r)/k) R.(s(r)/k.) for all k E c (5.), 
l l l l 
R. (s(r)/k) < R.(s(r)/k.) for all k i c(s. l, and 
l l l l 
sk(r) 0 for all k i c (s. l. 
l l 
Therefore, we have that s(r) E E(f(r)), for all rE U. Since every equilibriums of 
f(r) which is in V satisfies F(s,r) = 0, we, in fact, have that s(r) is the only 
equilibrium of f(r) which is in V. This establishes the first part of the Theorem. 
Furthermore, since the mapping r ~ s(r) is continuous, also the second assertion of 
the theorem is true. D 
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.5.5, we have: 
COROLLARY 2.5.6. Every regular equilibrium is essential. 
Let us call an equilibrium s of a game r isolated, if there exists a neighborhood 
V of s such that V n E(f) = {s}. As a consequence of Theorem 2.5.5, we have 
COROLLARY 2.5.7. Every regular equilibrium is isolated. 
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Finally by using the result of Theorem 2.5.5. and the method of the proof of Theorem 
2.4.3, we can show: 
THEOREM 2.5.8. Every regular equilibrium is strictly proper. 
2.6. AN "ALMOST ALL" THEOREM. 
Intuitively, it will be clear that games with irregular equilibria are exceptional. 
Namely, the existence of an irregular equilibrium entails a special numerical rela-
tienship among the payoffs of the game and this relationship can be disturbed by 
perturbing the payoffs of the game slightly. In this section, we will prove that 
indeed for almost all games all equilibria are regular. This result was first proved 
in HARSANYI [1973b] and the proof we will give essentially follows the same lines 
as the proof given in that paper. It's an application of Sard's Theorem (SARD [1942] 
or MILNOR [1965]), in the way as initiated in DEBREU [1970]. 
THEOREM 2.6.1. For almost all normal form games all equilibria are regular. 
PROOF. Let ~ 1 , ... ,~n be an n-tuple of finite, nonempty sets, and let G(~ 1 , ... ,~n) be 
thesetof all games with pure strategy spaces ~ 1 , ... ,~n. We identify G(~ 1 , ... ,~n) nm* 
with ~ via (2.1.13). Furthermore let I(~ 1 , ... ,~n) be thesetof all games in 
this class, which have an irregular equilibrium. \'Ie will prove that I ( ~ 
1
, ... , ~ n) is 
a closed set with Lebesgue measure zero. 
nm* m nm* 
We first prove that I (~ 1 , ... '~n) is closed. Let F : ~ x JR ->- ~ be the mapping 
defined by (2.5.10)-(2.5.11). Since this mapping depends on which reference point 
~ E ~is chosen, we will write F(r,xl~) for the image of (r,x) under this mapping. 
Let J(r,xl~) be the Jacobian of (2.5.12). If sis an equilibrium of f(r) with ~ c C(s), 
then F(r,sl~) = 0 and, in this case, s is an irregular equilibrium of f(r) if and 
only if J(r,sl~) = 0. Let {f(r(t))}tE~ be a sequence of games in I(~ 1 , ... ,~n), such 
that È~ r(t) = r. FortE ~. let s(t) be an irregular equilibrium of f(r(t)) and, 
withoutlossof generality, assume s = l~ s(t). Then sis an equilibrium of f(r), 
since the correspondence which assigns to each game its set of equilibria is upper 
semi-continuous. We claim that sis an irregular equilibrium of f(r). Namely, let 
~ E C(s). Then ~ E C(s(t)) for all t which are sufficiently large and therefore, 
J(r(t),s(t) I~) 0, for all sufficiently large t. Since F is infinitely often diffe-
rentiable, J is continuous and so J(r,sl~) = 0, which establishes our claim. Hence 
f(r) E I(~ 1 , ... <1>n) and so I(~ 1 , ... ,~n) is closed. 
Next,nwe will show t~at À(I(~ 1 , ... ,~n) = 0. For iE N, let Ci,Bi c ~i' and let 




, ... ,il>n) which have an equilibrium (resp. irregular equilibrium) s with C(s) =C 
and B(s) = B. We have 
U G(C,B) and I(tl>
1
, ... ,<!>n) 
C,Bc<J> 
U I (C,B), 
C,Bclj> 
hence, since <!> is finite, it suffices to show that for all C,B c <!>: 
(2. 6. 1) À ( I(C,B)) 0 . 
Hence, let C,B c <!> be fixed· If C= 0 or C ~ B, then (2.6.1) is trivially fulfilled, 
so assume C ;< 0, Cc B. Letiji= (k
1
, ..• ,kn) cC be fixed. For iE N, let il>(i) c <!> be 
defined by 
$/k forsome kc B.\~k. }} 
~ ~ 
Assume that we have given r and s such that: 
(2 .6. 2) f(r) E G(C,B), sE E(f(r)), C(s) C and B(s) B. 
Then, to be able to compute the complete payoff vector r, we actually only have to 
know the subvector 
(2 .6. 3) {R. (qJ) 
~ 
qJE<f\<!>(i),iEN}. 





since this equation (once we know (2.6.3) only contains Ri (~/k) as an unknown variabl~ 
and since this variable occurs in this equation with a positive coefficient. Let us 
denote by H the mapping, by means of which the complete payoff vector r can be com-
puted from the data in (2.6.3). To be more precise, let 
p {p 
C(S) tS E S s 
I!>\<!> (i) --> JR. } , and 
c.}, 
~ 
and for p E P , s E C(S) define H(p,s) as the unique vector r E JR.nm* which satisfies 
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for i E N, qJ E <1>\ <!>(i)' and 
(2 .6. 5) R. (s/k) R. (s/k.) for i E N, k E Bi\{ki} 
~ ~ ~ 
Notice that there is indeed a unique vector r satisfying (2 .6.4) and (2 .6. 5)' since 
for fixed i EN, k E Bi\{ki} the equation (2.6.5) only contains the unknown Ri (~/k) 
which occurs in it with the positive coefficient s(~) (this coefficient is positive 
sinces E e(S) and ~ E e(s)). Futhermore, since in this case Ri (~/k) is computed by 
using multiplications, additions and substractions and only dividing by s(~), we have 
that H is infinitely often differentiable on P x e(S). 
nm* 
For r = (r
1




) , ... ,pn(rn)) where 
p. (r.) is the restrietion of r. to <!>\<!>(i), for iE N. The mapping H is constructed in 
~ ~ ~ 
such a way that H(p(r),s) = r, if rand s satisfy (2.6.2). Therefore, we have: 
(2 .6.6) G(e,B) c {f(r) ; 3(p,s) E p x e(S)[H(p,s) = r]} , 
from which we can conclude that (2.6.1) is true,·in the special case where e ~ B. 
Namely, in this case 
dim(P) nm* - IBI + n dim (e (S)) Ie I - n, 
and, therefore, dim(l' x e(S)) < * nm , if Ie I < IBI. This implies, by means of (2.6.6), 
that À(G(e,B)) = 0, if e ~ B (since we assumed that e c B). Hence, (2.6.1) is true 
if e ~ B. 
Next, assume e = B. In this case, it easily fellows from the definition of H, that, 
if r,s are such that (2.6.2) is satisfied, then 
(2. 6. 7) 3H (p ,a) I 
3(p,o\ (p(r),s) 
3F(r,xi~J I 
is singular iff ox (r,s) is singular. 
From (2.6.6) and (2.6.7) we see that I(e,e) is a subset of 
(2 .6.8) {r(r); 3- _ LH(p,sJ 
p,s 
r and 3H (p ,a) I 
3(p,o) \(p,s) 
is singular]} . 
Sard's theerem (MILNOR [1965],p.10) assures us that Lebesque measure of thesetin 
(2.6.8) is zero and, therefore, we have À(I(e,e)) = 0. 0 
If all equilibria of a normal form game rare regular, then this game has a finite 
number of equilibria (eorollary 2.5.7). Harsanyi has sharpened this result and proved 
that a game for which all equilibria are regular, in fact has an odd number of equi-
libria (HARSANYI [1973b], Theorem 1; for alternative proofs that almost all games 
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have an odd number of equilibria, see ROSENMÜLLER [1971] or WILSON [1971]). Therefore, 
by combining the Theorems 2.3.5, 2.3.7, 2.5.8, 2.6.1 and the Corollaries 2.5.3, 2.5.6, 
we can draw our main conclusion for normal form games: 
THEOREM 2.6.2. Almost all normal form games possess an odd number of equilibria, which 
are all regular, quasi-strong, essential and strictly proper (and hence also proper 
and perfect) . 
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CHAPTER 3 
MATRIX AND B H1ATRIX GAMES 
In this chapter, we study 2-person normal form games, zero-sum games (matrix games) 
as well as nonzero-sum games (bimatrix games). It is our objective to investigate 
whether, for the special case of a 2-person game, the results of the previous chapter 
can be refined and specialized. 
Insection 3.1,some notation and terminology is introduced, sarnething is said about 
the structure of the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game and some well-known results 
concerning matrix games are stated. 
In section 3.2,perfect equilibria are studied. The main result is, that an equilib-
rium of a bimatrix game is perfect if and only if it is undominated, from which it 
follows, that one can verify whether an equilibrium of a bimatrix game is perfect 
by solving a linear programming problem. 
Regular equilibria are studied in section 3.3. A first characterization of such equi-
libria is derived and it is shown, that for a bimatrix game which is nondegenerate 
in the sen se of LEMKE AND HOl~SON [ 1964], all equilibria are regular. 
Insection 3.4,further characterizations of regular equilibria are derived. The main 
result is, that an equilibrium s of a bimatrix game is regular if and only if s is 
isolated and perfect in the s-restriction of r. From this result several other char-
acterizations follow easily. 
In the last section of the chapter zero-sum games are studied. Attention is focused 
on proper equilibria, and it is shown that an equilibrium of a matrix game is proper 
if and only if it is a pair of best strategies in the sense of DRESHER [1961], from 
which it follows that it is easy to check whether an equilibrium of such a game is 
proper. 
The results in this chapter are based upon VAN DAMME [1980b, 1981b]. 
3.1. PRELIMINARIES 
A 2-person normal form game r = (~ 1 .~2 ,R 1 ,R2 ) is also called a bimatrix game, for 
reasans which will be clear.With respect to such a game, we will use the same nota-
tion and terminology as the one we used for general n-person normal form games (cf. 






. For s E S, the expected payoff Ri (s) to player i if s is played is de-
fined as in (2.1.7). Furthermore, as insection 2.5, we write X. for F(~. ,F) (the 
~ ~ 




. Ri is extended from S to X as 




, then Ri and x
1 
determine a 
linear mapping from x
2 
to F , which we denote by Ri (x
1


















to m. The mappings Ri (x
1
) and 
since the index will always point out which mapping is 
Ri is row-regular, if Ri (x
1






Ri is column-regular, if Ri (x
2
) 7 0 for all x
2 
7 0, and 
c x2 de termine 
cannot be mixed 
We say that 







) ES. If player 1 knows, that player 2 plays s
2
, then he will assign 
a positive probability only to the pure strategies belonging to B
1 
(s), and a similar 
remark applies to player 2. Hence, if sis played, the most relevant payoffs are the 
payoffs Ri (~) with ~ E B(s). Therefore, wedefine the s-restriction of ras the game 
s s s s s s s s s s 
r = (~ 1 .~2 ,R 1 ,R2 ), where ~i Bi (s) and Ri is the restrietion of Ri to ~ = ~ 1 x ~ 2 . 
Rs is called the s-restriction of the payoff matrix R .. we write X~ for F(~~,F) and 
l l l l 
we extend R: bilinearly from ~s to Xs = X~ x X~. A generic element of x: is denoted 
by x~ and the extension of x~ to ~. is the element x. c F(~. ,F) , defined by 
l l l l l 
if ~. E ~s , 
~ ~ 
otherwise. 
When no confusion can result, x. and x~ are identified and, consequently, sametimes 
~ ~ 
x. is used to denote a generic element of X~. 
~ ~ 
Next, let us briefly say sarnething about the structure of the set of equilibria of 
a bimatrix game. If s,s' are equilibria of a bimatrix game r, then s and s' are said 
to be interchangeable, if (s
1 
,s;~) and (si ,s
2
) are also equilibria of r. A set of 
equilibria is said to be a maximal Nash subset (HILLHAM [1974], HEUER AND MILLHAM 
[1976]) or subsalution (NASH [1951] if it is a maximal set with the property that all 
its elements are interchangeable. Theorem 2.1.1, of which a proof can be found in 
JANSEN [1981a], shows that maximal Nash subsets are important in the study of the 
structure of the set of equilibria: 
THEOREM 3.1.1. Let f be a bimatrix game. Then 
(i) every maximal Nash subset is a closed and convex polyhedral set, 
(ii) the set of equilibria of r is the (not necessarily disjoint) union of all 
maximal Nash subsets, 
(iii) there are only finitely many maximal Nash subsets. 
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By using Theerem 3.1.1., it is straightforward to prove 
caRaLLARY 2.1.2. An equilibrium sof a bimatrix game is isolated if and only if {s} 
is a maximal Nash subset. 
For general n-person games, also interchangeability of equilibria and maximal Nash 
subsetscan be defined. If n ~ 3, however, there may exist an uncountable number of 
maximal Nash subsets (CHIN, PARTHASARATHY AND RAGHAVAN [1974], p.3) and, therefore, 
in this case if {s} is a maximal Nash subset, s is not necessarily isolated. 
To conclude our preliminary discussion on bimatrix games, let us remark, that we can 
assume, whenever it is convenient to do so, that all payoffs in a bimatrix game are 
positive. Namely, let f 
result from r by adding a fixed amount to all payoffs in r, such that all payoffs in 
f' are positive. Then the strategie situation in r• is the same as the onè in r, and 
so the equilibria of these games are the same and, hence, in order to analyse r, we 
can justas well analyse f'. 
In the remaining part of this section, we consider matrix games, i.e. bimatrix games 
(~ 1 .~2 ,R 1 ,R2 ) with R2 = -R1 . We denote the matrix game in which the payoff function 
of player 1 is R by (~ 1 .~2 ,R). Fora matrix game r = (~ 1 .~2 ,R) all equilibria are 
interchangeable, i.e. E(f) is a maximal Nash subset, and all equilibria yield the 
same payoff to player 1. This payoff is called the value of the gamerand is denoted 





(3. 1.1) for all ~ E ~2 }, and 
(3 .1. 2) for all k E ~ 1 }. 
ai (f) is a closed, convex polyhedral set (and, hence, ai (f) has a finite number of 
extreme points) , the elements of which are called the optimal strategies of player i 


















and so in a matrix game a strategy of player 1 is an equilibrium strategy if and only 
if it is aso called maximin strategy (as we know from the game of figure 1.6.2, this 
is not true for nonzero-sum games). A similar property holds for the optimal strate-
gies of player 2. From (3.1.1) and (3.1.2) it fellows that a
1 
(f) and V(f) can be 
determined by solving the linear programming problem (3.1.3): 
- 51 -




,i) :> v for all iE <1>
2
; 




(f) and v ~ v(f) if and only if (s
1
,v) solves 
(3.1.3), (where "solves" means "is an optimal salution of"). Therefore, v(f) and o
1
(f) 
can be determined easily (cf. BALINSKI [1961]). An important property of matrix games, 
which first was proved in GALE AND SHERMAN [1950] and, independently, in BOHNENBLUST, 
KARLIN AND SHAPLEY [1950] is, that a pure strategy is used by some optimal strategy 
with a positive probability, if and only if this strategy is a best reply against all 
optimal strategies of the opponent. Hence, for a matrix game f: 
(3. 1. 4) U C(s.) 
s. EO, (f) l 
l l 
or, to put it differently 
(3 .1. 5) u 
SEE (f) 
C(s) 
n B. (s) i,j E {1,2}. i ;t j, 
s. EO. (f) l 
J J 
n B(s). 
s EE ( f) 
We denote the set of pure strategies which are in the Carrier of some equilibrium stra-






(hence, C. (f) is thesetof (3.1.4)) and C(f) denotes 
l 
Finally we remark, that, just as we can assume that in a bimatrix game all payoffs 
are positive, we can assume, whenever it is convenient to do so, that all payoffs to 
player 1 in a matrix game are positive (and, hence, that all payoffs to player 2 are 
negative). 
3.2. PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
In chapter 2 (Corol1ary2.2.6), we have seen that a perfect equilibrium is always un-
dominated, but that an undominated equilibrium is not necessarily perfect. It is our 
objective in this section to show, that in a bimatrix game however, an undominated 
equilibrium is perfect. Furthermore, it is shown that in this case one can verify 
whether an equilibrium is perfect, by solving a linear programming problem. 
The proof of the main result of the section, is based on the following lemma: 

















. Define the 
(<I> 1 ' <I> 2 'R) by: 
for k E <1>
1 









PROOF. It is easily verified, that the assertions (3.2.1)-(3.2.4) are all equivalent: 
(3.2.1) s
1 
is dominated by si in r, forsome si, 
(3.2.3) R(si,~l ~ 0 for all~ and R(si,~l > 0 forsome ~. forsome si, 
Since in f(s
1
) player 1 can guarantee himself a payoff 0 by playing s
1
, we have 
v(f(s
1
)) ~ 0, hence, (3.2.4) is equivalent to 
The equivalence of (3.2.1) and (3.2.5) establishes the lemma. 0 






) be an equilibrium of the bimatrix game f = (~ 1 .~ 2 ,R 1 ,R2 ). In 
view of Corollary 2.2.6, it suffices to show, that s is perfect if s is undominated. 
Assume sis undominated and let f(s
1
) be as in Lemma 3.2.1. Since v(f(s
1
















)) = ~2 and formula (3.1.4.). Then s 1 
is a best reply against s; in f(s
1
), which implies that s
1 
is also a best reply 
against s2 in r. For E > 0, let s
2




(E) is completely 
mixed, s
1 




(E) converges to s
2
, as E tends to zero. 
Since undominated strategies of player 2 can be characterized similarly as undominated 
strategiesof player 1, we can follow the sameprocedure for this player and, hence, 




, such that s
2 
is 
a best reply against s
1 
(E) and such that s
1 
(E) converges to s
1
, as E tends to zero. 




(E)). Then {s(E)}E+o satisfies the condition of Theorem 2.2.5 (iii) 
which shows that s is a perfect equilibrium of r. 0 
In view of the theorem above, in order to verify whether an equilibrium of a bimatrix 
game is perfect, it suffices to check whether both equilibrium strategies are undomi-
nated. We will now demonstrate that this is an easy task. Let us confine ourselves to 
the equilibrium strategy of player 1. It follows from Lemma 3.2.1, that it suffices 
to show that the value of a matrix game r = (~ 1 .~ 2 ,R) can be easily determined and, 
that it is easy to verify whether c
2
(f) ~2 . Withoutlossof generality, we can re-
strict ourselves to the case where R(~) > 0 for all ~ E ~-
The value of r can be determined by solving the linear programming problem (3.1.3). 




/v (this causes 
no troubles, since v(f) > 0). By this change of variables (3.1.3) is transformed 
into (3.2.6), in which x
1 
(~ 1 ) denotes the sum of all x~ with k E ~ 1 . 
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(3. 2 .6) 
sminimize 
lsubject to for all Q, E <1>
2 
It is easily seen that: 
if (s
1











,1) solves (3.1.3), 
which implies that 
(3. 2. 7) 1, for all x
1 
which solve (3.2.6). 









) is a salution to the 
following system of inequalities: 
x1 (<I> 1) x2 (<1>2)' 
(3. 2 .8) ~R (x1 , 'I :> 1 for all ~ E <1>2, 
R(k,x
2





, x2 E X 2' xl :::: 0, x2 :> 0. 





notes the sum of all R(x
1
,Q,), where ~ranges over <1>
2
: 
rimi"e R(x1 ,<1>2)' subject to xl ( <!> 1) = x2 (<1>2)' 
(3. 2. 9) R(x
1
, ~) :> 1 for all ~ E <1>2' 
R(k,x
2
) s for all k E <!> 1 ' and 
xl E x1 , x 2 E x2 , x1 :> 0, x 2 :> 0. 




if and only if the value of the linear 














)) and so, we have proved: 






















if and only if the value of (3.2.9) is m
2
. 
The linear programming problem (3.2.9) can easily be solved and so, in a bimatrix 
game, it can easily be checked whether a strategy of player 1 is dominated. The same 
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holds for player 2 and, therefore, it is easy to verify whether an equilibrium of 
a bimatrix game is perfect. 
3.3. REGULAR EQUILIBRIA 
In this section, a first characterization of regular equilibria in a bimatrix game 
is derived. Furthermore, it is shown that, fora game which is nondegenercte in the 





) be an equilibrium of a bimatrix game r = (~ 1 .~2 ,R 1 ,R2 ). FrJm Corollary 
2.5.3 we know, that s has to be quasi-strong, in order to be regular. 
Let us investigate under which conditions a quasi-strong equilibrium s is :egular. 
Without loss of generality, assume that ~ (1,1) E ~s. where ~s = C(s) = l(s). De-
fine the lc(s
1
) I x lc(s
2





( 3 0 3 .1) Al (1, l',) for 9, E ~s 2 




9, E ~2' k"' 1, 
(3.3.3) A
2 
(k, 1) for k E ~s 
1 ' 










9, f ~2' 9, "' 1. 
Let the Jacobian J(sl~lbe as in Lemma 2.5.2. Sinces is quasi-strong, it fo:lows 
that J(sl~) is nonsingular if and only if the matrix 
is nonsingular. Obviously, this matrix is nonsingular, if and only if A
1 
and ~ 2 are 
both nonsingular, which can be the case only if lc(s
1
) I = lc(s
2
) I. We have prJved: 
LEMMA 3.3.1. An equilibriums of a bimatrix game is regular if and only if it is a 
quasi-strong equilibrium with lc(s
1
) I = lc(s
2





defined in (3.3.1)-(3.3.4), are nonsingular. 
Next, assume r = (~ 1 .~2 ,R 1 ,R2 ) is a bimatrix game in which all payoffs are pc~itive 
and assume sis a quasi-strong equilibrium of r with IC(s
1
) I = IC(s
2
) 1. We clëim that, 
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in this case, Ai is nonsingular if and only if the s-restricted payoff matrix R~ is 
nonsingular (i E {1,2}). Let us demonstrate this fact for i~ 1. Assume Al is singu-
lar and let 
s 
such that x2 E x2 
be x2 7 0 and A1 
(x
2






) 0, then Rl (x2) ~ 0, and 





) 7 0, then Rl (x2) is a scalar multiple of Rl (s2)' 
whereas x
2 











) ~ 1} 
s 
In both cases, we can conclude that R
1 
is singular. 
Next, assume R~ is singular and let x
2 























(since R~(x2 ) ~ 0 and R~(s 2 ) > 0, since R1 is positive) 
In both cases, one can conclude that A
1 
is singular. Similarly, it can be proved 
that A
2 
is singular if and only if R; is singular and so we have: 








) be a bimatrix game with positive payoffs. Then 
sis a regular equilibrium of r, if and only if sis a quasi-strong equilibrium with 
IC(s
2
) I, for which thematrices R~ and R~ are nonsingular. 
Up to now, nothing has been said about the actual computation of equilibria. Algorithms 
to compute the set of all equilibria of a bimatrix game have been given in VOROB'EV 
[1958], MILLS [1960], KUHN [1961]and WINKELS [1979], but all these algorithms are more 
of theoretical than of practical interest. An efficient algorithm to compute one 
euilibrium of a bimatrix game, has been proposed in LEMKE AND HOWSON [1964]. This 
algorithm is based on path following and can be applied to nondegenerate games (see 
below). To compute an equilibrium of a degenerate game, one first has to perturb the 
game slightly (e.g. by means of the scheme proposed by Lemke and Howson) in order to 
yield a nondegenerate game to which the algorithm can be applied. In this monograph, 
we will not consider the question how to compute equilibria, but we will show, that 
a bimatrix game which satisfies the nondegeneracy condition of Lemke and Howson, pos-
sesses only regular equilibria. The following lemma is essential: 
LEMMA 3.3.3. Fora bimatrix game r which is such that IB(s) I s lc(s) I for all s E S, 
all equilibria are regular. 
PROOF. Assume f satisfies the condition of the lemma and let s be an equilibrium of 
r. Then C(s) c B(s) and, therefore C(s) ~ B(s) by the condition of the lemma. Hence, 
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sis a quasi-strong equilibrium. From Lemma 3.3.1 it follows that it suffices to 




, as defined in (3.3.1)-(3.3.4) are nonsingular. 
s s s s 
Assume A
1 




be such that x
2 























(E)). If Eis sufficiently small, then s(E) ES, C(s(E)) ~ C(s) and 
B(s(E)) ~ B(s). Define È by 
sup {E > 0 s(E) E S, C(S(E)) C(s), B(s(E)) B(s)}. 
Notice that È is finite, since x
2 
has at least one negative component. Since s is an 
equilibrium of r, we can conclude from the definition of È 
C(s(È)) cc(s) B(s) c B(s(È)), where at least one inclusion is strict. 
This contradiets the condition of the lemma and sa A
1 
is column-regular, which im-
plies lc(s
1
) I ~ lc(s
2
) I. Similarly, it can be shown that A
2 
is row-regular, and sa 
lc(s
1
) I <:: lc(s
2








are bath nonsingular, 
which implies that sis a regular equilibrium of r. 
Next, let us turn to the nondegeneracy assumption, which is imposed in LEMKE AND 
HOWSON [1964]. We restriet ourselves to bimatrix games (~ 1 .~ 2 ,R 1 ,R2 ) in which all 
-s -s 





(k E C ( S l) , 9- E B
2 
( S) ) • 
The nondegeneracy assumption which Lemke and Howson impose is: 
-s 
the rows of R
1 
are independent, for all s E S, and 
-s 
the columns of R
2 
are independent, for all s E S. 





from which it follows that 
lc(s) I ~ IB(s) I 
I B
1 




for every s E s. 
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D 
Hence, if the nondegeneracy condition of Lemke and Howson is satisfied, then the 
condition of Lemma 3.3.1 is fulfilled and all equilibria are regular. In SHAPLEY 
[1974] a similar nondegeneracy condition is imposed and, therefore, we also have that 
all equilibria are regular, if that condition is fulfilled. 
THEOREM 3.3.4. Fora bimatrix game which satisfies the nondegeneracy condition of 
LEMKE AND HOWSON [1964] (or SHAPLEY [1974]) all equilibria are regular. 
3.4. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF REGULAR EQUILIBRIA 
In this section several characterizations of regular equilibria are derived. The fun-
damental result of the section is, that an equilibrium sof a bimatrix game r is 
regular if and only if s is an isolated equilibrium of r, which is perfect in the 
s-restriction of r. Once this result has been established, several other characteri-
zations of regular equilibria follow easily. At the end of the section, an example 
is given to demonstrate, that the results of this section cannot be generalized to 
games with more than two players. 
We first prove our main result: 
THEOREM 3.4.1. sis a regular equilibrium of the bimatrix game r = (~ 1 .~2 ,R 1 ,R2 ) if 
and only if s is an isolated equilibrium of r, which is perfect in the s-restriction 
rs of r. 
PROOF. If sis a regular equilibrium of f, then sis isolated, as we know from Corol-
s 
lary 2.5.7. Furthermore, if sis regular in f, then sis regular in f , as follows 
from Lemma 2.5.2 and, therefore, sis a perfect equilibrium of rs (Theorem 2.5.8). 




) is an isolated equilibrium of r, which is perfect in rs. 
Sinces is perfect in rs there exists a sequence {s(E)}s+o which converges tos, 
such that C(s(E)) = B(s) and such that sis a best reply against s(E) for every E > 0. 








) are both equilibria of r, for 








, for all 
E sufficiently close to zero, which implies that C(s) = B(s). Hence, s is a quasi-
















) = 0. Let x
2 





























is column-regular. Similarly, it can 
be shown that A
2 
is row-regular, from which it follows that both matrices are square 
and nonsingular. 0 
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If s is a regular equilibrium, then s is quasi-strong, as we know from Corollary 2.5.3. 
Furthermore, if s is a quasi-strong equilibrium of a bimatrix game r, then sis a com-
pletely mixed equilibrium of rs. Since every completely mixed equilibrium is perfect, 
we immediately deduce from Theorem 3.4.1: 
COROLLARY 3.4.2. An equilibrium of a bimatrix game is regular if and only if it is 
isolated and quasi-strong. 
The game of figure 1.5.3 shows, that a perfect equilibrium sof a bimatrix gameris 





)) and consequently a perfect and isolated equilibrium of a bimatrix game 




) is an isolated, though not 
a regular equilibrium of the game of figure 1.5.3). Next, we will show, that a weakly 
proper equilibrium of r has the property that it is perfect in rs, from which it can 
be concluded that a weakly proper and isolated equilibrium is regular. 
LEMMA 3.4.3. Let s be a weakly proper equilibrium of the bimatrix game r 
Then sis a perfect equilibrium of the s-restriction rs of r. 
PROOF. In view of Theorem 3.2.2, it suffices to show that sis undominated in rs. 
Assume s
1 
is dominated by sl in rs and let~· E ~~ (=B(s)) be such that 
Let the sequence {s(c)}c+o be as in definition 2.3.4. Notice that, if ~ E ~2\B2 (s), 
then 
Let M be defined by 
Then we have, for c sufficiently close to zero 
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which contradiets the definition of {s(E)}E+o . Hence, s
1 
is undominated in rs. simi-
larly, it can be shown that s
2 
is undominated in rs. Hence, s is a perfect equilib-
rium of rs. 
By combining Lemma 2.4.3 with the Theorems 3.4.1, 2.3.6, 2.4.3 and the Corollaries 
2.5.6 and 2.5.7, we see that regular equilibria can be characterized as follows: 
THEOREM 3.4.4. Fora bimatrix game r, the following assertions are equivalent: 
(i) s is a regular equilibrium of r, 
(ii) s is an isolated and weakly proper equilibrium of r, 
(iii) sis an isolated and strictly perfect equilibrium of r, and 
(iv) s is an isolated and essential equilibrium of r. 
The last characterization of regular equilibria which we give, is 
THEOREM 3.4.5. (cf. JANSEN [1981b], Theorem 7.4). An equilibrium of a bimatrix game 
is regular if and only if it is essential and quasi-strong. 
PROOF. The only if part of the theorem follows from Corollary 2.5.3 and Corollary 
0 




) is an essential and quasi-strong equilibrium of the 








). 1-Jithout lossofgenerality, assume that all payoffs in 
r are positive. In view of Theorem 3.3.2 it suffices to show that R~ and R~ are non-
singular. Assume R~ is row-singular and let x
1 
EX~ be such that x
1 
~ 0 and R~(x 1 ) 0. 
Without loss of generality assume x~ ~ 0 and, for E > 0, define the bimatrix game 
fS,E = s s s,E s (<P1 ,<P2,R1 ,R2) by: 
R~' E ( 1, lè) R~ (1, lè) + E for lè E s <P2' and 
S,E 
R~ (k,lè) for k <PS R1 (k, lè) E 1 ' lè E 
<PS 
2' 
k ~ 1. 
Since s is an essential equilibrium of r, we have that s is an essential equilibrium 
s 
of r and, therefore, if E is sufficiently close to zero, there exists an equilibrium 







but this contradiets our assumption that all payoffs in r are positive. Hence, R~ is 
row-regular. Similarly, it can be shown that R; 
and R; are both nonsingular, which implies that 
s 
is column-regular and, therefore, R
1 
s is a regular equilibrium of _r. [] 
We conclude this section by presenting an example which illustrates, that the results 
obtained in this section are not true for games with more than two players. 
Consider the 3-person game of figure 3.4.1. 
2 2 
0 2 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 
2 0 2 2 0 0 




Figure 3.4.1. The results of this section cannot be generalized togames with more 
than two players. 
The reader can verify, that this game has exactly two equilibria, viz. 
~ = (~ 1 .~ 2 .~ 3 ) = (1,1,1) and ~ = (~ 1 .~ 2 .~ 3 ) = (2,2,2). We will show that the second 






)be a mixed strategy combination. Then, 
we have: 
is a best reply against if and only 
2 1 
~1 s if 2s 2
s
3 




q;3 is a best reply against s if and only if 2s 1 
s
2 
from which it follows that 















<; s1 s2 __ ' 
0. 
Hence, there does not exist a completely mixed strategy combination such that ~ is 
a best reply against s, and so ~ is not perfect. Since this game possesses at least 
one essential equilibrium (by Theorem 2.4.2) and since ~ is not essential (Theorem 
2. 4. 3) , we have that ~ is essential. Hence, ~ is a lso strictly perfect and weakly 
proper. Moreover, ~ is even proper, since in a game in which each player has just 2 
pure strategies, every perfect equilibrium is proper. So, ~ is an isolated, essential, 
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strictly perfect and proper equilibrium. This equilibrium, however, is not regular, 
sirree it is not quasi-strong. 
Notice that this example shows, that a game with finitely many equilibria need not 
possess a regular equilibrium and that there exist games without quasi-strong equi-
libria (the latter phenomenon has also been observed in OKADA [1982]). 
3.5. MATRIX GAMES 
In this section, we consider matix games, i.e. 2-person zero-sum games in normal form. 
We concentrate on proper equilibria and show that an equilibrium is proper if and 
only if both equilibrium strategies are optimal in the sense of DRESHER [1961]. 
Let us first briefly consider the question which conditions an equilibrium has to 
satisfy in order to be regular. In section 3.1, we have seen that the set of equilib-
ria of a matrix game is convex and, therefore, we can conclude from Corollary 2.5.7 
that, if sis a regular equilibrium of a matrix game f, then sis the unique equilib-
rium of r. Conversely, if s is the unique equilibrium of r, then s is isolated and 
proper (since every game has a proper equilibrium) and, therefore, in view of Theorem 
3.4.4, regular. So, we have proved: 
THEOREM 3.5.1. $is a regular equilibrium of a matrix game f if and only if sis the 
unique equilibrium of r. 
In BOHNENBLUST, KARLIN AND SHAPLEY[1950] it is shown, that the set of all matrix games 
with a unique equilibrium is open and dense in the set of all matrix games. By similar 
methods as the ones used in the proof of Theorem 2.6.1, we can prove the slightly 
stronger result, that, within the set of all matrix games, the set of games with an 
irregular equilibrium is closed and has Lebesque measure zero. Hence, we have: 
THEOREH 3.5.2. Almast all matrix games have a unique equilibrium. 
Hence, if a matrix game is "nondegenerate", it has a unique equilibrium. However, in 
practice one almast always encounters degenerate games with more than one equilibrium 
and so the result of Theorem 3.5.2 is not as strong as it might look at first sight. 
Therefore, in the remainder of this section, we will consider matrix games with more 
than one equilibrium and we will investigate whether there exists an equilibrium which 
should be preferred to all others. 
If, in a matix game f, player 1 has more than one optimal (i.e. equilibrium, maximin) 
strategy, then by using any of these he can guarantee himself a payoff of at least 
v(f). If, moreover, his opponent also uses an optimal strategy, then every optimal 
strategy of player 1 yields exactly v(f) and so, if bath players play optimally, there 
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is no reasen to prefer one optimal strategy to another. However, if player 1 consid-
ers the possibility, that his opponent may make a mistake and may, therefore, fail 
to choose an optimal strategy, then by playing a specific optimal strategy he can 
perhaps take maximal advantage of such a mistake. Hence, the question which has to 
be considered is: which strategy should be chosen in order to exploit the potential 
mistakes of the opponent optimally?
1
) One approach in trying to solve this problem, 
is torestriet oneself to perfect equilibria. The game of figure 3.5.1 shows that 





I I I 
Figure 3.5.1. Which strategy should be chosen by player 1 in order to exploit the 
mistakes of player 2 optimally? 
In this game all equilibria are perfect: if player 1 expects that player 2 will choose 
his secend pure strategy with a greater probability than his third, then he should 
play his first strategy; if he expects the third pure strategy of player 2 to occur 
with the greater probability, then he should play his secend strategy; and if he ex-
pects bath mistakes to occur with the same probability, then all his strategies are 
equally good. Hence, if one fellows this approach, one has to knowhow the opponent 
makes his mistakes, in order to obtain a definite answer. 
If one expects that the opponent will make a more costly mistake with a much smaller 
probability than a less costly one and, hence, that the opponent makes his mistakes 
in a more or less rational way, one is led to proper equilibria. According to the 
properness concept in the game of figure 3.5.1, player 2 will mistakenly choose his 
secend strategy with a much greater probability than his third strategy and, there-
fore, player 1 should play his first strategy. Hence, in this example, the properness 
concept leads to a definite answer. Below, we will prove that the same is the case 
for any matrix game. To be more precise, we will prove that proper equilibria of a 
matrix game r are equivalent, where two strategy pairs s and s' are said to be 
equivalent in r if 
l) This question has also been considered in PONSSARD [1976]. 
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A slightly different approach to solve the problem has been proposed in DRESHER [1961]. 
This approach amounts to a lexicographic application of the maximin criterion. The 
idea underlying it is, that, since one does not know befarehand which mistake will be 
made by the opponent, one should follow a conservative plan of action and maximize 
the minimum gain resulting from the opponent's mistakes. If, in the game of figure 
3.5.1, player 1 behaves in this way, then he will play his first strategy, since this 
strategy guarantees a payoff 2 if player 2 makes a mistake, whereas his second 
strategy guarantees only 1 in this case. Hence, in this example, Dresher's approach 
yields a definite answer, which is the same as the one given by the properness concept 
(which is no coincidence, as we will see in Theorem 3.5.5). 
Fora matrix game f = (~ 1 ,~ 2 ,R) Dresher's proceduretoselect a particular optimal 
strategy of player 1 is described as follows: 
(i) Set t 0, write <P~ := ~ 1 , ~~ := ~ 2 and rt (~~,<P~,R). Compute o1 (rtJ, 
i.e. the set of optimal strategiesof player 1 in the game ft 
(ii) If all elements ofo
1 
(ft) are equivalent in rt, then go to (v), otherwise go 
to (iii). 
(iii) Assume that player 2 makes a mistake in rt, i.e. that he assigns a positive 
probability only to the pure strategies which 
than v(ft). Hence, restriet his pure strategy 
yield player 1 a payoff 
t t 
set to ~2 \c2 (r J. 
greater 
(iv) Determine the optimal strategies of player 1 which maximize the minimum gain 
resulting. from mistakes of player 2. Hence, compute the optimal strategiesof 
t+1 t+l t+1 t+l t 
player 1 in the game r := (~ 1 ,~ 2 ,R), where ~l ext o 1 (f ) is the 
(finite) set of extreme optimal strategies of player 1 in rt and 
"'t+l .-_ t t ~2 . ~ 2 \c2 (r ). Replacet by t+l and repeat step (ii). 
(v) The set of Dresher-optimal (or shortly D-optimal strategies ) of player 1 in r 
t 







(f) is well-defined, since in each iteration the number of permissible 
pure strategies of player 2 decreases with at least one, such that, eventually, all 
remaining optimal strategies of player 1 must be equivalent in ft. We claim that all 
D-optimal strategiesof player 1 in f are, in fact, equivalent inf. Let s
1
,sl E Dl (f) 
and let r
0
, ... ,r' be the sequence of games generated by the above procedure. Then 
s
1
,si are quivalent in r', by the definition of D
1 
(f). But then s
1 
and si arealso 




and si both yield v(f ) against ~' or an element of ~ 2 , in which case 
s
1 
and si yield the same against ~. since s
1 
and si are equivalent in r'. Hence, in-
ductively it can be proved that s
1 
and si are equivalent in rt for all tE {O, ..• ,T}, 
which shows, that s
1 
and si are equivalent in r. 
It will be clear that by reversing the roles of the players one obtains a procedure 
for selecting a particular optimal strategy (or more precisely a particular class of 
equivalent optimal strategies) of player 2. The set of all D-optimal strategies of 
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player 2 in f will be denoted by D
2
(f), and the product Dl (f) x D
2
(f) will be denoted 
by D(f). We have already seen: 
LEMMA 3.5.3. If s,s' E D(f), then s and s' are equivalent. 
From the description of Dresher's procedure it will be clear that a D-optimal strat-
egy cannot be dominated. Hence, by Theorem 3.2.2, we have 
THEOREM 3.5.4. A pair of D-optimal strategies constitutes a perfect equilibrium. 
We have already seen, that the converse of Theorem 3.5.4 is false: in the game of 
figure 3.5.1 only (1,1) is D-optimal, whereas all equilibria are perfect. This is 
nat really surprising, since the perfectness concept allows all kinds of mistakes, 
whereas player 1 assumes, if he plays a D-optimal strategy, that his opponent makes 
his mistakes as if he actually wishes to minimize player l's gain resulting from 
his mistakes. Hence, by playinq a D-optimal strategy you optimally exploit the mis-
takes of your opponent only if he makes his mistakes in a rational way. Based on 
this observation, one might conjecture that D-optimal strategies are related to 
proper equilibria. In the following theorem, we prove that this conjecture is correct. 
THEOREM 3.5.5. For matrix games, the following assertions are equivalent: 
(i) s is a proper equilibrium, 
(ii) s is a weakly proper equilibrium, 
(iii) s is a D-optimal strategy pair. 
PROOF. Let r = (~ 1 .~2 ,Rl be a matrix game. It suffices to show, that (ii) implies 
(iii) and that (iii) implies (i). 




) be a weakly proper equilibrium of rand let {s(E)}E~o 






, .•. ,rT be the sequence 









(ft) for all t c {O, ... ,T}. \'Ie will show, by using induction with 
respect to t, that s
1 
has the latter property. 






), sinces is an equilibrium of r. 










(f ) for all t' E {O, ... ,t} and, therefore 
(3. 5.1) 
- 65 -




(f ) , there exists some ~ E 
2 
such that 
(3. 5. 2) 
t t t 
Let W
2 
be the set of all ~ E <1>
2 




(r ) , 
we have 
(3. 5. 3) 
Futhermore, if k c <1>~/\jl~ and ~ E \jl~, then 
for all ~ c \jlt 
2 
from which it follows, by definition of s(E), that 
(3. 5. 4) 
By using (3.5.1), (3.5.3) and (3.5.4) one can show, similarly as in the proof of 
Lemma 3.4.3, that 
for all E sufficiently close to zero, 
but this contradiets the definition of {s(E)} . This establishes the induction 
t s+o 
step, and so s
1 
E Ol (r ) , for all t r: {0, ... T}. Hence, s
1 
E Dl (r). Similarly, .it 













) be a proper equilibrium 
of r. From the first part of the theorem, it follows that s E D(r), hence, by Lemma 
3.5.3, we have that s and s are equivalent. For E > 0, let 5(s) be an c-proper equi-
librium of r such that s(c) converges tos, as E tends to zero. Define s(c) by: 
S. (E) 
~ 
(1- E)S, + ES,(E) 
~ ~ 
for i E {1,2} . 
We will show that s(c) is an c-proper equilibrium of r, if E is sufficiently close 
to zero. It is clear that s(E) is completely mixed. Assume k,~ E <1>
1 
and E > 0 are 
such that 





is equivalent to 5
2
, formula (3.5.6) is equivalent to 
(3. 5. 7) 
If E is sufficiently close to zero, (3.5. 7) implies 










since 5(E) is an E-proper equilibrium of f. From Lemma 2.3.2 we know that s
1 
is a 
best reply against s
2
(E), if E is small, which implies, since s
1 





is a best reply against s
2
(E), if Eis small. Hence, if (3.5.8) is satis-
fied and E is small, then sk = 0. Therefore we have, if E is sufficiently small and 
1 
if (3.5.5) is satisfied 





Similarly, we can prove, that for all E sufficiently close to zero 
if R(s
1 
(E) ,k) > R(s
1 
(E) ,9,), then s~(E) <: ES~(E) for all k,t E <1>
2
, 
and, therefore, s(E) is an E-proper equilibrium of r, if E is sufficiently close to 
zero. Hence, s is a proper equilibrium of f. D 
Since the set of D-optimal strategies of a matrix game can easily be determined (the 
only thing one has to do is to compute the optimal strategy sets of a finite number 
of matrix games, which is an easy task, cf. BALINSKI [1961]), we have, as a conse-
quence of the theorem above, that a proper equilibrium of a matrix game can be com-
puted easily. Furthermore, as a consequence of Lemma 3.5.3 and Theorem 3.5.5 we have 
COROLLARY 3.5.6. If s,s' are weakly proper equilibria of a matrix game , then s and 
s' are equivalent. 
So, a matrix game has essentially one (weakly) proper equilibrium and, therefore if 
one expects the opponent to make his mistakes in a rational way, there is a unique 





In this chapter, games wi th control casts!) are studied. These are normal farm games in 
which each player, in addition to receiving his payoff from the game, incurs casts 
depending on how well he chooses to control his actions. Such a game models the idea 
that a player can reduce the probability of making mistakes, but that he can only 
do so by being extra prudent, hence, by spending an extra effort, which involves some 
costs.The goal of the chapter is to investigate what the consequences are of viewing 
an ordinary normal farm game as a limiting case of a game with control costs,i.e. it 
is examined which equilibria are still viable when infinitesimally control casts 
are incorporated into the analysis of normal farm games. 
In section 4 .1, the motives for studying games wi th control casts are discussed and 
the formal definition of such a game is given, while it is shown in section 4.2, that 
a game with control casts always possesses at least one equilibrium. In this section, 
also a characterization of equilibria of such a game is derived. 
In section 4.3, a first analysis is performed on the question of which equilibria of 
an ordinary normal farm game are still viable when control casts are taken into account, 
i.e. it is investigated which equilibria can be approximated by equilibria of games 
wi th control casts, as these casts go to zero. It is shown that the set of equilibria 
which are approximated may depend on the control casts andthat there exist equilibria 
(even perfect ones) which cannot be approximated. 
In section 4.4,it is shown that the basic assumption underlying the properness concept, 
viz. that a more costly mistake is made with a probability which is of smaller order, 
cannot be justified by the control cast approach. Namely, if the players incur control 
costs,then a non-optimal strategy is chosen with a probability which is inversely 
proportional to the loss which is incurred if this strategy is played. 
In section 4. 5, i t is investigated whether control casts re sult in playing a perfect 
equilibrium. It is shown that this is the case only, if the control casts are 
sufficiently high. For the special case of a bimatrix game, an exact formulation of 
!) The idea to study such games was raised by R.Selten. 
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the control costs being sufficiently high is given. 
Finally, it is shown in section 4.6, that a regular equilibrium is always approximated 
by equilibria of games with control costs,as these costsgo to zero. 
The material in this chapter is basedon VAN DAMME [1982]. 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the 2-person normal form game of figure 4.1.1, in which Missome positive 
real number. 
2 3 
2 1 0 
2 1 0 
2 0 M 
2 2 1 0 
Figure 4.1.1. A bimatrix game to illustrate undesirable properties of the perfect-
ness concept and the properness concept. 
The equilibria of this game are the strategy pairs in which player 2 plays his first 
strategy. What player 1 should do, depends on how player 2 makes his mistakes. If we 





, player should play his first strategy, 





, player should play his second strategy. 
The perfectness concept does not give an apinion on which of these cases will prevail 
and, consequently, all equilibria are perfect. If player 1 believesin the properness 
concept (or weakly properness concept), however, then he should always (no matter 
what the value of M is) choose his first strategy, since, according to this concept, 
p
3 
is of smaller order than p
2 
as a consequence of the fact that player 2 tries much 
harder to prevent playing his third strategy by mistake. 
In this game both the perfectness concept and the properness concept yield unsatis-
factory answers: the perfectness concept does not discriminate between the Nash 
equilibria and the properness concept yields a salution which is independent of M, 
whereas, intuitively, one would say that player 1 should choose his first strategy 
for small values of M and his second strategy for large values of M. 
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The game of figure 4.1.1 illustrates a phenomenon which occurs for many games: Since 
the perfectness concept allows for all kinds of mistakes, there exists a plethora of 
perfect equilibria, some of which are unreasonable; Contrary to this, the properness 
concept severely restricts the possibilities for making mistakes, such that some un-
reasonable perfect equilibria are excluded. However, it is unclear whether it is 
appropriate to restriet oneself to proper equilibria, since the basic assumption 
underlying this concept (viz. that more costly mistakes occur with a probability 
which is of smaller order) is questionable. In this chapter, as well as in the next 
one, we investigate whether this assumption can be justified. It will be clear that, 
in order to judge the reasonableness of this assumption and in order to be able to 
refine the perfectness concept in a well-founded way, one needs a model in which the 
mistake probabilities are endogenously determined, rather than a model in which these 
probabilities can be chosen in some ad hoc way. In this chapter, one such model is 
developed. A second model will be considered in the next chapter. 
Obviously, the reason that the players make mistakes, lies in the fact that they 
are not as careful as is needed to prevent these mistakes. In this chapter, we elab-
orate the idea that the players are not as careful as is needed simply because it is 
too costly to be so careful. The basic idea behind the approach of this chapter is 
that a player can reduce his probability of making mistakes, but that this probabil-
ity can be reduced only by being extra careful. If a player wants to be extra careful, 
this means that he actually has to do something, i.e. that he has to spend an extra 
effort which involves some costs.Hence, in this chapter we assume, that a player 
can reduce his probability of making mistakes, but that he incurs castsin doing so. 
Obviously, the more a player wants to reduce his mistake probability, the more effort 
he has to spend and hence, the higher the cost he incurs. Furthermore, it will be clear 
that, if it becomes increasingly difficult (i.e. increasingly costly) to reduce the 
mistake probability further and further, then a player will choose to prevent mistakes 
only to a certain level and, hence, each player will make mistakes with a positive 
probability. In this chapter, this is viewed as the basic reason why mistakes occur 
and it is investigated what the consequences of this view are, i.e. it is investigated 
whether this view leads to a refinement of the perfectness concept, whether it leads 
to a justification of the properness concept, etc. 
Next, let us state the ideas outlined above more precisely. For the remainder of this 
section, let an n-person normal farmgame f = (<ll
1
, •. .,<Pn,Rl, .. .,Rn) be fixed. Let si be a 
mixed strategy 
I k k . 
L f . ( s , ) lf he 
k l l 
of player i in r. We will assume that player i incurs control costs 
k 
wants to play si in r, where fi represents the cost player i incurs 
due to his special attention to the strategy k. We will assume that player i can 
control all his pure strategies equally good (or equally bad) , which implies that all 
fk are equal tosome function f .. Hence, we assume (although the theory could as well 
i l 
be developed without this assumption, however, see the end of section 4.3). 
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ASSUMPTION 4.1.1. f. 
l 
The function fi is called the control cost function of player i. 
The following assumption has been motivated above. 
ASSUMPTION 4.1.2. f 
l 
[0, 1] _,. lR u{=} is a decreasing function with fi (0) 
Notice that we allow a control cost function to take the value From the fact that 
fi is decreasing it follows, however, that fi {x) < if x > 0. The conventions which 
will be used with respect to -= and = are the same as in ROCKEFELLAR [1970]. 
The exact formulation of the assumption, that it becomes increasingly difficult for 
player i to decrease his mistake probability further and further, is 
if 0 < E < X < y, then f. (x- E) - f. (x) > f. (y- E) - f. (y), 
l l l l 
which is equivalent to saying that fi is strictly convex. 
ASSUMPTION 4.1.3. fi is a strictly convex function. 
Finally, we make an additional assumption for mathematica! convenience. 
ASSUMPTION 4.1.4. fi is at least twice differentiable. 
From now on, a control cost function, is a function for which the Assumptions 
4.1.2- 4.1.4 are satisfied. Let f = (f
1
, ... fn) be an n-tuple of such functions. 
If, in the game r, each player i, in addition to receiving a payoff as described by 
Ri,incurs a costas determined by fi, then the strategie situation is more adequately 
f f f 










for i E N, S E S. 
The game rf is called a game with control costs.Note that in such a game a payoff 
of -= can occur. Strategically this is however irrelevant, since each player can 
guarantee a finite payoff by playing a completely mixed strategy. 
If control costs are present in an ordinary normal form game, these costs will be of 
much less importance than the ordinary payoffs of the game. This can be modelled by 
considering infinitesimally small control costs, i.e. by approximating an ordinary 
normal form game r with games rEf by letting Ego to zero. In this chapter, it is 
investigated what the consequences are of doing so. Hence, we examine which equilib-
Ef 
ria of r are approximated by equilibria of r as E goes to zero. Such equilibria 
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are called f-approachable equilibria, and we are particularly interested in aspects 
as: 
(i) How does the set of f-approachable equilibria depend on f? 
(ii) Is an f-approachable equilibrium perfect (resp. proper)? 
(iii) Is a perfect (resp. proper) equilibrium f-approachable? 
Befare considering these questions, let us first study games with control cast in 
somewhat greater detail. 
4.2. GAMES WITH CONTROL COSTS 
In this section, we prove some elementary properties of games with control casts. 
In particular it is shown, that any such game possesses at least one equilibrium. 
Furthermore, a condition which is necessary and sufficient fora strategy combination 
to be an equilibrium is derived. 





, ... ,Rn) and a fixed n-tuple of control cast functions f = (f
1
, .•• ,fn). 
We write Si for the set of mixed strategies of player i and, if E > 0, then 
(4. 2.1) S. (E) := {s, E S, 
~ ~ ~ 
s~ 2 E for all k}, S(E) 
~ 
n 
iLh si (E) • 
f 
The object of study is the game r , defined as in the previous section. Throughout 
the section, when we speak of a best reply, we will mean a best reply in rf. 
LEMMA 4.2.1. There exists some E >0, such that for all sE S: if sis a best reply 
against s, then sE S(E). 
PROOF. Lets' be an arbitrary completely mixed strategy combination. Since fi(O) 00 , 
we have for each iE N and k E <!>,, 
k s ~0 
i 
which proves the lemma. 
~ 
D 
LEMMA 4.2.2. Every strategy combination has a unique best reply. The mapping which 
assigns to each strategy combination its best reply is continuous. 
PROOF. Lets E S, let E > 0 be as in Lemma 4.2.1 and let i E N. From Lemma 4.2.1, 
we know that every best reply of player i against s is an element of S. (E). Since 
~ 
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S. (c) is compact and since s. + R~(s\s.) is continuous onS. (E), we have that a best 
l l l l l 
reply of player i against s exists. The best reply of player i must be unique, since 
the mapping si R~(s si) is strictly concave. Continuity follows in a standard way. [] 
The unique best reply against s E S in the game rf will be denoted by 
b(s,f) = (b
1 
(s,f), ... ,bn(s,f)). we have 
LEMMA 4.2.3. If s,s E S, then s 
lowing set of equations: 
(4. 2. 2) R. (s\kl - R(s\SOJ 
l 
b(s,f) if and only if s is a salution to the fol-
for all i eN, k,\0 E ~ .• 
l 
PROOF. s = b(s,f) if and only if for each i E N we have that si is a salution of the 
convex programming problem. 
(4. 2. 3) maximize Rf(s\s.) , subject to s. e S .. 
l l l l 
Since every salution of (4.2.3) is in the interior of S., we have that s. eS. solves 
(4.2.3) if and only if 





l l l 
for all k e ~i 
where Ài E ~ is a Lagrange multiplier. This completes the proof, since (4.2.2) is 
noting else than arestatement of (4.2.4) 
Let s c S and let s b(s,f). Formula (4.2.2) shows that 
if R. (s\kl < R. (s\SOJ 
l l 
, then C (s~) < C (s~) 
l l l l 
for all i eN, k,!O E ~i 
Since fi is convex, f~ is increasing and, therefore, we have 
COROLLARY 4.2.4. Let s E S and s b Cs, f). Then 







The following corollary of Lemma 4.2.3, will turn out to be useful in section 4.6: 
LEMMA 4.2.5. Let s e S, i e N, ~. c ~ and s. c S .. If s. is such that 




(4 .2 .6) 
Then s. 
l 







for all k,1 E ~., and 
l 
for all k i~. 
l 










from which it follows, by using the monotonicity of fi, that 
(4 .2. 7) b~(§,f) forsome k E ~1., then sk < bk(§,f) for all k E ~ .• l i l 1 
Formula (4.2.6) has the consequence that 




L b, (s,f), 
kE~. l 
l 
and so, by combining (4.2.7) and (4.2.8), we see that sk 
l 
b~(s,f) for all k E ~ .• D 
l l 
By combining the results of the Lemmas 4.2.1 and 4.2.3, we obtain the main result 
of this section: 
THEOREM 4.2.6. The game rf possesses at least one equilibrium. All equilibria of rf 
are completely mixed. A strategy combination s E S is an equilibrium of rf if and 
only if s is a salution to the following set of equations 




for all i E N, k,1 E ~i. 
PROOF. Let E be as in Lemma 4.2.1. It follows from that lemma, that s is an equilib-
f f f 
rium of r if and only if sis an equilibrium of the game (s
1 
(s), ... ,Sn(E),R1 , •.• ,Rn). 
In view of Theorem 2.1.1, the latter game has an equilibrium and, hence, also rf has 
an equilibrium. Theother assertions of the theorem follow directly from Lemma 4.2.1 
and Lemma 4.2.3. D 
4.3. APPROACHABLE EQUILIBRIA 
In this section, we start investigating the consequences of viewing an ordinary normal 
farm game as a limiting case of a game with control costs.Hence, for an n-person 
normal form gamerand an n-tuple of control cast functions f, we consider the ques-
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tion which strategy combinations of r are approached by equilibria of rcf as E tends 
to zero. Theorem 4.3.1 shows that only equilibria of r can be approached in this way. 
Theorem 4.3.1. Let r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R 1 , ... ,Rn) be an n-person normal form game and let 
f = (f
1
, ... ,fn) be an n-tuple of control cost functions. If sE Sis the limit of a 
sequence {s(E) }c+o with s(c) E E(fcf) for all E, then sis an equilibrium of r. 
PROOF. Assume sis the limit of such a sequence {s(c)}c+o" Let iE N and kc ~i. We 
have to prove that sk = 0 if k is not a best reply against s in r. For E > 0 and 
i 
~ E ~i' we have, by (4.2.9) 
(4. 3.1) R. (s(E)\k) - R. (s(E)\~) 
~ ~ 
If kisnota best reply against sin r, while ~is a best reply against s, then the 
limit (as E tends tozero) of the left hand side of (4.3.1) is negative,hence, in this 
case we have 
which implies, since f. 
k ~ 
zero. Hence, s. = 0, if 
~ 
- oo, 
is decreasing, that sk(E) converges to 
~ 
kisnota best reply against s in r. 
zero, as E tends to 
If one holds the view, that the players in a normal form game always incur some 
infinitely small control casts, then one can consider as being reasonable only 
D 
those equilibria which can be obtained as a limit in the way of Theorem 4.3.1. The 
fact that, in general, such a limit need not exist (see below), motivates the differ-
ent approachability concepts introduced in Definition 4.3.2. 
DEFINITION 4.3.2. Let r be an n-person normal form game and let f = (f
1
, ... ,fn) be 
an n-tuple of control cost functions. A strategy combination s E S is said to be 
weakly [-approachable, if sis a limit point of a collection {s(c)}c+o with 
s(E) E(fEf) for all E; if s is actually the limit of such collection, then s is 
said to be [-approachable, and s is said to be continuously [-approachable if s is 
the limit of such a collection {s(c)}c+o with the property that the mapping E + s(E) 
is continuous in a neighborhood of zero. 
We have the following: 
THEOREM 4.3.3. Let f and f be as in Definition 4.3.2. Then 
(i) if s is weakly f-approachable, then s E E(f), 
(ii) there exists at least one weakly f-approachable equilibrium of r, 
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(iii) if f is such that the equations in (4.2.9) are algebraic, then there exists at 
least one continuously f-approachable equilibrium of r. 
PROOF. (i) follows in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, and (ii) follows 
from Theorem 4.2.6 and the compactness of S. The assertion in (iii) can be proved in 
the same way as in HARSANYI [1973b] (Lemmas 2,3 and 4). 0 
In the remainder of this section, we elucidate the concepts introduced above by com-
puting the set of approachable equilibria in a simple example (the game of figure 
4.3.1). This example will serve to demonstrate the following properties of the ap-
proachability concepts: 
(4.3.2) the set of weakly f-approachable equilibria may depend upon the choice of f, 
(4.3.3) there exist equilibria which fail to be weakly f-approachable for any choice 
of f, and 







Figure 4.3.1. A bimatrix game to illustrate the approachability concepts. 
The equilibria of the game r of figure 4.3.1 are the strategy pairs in which player 2 




) be a pair of control cost functions and, 




(E)) be an equilibrium of rEf. Because of Corollary 4.2.4, 
we have s~(E) > ~ for allE> 0 and, therefore, the equilibria with s~ < ~ fail to 
be weakly f-approachable for any choice of f. 
Next, let us show that every equilibrium with s




forsome choice of f. Let us write p(E) for s
1 
(E) and q(E) for s
2
(E). From (4.2.9) 
we know that p(E) and q(E) satisfy: 
(4. 3. 5) fl (1 - p(E)) - fl (p(E)) 
(4. 3. 6) 
For iE {1,2}, define the mapping gi 
g, (x) 
]._ 
C (1 - x) - C (x) 
]._ ]._ 
q(E)/ E ' 
1/E . 
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Then (4.3.5) and (4.3.6) are equivalent to 
(4. 3. 7) 1/E . 
Since, fi is convex, gi is decreasing and, hence, gi has an inverse hi : [O,oo] +[0,~], 
which is continuous (as follows e.g. from the implicit function theorem). Formula 
(4.3.7) is equivalent to 
(4 .3 .8) p(E) q(E) 
From which it follows that rEf has a unique equilibrium and that this equilibrium 
depends continuously on E. Substituting the expression for 1/E of (4.3.7) in the ex-
pression for p(E) in (4.3.8), yields 





is such that 
lim x f;(x) exists, 
x+o 
where we allow the possibility that L(f
2
) 
tends to zero, we have 




from which it follows that every equilibrium with s
1 
S ~ is continuously f-approach-
able for some f. Namely, choosing 
f
2
(x) 1/x yields L(f
2
) and, hence, 
2 
sl = 0, 
f
2
(x) alogx with a < 0, yields L(f
2
) a and, hence, 0 < 
2 
~. sl < 
f
2
(x) logllogxl yields L(f
2
) 0 and, hence, 
2 
= ~ sl 
Futhermore, it follows from (4.3.9) that f-approachable equilibria may not exist, if 
f
2 
is not nice. Namely, if f
2 
is such that 
liminf x f 2 (x) 
x+o 





which also satisfies the Assumptions 4.1.1- 4.1.4 can be constructed), 
then all equilibria with s~ S ~ will be weakly f-approachable, but none of them is 
f-approachable. 
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Notice that, in the game of figure 4.3.1, the perfect equilibrium is obtained only 
if L(f
2
) = -oo. Intuitively this can be explained as follows. If this condition is 
fulfilled, the castsof player 2 increase very fast if this player tries to reduce 
his mistake probability, which means that player 2 has great trouble in cantrolling 
his actions. In this case, player 2 will play his second strategy with a relatively 
large probability, with the consequence that the second strategy of player 1 is much 
worse than his first strategy, which implies that player 1 will choose his second 
strategy with a small probability. If, however, L(f
2
) > -oo, then player 2 is capable 
of choosing his second strategy with a relatively small probability, which implies 
that the second strategy of player 1 is only a little bit worse than his first one, 
in which case the controlcasts for~e player 1 to choose his second strategy with a 
relatively large probability. 
In section 4.5, we will see that, if both players in a bimatrix game have great trou-
ble in cantrolling their actions, then the control costs will result in a perfect 
equilibrium being played (Theorem 4.5.1). 
We conclude this section by presenting an example which shows that there exist perfect 
equilibria which fail to be weakly f-approachable for any choice oi f. Namely, con-
sider the game of figure 4.1.1 with M = 1. All equilibria of this game are perfect, 
however, the equilibria in which player 1 assigns a probability gr€ater than ~ to 
his second strategy can never be weakly f-approachable, as follows from Corollary 
4.2.4. 
As a consequence of Corollary 4.2.4, the unreasonable perfect equilibria in which a 
player chooses a more costly mistake with a greater probability than a less costly 
one are excluded by the approachability concept. Notice, however, that Corollary 
4.2.4 essentially uses Assumption 4.1.1. If this assumption would not be satisfied 
and if, for instance, in the game of figure 4.1.1 (with M = 1) player 2 could control 
his second strategy much better than his third, then it might be optimal for player 
to choose his second strategy. Hence, to reach the conclusion that there exist per-
fect equilibria which fail to be weakly f-approachable for any choice of f, one essen-
tially needs the assumption that a player can control all his strategies equally good. 
The assertion in (4.3.3), however, remains true for non-identical control costs. 




) of the game of figure 1.5.1 
fails to be weakly f-approachable for any choice of f, even if Assumption 4.1.1 is 
dropped. 
4.4. PROPER EQUILIBRIA 
The basic assumption underlying the concepts of proper and weakly proper equilibria 
is that, if a pure strategy k is worse than a pure strategy ~. then k will be mis-
takenly chosen with a probability which is an order smaller than the probability 
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with which ~ is mistakenly choseno Our objective in this section is to show that 
this assumption cannot be justified by means of the control cost approach as set 
forth in this chaptero 
To make the above statement more precise, consider an n-person normal form game 
r = (~ 1 ,ooo'~n,R 1 ,ooo,Rn) o If sis a weakly proper equilibrium of rand if {s(E)}E~o 
is as in Definition 2o3o4, then for all i,k,~ 
(4 o4 o1) 
k 
if R. (s\k) < R. (s\~) , then lim si (E)/ ~ 
l l E~O /si (E) 
0 0 
In this section, it will however be shown that, if f is an n-tuple of control cost 
functions and if the equilibriums of ris continuously approached by s(E) E E(fEf), 
then for all i,k,~ 
(4 o4 0 2) 
k 
if R. (s\k) < R. (s\~) < max R. (s\k'), then limsup si (Els~ > Oo 
l l k'E~ l E~O Si (E) 
i 
Hence, if a player incurs control costs,then he will notmake a more costly mistake 
with a probability which is an order smaller than the probability of a less costly 
one. 
This section is devoted to the proof of (4o4o2), as well as several specializations 
of it for cases in which the control cost functions satisfy some extra conditionso 
For the remainder of the section, let an n-person normal form game 
f = (~ 1 , ooo'~n'R 1 ,ooo'Rn) and an n-tuple of control cost functions f 
be fixedo Furthermore, assume s E E(f) is continuously approached by 
E tends to Oo Let i E N and assume, without loss of generality, that 
suppose k,~ E ~i are such that 
(4 o4 0 3) R. (s\k) < R. (s\~) < R. (s\1) ma x 
k'E~ 
i 
l l l 
To simplify notation, we write, 
(4 o4o4) K (E) .- l(E) À ( E) 
l 
S ~ ( E) , ]J ( E) 
l 
R. (s\k') ) o 
l 
= (f1,ooo,fn) 
S(E) EE(fEf) as 
s
1 
> Oo Finally, 
l 
The proof of (4o4o2) is basedon formula (4o2o9) 0 From that formula we see that for 
every E > 0 
(4o4o5) 
R. (s(E)\1) - R. (S(E)\~) - Ef~ (]J(E)) 
l l l 
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from which it follows, that for every E > 0 
K(E) K(E)f:(K(E)) [R.(s(E)\1) - R.(s(E)\9,)- Ef:(\l(E))J 
l 1 l l 
(4 .4.6) 
À(E) À(E)f:(À(E)) [R,(s(E)\1) - R.(s(E)\k)- Ef:(\l(E))] 
l l l l 
Since both k and ~are nota best reply against s, we have that K(E) and À(E) con-
1 
verge to 0 as E tends to 0. Since, furthermore, \l(E) tends to si > 0, we immediately 
deduce from (4.4.6) 
THEOREM 4.4.1. If lim 
x+o 




R. (s/1) - R, (s/~) 
~ ~ 
R. (s/1) - R. (s/k) 
~ ~ 
Loosely speaking, Theorem 4.4.1 says that, if the condition of the theorem is satis-
fied, a pure strategy which is not a best reply is chosen with a probability which 
is inversely proportional to the loss the player incurs, when he plays this strategy. 
In Theorem 4.4.2, we show that a similar property holds in case lim x f: {x) 
x+o 
1 
THEOREM 4.4.2. If lim x C (x) -oo, then 
x+o 
~ 
s~ (E) R. (s\1) - R. (s\~) 
limsup 
~ ~ ~ 
s~ ( E) 
2: 
E+o R. (s\1) - R. (s\k) 
~ ~ ~ 
PROOF. The theorem immediately follows from (4.4.6), if there exists a sequence 
{Et} tElN converging to 0 and such that 
K(E )f:{K(E )) < À(E )f:(À(E )) 
t ~ t t ~ t 
for all t. 
Assume such a sequence does not exist and let El > 0 be such that 





(4.4.8) K{E) < À(E) 
Note that such E
1 
can be found, because of Corollary 4.2.4. Since À(E) depends 
continuously on E and converges to 0 as E tends to 0, we can define a sequence 
(4 .4. 9) À {E) 
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Let us write Kt (resp. Àt) for K(Et) (resp. À(Et)). Since Et converges to 0 ast tends 
to infinity, Àt converges also to 0. Furthermore, we have 
for all t E N, 
which contradiets the condition of the theorem. 
Befare proving (4.4.2), we consider another special case in which a result, similar 
to the one of Theorem 4.4.2, holds. 
THEOREM 4.4.3. If the limit in formula (4.4.10) exists, then 
l(E) R. (s\ 1) - R. (s\~) 
(4. 4. 10) lim 
l l l 
? 
E-l-0 S :(E) R. (s\1) - R. (s\k) 
l l l 
PROOF. Assume that the limit in (4.4.10) exists, but that the inequality in this 
formula is not valid. Let s
1 
be such that (4.4.8) is satisfied, define {Et}tE~ as 
0 
in (4.4.9) and let Kt and Àt(t E ~) bedefinedas above. Our assumptions imply, that 
lim 
À - À 
t t+l 
< 
R. (s\1) - R. (s\n 
l l 
R. (s\1) - R. (s\k) 
l l 
which, when combined with (4.4.5), yields 
< 1' 
which in turn implies that 
Therefore we have, since f~ is increasing 
Àt 
~ J f~ (x)dx? ~(Àt- Àt+l)f~ (Àt+l) > -oo , 
Àt+l 




As an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.4.3, we have 
COROLLARY 4.4.4. The basic assumption underlying the (weakly) properness concept 
cannot be justified by the control cost approach (i.e. the statement in (4.4.2) is 
correct). 
4.5. PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
In section 4.3, we saw that f-approachable equilibria need not be perfect: the perfect 
equilibrium of the game of figure 4.3.1 is f-approachable only if the control cost 
have considerable influence on the strategy choice of player 2, i.e. only if 
U_m x f' (x) = -oo. By reversing the roles of the players in this game, it is clear 
x+o 2 
that also ~~~x fl (x) = -oo is necessary to enforce that, for every bimatrix game, 
only perfect equilibria will be f-approachable. In the next theorem we show that 
these conditions are also sufficient to guarantee perfectness for bimatrix games. 




) be a pair of control cost functions, such that 
lim x C (x) for i 1 '2 . 
x+o l 
Then, for every bimatrix game, every weakly f-approachable equilibrium is perfect. 
PROOF. Let r = (~ 1 .~ 2 ,R 1 ,R2 ) be a bimatrix game. We will prove that every f-approach-
able equilibrium is perfect (the general case can be proved by the same methods). 
Hence, let s be an f-approachable equilibrium of rand, for E > 0, let s(s) E E(fsf) 
be such that s(s) converges to sas s tends to 0. In view of Theorem 3.2.2, if suf-










). Since every s
2
(s) is completely mixed, we have 
and, therefore, for every s > 0, there exist ks E C(s
1





















> 0 . 
kEC (s 1 ) 





). Since ~(s 1 + s1 ) dominates s 1 , we can assume C(s 1 ) 




). Withoutlossof generality, assume 1 E C(s
2
). From (4.2.9) we obtain 
that, for every E > 0 
(4.5.2) 
~ 
Multiplying both sides of (4.5.2) with s
2
(E) and using the condition of the theorem, 
~ 
tagether with the fact that s
2







Applying (4.2.9) with respect to player 1 yields, that for all k,k E C(s
1
) and all 
E > 0 
k k 









The limit, as E goes to 0, of the right hand side of (4.5.4) is finite. For the left 




and because of (4.5.1) and (4.5.3): 
The contradietien shows that s
1 
cannot be dominated. Similarly it can be shown, that 
s2 is undominated and, therefore, s is a perfect equilibrium of r. 
The reader might wonder whether Theerem 4.5.1 can be generalized to n-person games. 
A simple example can serve to show that, in order to guarantee perfectness in this 
case, the control costs have to satisfy more stringent conditions. Namely, consider 
the game r described by the following rules: 
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0 
(i) There are n players, every one of them having 2 pure strategies. 
(ii) Each player iE {2, ... ,n} receives 1 if he plays his first strategy and 0 if 
he plays his second one. 
(iii) The first strategy of player 1 yields him 1 if all players play 1 or if all 
other players play 2 and 0 otherwise; his second strategy yields 1 if all other 
players play 1 and 0 otherwise. 
r can be considered as an n-person analogon of the game of figure 4.5.1. 




) be an n-tuple of identical control cost functions. Then, in the 
same way as in section 4.3, it is seen that the perfect equilibrium of r (in which 
all players choose their first strategy) is f-approachable if and only if 
n-1 
~t~ x fi (x) ~ -oo. Hence, in order to obtain perfectness for n-person games, the 
control castshave to go to infinity very fast. It is unknown to the author, whether, 
for an n-tuple of control cost functions f ~ (f
1
, ... ,fn) which is such that 
n-1 
~t~ x fi (x) ~ -oo for all i E N, only perfect equilibria of an n-person game are 
f-approachable. 
The results obtained in this section are of some relevanee with respect to the 
Harsanyi/Selten salution theory for noncooperative games (HARSANYI [1978], HARSANYI 
AND SELTEN [1980, 1982]). An essential element in this theory is the tracing procedure 
(or more precisely the logarithmic tracing procedure, HARSANYI [1975]), which is a 
mathematical procedure to determine a unique salution of a noncooperative game, once 
one has given for each player i a probability distribution p., representing the 
l 
other players' initial expectations about player i's likely strategy choice (how 
these pi's should be determined is another important element of the theory). Since 
the Harsanyi/Selten theory has to prescribe a perfect equilibrium as the salution of 
a noncooperative game r (cf. Chapter 1), todetermine the salution of a game r, how-
ever, one cannot apply the theory directly to r, but rather one has to apply the 
theory toa sequence of perturbed games {(f,n)} , . If it would be the case that the 
nyo 
tracing procedure would always (no matter which prior is chosen) end up with a perfect 
equilibrium, then one could circumvent this circuitious way and apply the theory 
directly to r (which would simplify the theory considerably). Unfortunately, the 
tracing procedure may yield a non-perfect equilibrium for some priors. Namely, the 
logarithmic tracing procedure involves approximating a normal form game with games 
with logarithmic control costsand since logarithmic functions do not satisfy the 
condition of Theorem 4.5.1, one may expect non-perfect equilibria. A simple example 
where this occurs is the game of figure 4.3.1, but this example is not really con-
vincing, since Harsanyi argues that one should first eliminate all dominated pure 
strategies, befare applying the tracing procedure (HARSANYI [1975], p.69~. 
However, also examples without dominated pure strategies, in which, nevertheless, the 
tracing procedure yields a non-perfect equilibrium can be constructed. 
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4.6. REGULAR EQUILIBRIA 
In section 4.3, we saw that, for a given game r, the set of equilibria of r which 
are weakly f-approachable may depend upon the choice of f and, that there does not 
necessarily exist an equilibrium of r which is weakly f-approachable for every possible 
choice of f. This raises the question which conditions an equilibrium has to satisfy, 
in order to be weakly f-approachable for every possible choice of the control cost 
functions f. This question is answered in Theorem 4.6.1, the proof of which is the 
subject of this section. 
THEOREM 4.6.1. A regular equilibrium is f-approachable for every possible choice of f. 
PROOF. Assume s is a regular equilibrium of an n-person normal form game 
r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R 1 , ... ,Rn) and let f = (f 1 , ... ,fn) be an n-tuple of control cost func-
tions. We have to construct, for every sufficiently small s > 0, an equilibrium s(s) 
of rsf, such that s(s) converges to sas s tends to 0. This desired s{s) will be 
constructed by using the implicit function theorem in combination with Brauwer's 
fixed point theorem. 
Let us first fix our notation. We write 
n 
'V, ~. \C (s.) 'V iD1\jli l l l 
F (~. 'JR l 
n 
X. x ill1Xi l l 
n 
Y. F(c(s.),JR) y iD1yi l l 
n 
z. F ('V.' JR l z .- iD1 2 i l l 
A generic element of Xi is denoted by xi, etc. If x E X, then we write x (y,z) 
where y Y and z E Z. The equilibrium s is viewed both as an element of X and as an 
element of Y. The restrietion of x E X to Z is denoted by Çx and b(x,s) denotes the 
best reply against x in the game rsf. Finally, withoutlossof generality, it is as-
sumed that (1, ... ,1) E C(s). 
Sinces is a quasi-strong equilibrium of r (Corollary 2.5.3), there exists a neigh-
borhood X of s in X, such that 
x~ > 0 
l 
R. (x\k) < R. (x\1) 
l l 
for all x EX, iE N and k E C(s.), 
l 
for all x EX, i EN and k E 'Vi, 
from which it follows, as in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, that 
(4 .6.1) lim Çb{x,s) 
E+o 
0 for all x E X . 
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R.(x\k)- R.(x\1) - E[f:(x~)- f~(s~)] for iEN,kEC(s.),k+'1, 
l l l l l l l 
/:x~ - 1 
k l 
for iE N. 
F is a differentiable mapping and, since s is a regular equilibrium of r, we have 
3F(x, s) I 
ay (s,O) is nonsingular. 
Hence, by the implicit function theorem (DIEUDONNE [1960], p.268) there exist neigh-
borhoods Y of s in Y, Z of 0 = Çs in Z and E of 0 in JR+, as well as a differentiable 
mapping y: Z x E ->- Y, such that 
(4.6.4) {(y,z,s) EYxZxE F(y,z,E) = 0} {(y(z,E),z,E); ZEZ, EEE}. 
Since every open neighborhood contains a closed neighborhood (i.e. closed set with 
nonempty interior) , we can choose Y and Z such that 
(4.6. 5) Y x Z c X and Z is compact and convex. 
Define mappings x and z with domain Z x E, by 
X(z, E) (y(z, s) ,z) Z(z,s) := Çb(X(z,E),E). 
Note that both mappings are continuous, because of Lemma 4.2.2. In view of (4.6.1) 
and (4.6.3), we can choose E so small that 
(4 .6.6) Z(z,s) E Z for all z E Z and s E E. 
Let E be such that (4.6.6) is satisfied and let E E E. The mapping z ->- Z(z,s) is a 
continuous mapping from the nonempty compact and convex set Z into itself and, hence, 
by Brauwer's Fixed Point Theorem (LEFSCHETZ [1949], p.117) this mapping has a fixed 
point. Let z(E) be a fixed point of this mapping and let us write x(s) for X(z (s),s). 
From (4.6.4) we can conclude that 




C(x~(s))] for iEN, kEC(sl.)and 
l l 
for iE N. 
Furthermore, since z(E) is a fixed point of the mapping z ~ Çb(X(z,E) ,E), we have 
(4 .6. 9) Çx ( E) Z (E) Çb(x(E) ,E). 
From (4.6.7)-(4.6.9) it follows, by applying Lemma 4.2.5, that x(E) is an equilibrium 




Games with incomplete information are games in which some of the data are unknown to 
some of the players. In this chapter, a particular class of games with incomplete 
information, the class of disturbed games, is studied. A disturbed game is a normal 
form game in which each player, although knowing his own payoff function exactly, 
has only imprecise information about the payoff functions of his opponents. We study 
such games, since we feel that it is more realistic to assume that each player always 
has some slight uncertainty about the payoffs of his opponents, rather than to assume 
that he knows these payoffs exactly. Our objective in this chapter is to study what 
the consequences are of this more realistic point of view. 
Disturbed games are introduced informally in section 5.1 and formally in section 5.2. 
In this latter section it is also shown that every disturbed game possesses an equi-
librium, provided that some continuity condition is satisfied. 
In section 5.3, it is shown that equilibria of disturbed games converge to equilibria 
of undisturbed games as the disturbances go to 0. Equilibria which can be approximated 
in this way are called P-stable equilibria, where P summerizes the characteristics of 
the disturbances (i.e. of the uncertainty the players have). Since there exist equi-
libria which fail to be P-stable wathever Pis, not every equilibrium of a normal 
form game is viable, when the slight uncertainty which each player has about his 
opponents' payoffs is taken into account. 
The main result of section 5.4 states that, if the uncertainty about the payoffs is 
of a special kind, this uncertainty will force the players to play a perfect equilib-
rium. Hence, under some conditions on P, every P-stable equilibrium is perfect. There 
exist, however, perfect equilibria which for every choice of P fail to be P-stable. 
If the uncertainty about the payoffs is of a very special kind, the players will be 
forced to play a weakly proper equilibrium, as is shown in section 5.5. This implies 
that the assumption that a considerably worse mistake is chosen with a considerably 
smaller probability than a less costly mistake is justifiable. The properness concept, 
however, cannot be justified by the approach of this chapter. 
In general, the set of equilibria which are P-stable may depend upon the choice of 
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(i.e. upon the exact characteristics of the disturbances). However, in section 5.6, 
it is shown that every strictly proper equilibrium of a normal form game r is P-stable 
for all disturbances P which occur only with a small probability and that every regu-
lar equilibrium is P-stable for all disturbances P. 
Finally, section 5.7 is devoted to the (technical) proofs of the results of section 
5. 5. 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapters we have assumed that each participating player in a game 
knows the payoff functions (utility functions) of the other players exactly. This 
assumption is, however, questionable, due to the subjective character of the utility 
concept. It is more realistic to assume that each player, although knowing his own 
payoff function exactly, has only somewhat imprecise information about the payoffs 
of the other players. In this chapter, the consequences of this more realistic point 
of view will be investigated. Hence, we will examine which influence inexact infor-
mation about the payoffs has on the strategy choices in a normal form game. 








Figure 5.1.1. The influences of incomplete information on the strategy choices. 
r has two equilibria, viz(1,1) and (2,2). Next, let us suppose that each player only 
knows that his own payoffs are as in r and that the payoffs of his opponent are ap-
proximately as described by r. In this case, is it still sensible for player 1 to 
play his second strategy? It is only sensible for him to do so, if he is absolutely 
sure that player 2 will play his second strategy. However, since he is not sure that 
the payoffs of player 2 are actually as prescribed by r, he cannot be sure of this. 
Namely, the actual payoffs of player 2 might be such that his first strategy strictly 
dominates his second, in which case player 2 will certainly play his first strategy. 
Hence, there is a positive probability that player 2 will play his first strategy, 
which implies that the only rational choice for player 1 is to play his first strategy. 
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Similarly, it is seen that also player 2 has to play his first strategy and, hence, 
only the equilibrium (1,1) is viable when each player has somewhat imprecise infor-
mation about the other player's payoffs. 
The example shows that there exist equilibria which are not viable when the slightun-
certainty each player has abouttheother players' payoffs is taken into account. Our 
aim in this chapter is to investigate which equilibria are still viable in this case. 
To model the situation in which each player is uncertain about the payoffs of the 
other players, we will follow the approach as proposed in HARSANYI [1968, 1973a]. 
The basic assumption underlying this approach is, that this uncertainty is caused 
by the fact that each plaxer's utility function is subject to small random fluctua-
tions as aresult of changes in this player's mood or taste, the precise effects of 
which will be known only to this player himself. Hence, we will consider games with 
randomly fluctuating payoffs (which will be called disturbed games) rather than games 
with a priori fixed and constant payoffs. According to this model·, a game in which 
each player has exact knowledge of the payoff functions of the other players corre-
sponds to the limiting situation in which the random disturbances are 0. Therefore, 
to model the situation in which each player has slight uncertainty about the payoffs 
of the other players, we will consider sequences of disturbed games in which the 
disturbances go to 0. Hence, in order to answer the question of which equilibria are 
still viable in the case where each player has some slight uncertainty about the 
payoffs of his opponents, we will investigate which equilibria are approximated by 
equilibria of such disturbed games. Such equilibria will be called stable equilibria. 
In the game of figure 5.1.1, only the perfect equilibrium(1,1) is stable. This is 
not really surprising, since for each player the situation in which he is slightly 
uncertain about the payoffs of his opponent is equivalent to the situation in which 
he knows that his opponent with a small probability makes mistakes. Since sarnething 
similar is true for an arbitrary game (at least if Assumption 5.3.3. is satisfied), 
the disturbed game model can be viewed as a model in which the mistake probabilities 
are endogenously determined. This makes it interesting to look at the relations 
between stable equilibria on the one side and perfect (resp. weakly proper, resp. 
proper) equilibria on the other side. We will see that, under some conditions on 
the disturbances, a stable equilibrium is perfect, but that the converse is not true. 
Hence, the approach of this chapter yields (for normal form games) a refinement of 
the perfectness concept. Moreover, we will see that, under stronger conditions on 
the disturbances, every stable equilibrium is weakly proper. This implies that the 
assumption of a considerably worse mistake being chosen with an order smaller proba-
bility than a less costly mistake is justifiable. However, since stable equilibria 
possess more monotonicityproperties than arbitrary weakly proper equilibria, not 
every weakly proper equilibrium is stable and so our approach yields a refinement of 
the weak properness concept. Finally, we will see that the assumption that also a 
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little bit more costly mistake will be chosen with a probability of smaller order 
cannot be justified by the disturbed game approach and, consequently, a stable equi-
librium need to be proper. 
To conclude this section, let us say sarnething about the terminology which is used 
throughout the chapter. 
\-Ie consider a f ixed class of n-person normal form games G (<I> 
1 
, .... <l>n) . A game in th\s 
classis completely determined by its payoff vector r = (r
1
, ... ,rn)' where ri E lRm 
m* 
is given by (2.1.13). We assume lR is endowed with its Borel cr-field Rand whenever 
we speak of measurable, we mean Borel measurable. In order to have a consistent 
framewerk for our probability calculations, we assume a basic probability space 
(~,A,F) is given. All random variables to be considered are defined on this space. 
m* 
If Xi is a random vector with values in lR , then Xi (~) is the component of Xi 
corresponding to ~ E <!>. Futhermore, for s E s, the random variabie Xi (s) is defined 
by xi (s) := l:s (~)X.(~). 
~ l 
We use standard measure theoretic terminology. Standard results from measure theory 
will be used without giving references. For proofs as well as for definitions of 
measure theoretic concepts, we refer to HALHOS [1950] or KINGMAN AND TAYLOR [1966]. 
5.2. DISTURBED GAMES 
In this section, we introduce the model (the disturbed game f(~)) by means of which 
we will investigate what the consequences are of each player not knowing the payoff 
functions of the other players exactly. This model is a generalization of the model 
introduced in HARSANYI [1973a]. Furthermore, it is shown that every disturbed game, 
which satisfies some continuity cond~tion, possesses at least one equilibrium. 
DEFINITION 5.2.1. Let r = (<!> , ••• ,<!> ,R
1
, ... ,R) be an n-person normal form game and 
1 n n * 
let~ (~ 1 , ... ,~n) be an n-tuple of probability measures on lRm. For iE N, let 
Xi be a random vector with distribution ~i· The disturbed game f(~) is described by 
the following rules: 
(i) Chance chooses an outcome x of X. 
(ii) Player i (iE N) gets to hear the outcome xi of Xi (and nothing more). 
(iii) Player i (iE N) chooses an element s. E S .. 
l l 
(iv) If the outcome x= (x
1
, .. -.xn) resulted in (i) and if s = (s
1
, .. "'sn) has been 
chosen in (iii), then player i receives the expected payoff R~i(s) :=R.(s) +x.(s). 
l l l 
It is assumed that the basic characteristics of f(~), i.e. the gameritself and the 
distributions (~ 1 , ... ,~n) are known to all players; the outcome of Xi, however, is 
only known to player i. The probability distribution ~i represents the information 
which every player different from i has about the disturbances in the payoffs of 
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player i; the precise effects of the disturbances are known only to the player himself. 
The disturbed game f(~) is a (possibly infinite) extensive form game with perfect 
reeall (cf. Assumption 6.1.7) and, therefore, the players can restriet themselves 
to behavier strategiesin f(~) (AUMANN [1964]), a behavior strategy of player i being 
a measurable function o. 
l 
m* 
from F to S .. Two behavier strategies of player i are said 
l 
to be equivalent if they differ only at a set of ~.-measure zero. If o. is a behavier 
l l 
strategy of player i, then oi induces an element si of Si defined by si Joid~i· 
We call si the aggregate of oi. If player i plays oi, then to an outside observer 
(who knows nothing about *Xi) it will look as if i plays the aggregate si of oi. 
For i E N, k E <!>i, x i E Fm and s E S, we define 
( 5. 2.1) B. (sI x.) {k E <!> . . ' R~i(s\k) max R~i (s\Q.)}, and l l l l Q.e<!>, l 
l 
(5.2.2) x~ (s) := {x. E m* F k E B. (sI x.)} 
l l l l 
Bi (slxi) is the set of all pure best replies of player i against a behavior strategy 
combination with aggregate s, if the realization of Xi is xi. We say that a behavior 
strategy combination o is an equilibrium of f(~) if each player i always (i.e. for 
all realizations of Xi) chooses a best reply. Hence, a strategy combination o with 
aggregate s is an equilibrium of f(~) if we have 
(5.2.3) if ok(x.) > 0, then k eB. (slx.) 
l 1 l 1 
or equivalently 
(5. 2 .4) if o~(x.) > 0, then x. e Xk(s) 
1 l l l 
m* 
for all i EN, k e <!>. and x. E F 
l l 
m* 
for all i E N, k e <!>. and x. E F 
l l 
The disturbed game f(~) can be expected to possess an equilibrium only if some con-
tinuity conditions are satisfied. Therefore, tbraughout the chapter, we will assume: 
ASSUMPTION 5.2.2. Every ~. can be written as~ 
d l i 
where ~i is a discrete probability measure with 
d 
= ai~i + (1 -
only finitely 
ac . [ 
ai)~i wlth ai e 0,1), 
many atoms and where 
ac 
~i is a probability measure which is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue 
measure, such that the associated density f. is continuous. 
l 
Next, we will show that the disturbed game f(~) possesses an equilibrium, if ~ satis-
fies Assumption 5.2.2. For related (and, in fact, strenger) existence results, we 
refer to MILGROM AND WEBER [1981] and to RADNER AND ROSENTHAL [1982]. Our proof, 
which follows the ideas outlined in HARSANYI [1973a], proceeds by constructinga 
correspondence B from S toS whose fixed pointsinduce equilibria in f(~). Let us 
first show how B comes about. Let f(~) be such that Assumption 5.2.2 is satisfied 
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and, for i EN and s E s, define b~c(s) as the vector of which the kthcomponent is 
l. 
given by 
(5.2.5) \l~c <X~ (s)) 
l. l. 
As a consequence of the fact that 
( 5. 2 .6) 
k 2 m* x X. (s) n X. (s) c {x. E JR R,i(s\k) 
l l l l 
for k E 1> .• 
l. 
and since, if k ~ ~. the set in the right hand side of (5.2.6) is a hyperplane with 
Lebesgue measure 0, we have 
(5. 2. 7) 0 if k ~ ~-
Formula (5.2.7) implies that b~c(s) ES. for all iE N, sE s. Another important 
l. l. 
consequence of (5.2.7) is, that s ES is the aggregate of an equilibrium a of f(\1) 
if and only if every component si of s can be written as 
(5.2.8) S, 
l. 
with b.(slx.) E convB.(slx.) 
l. l. l. l. 
for all x. E A. , 
l. l. 
where A. denotes the set of atoms of 11. and where "conv" stands for "convex hull", 
l. l. 
hence conv Bi (slxi) is thesetof all mixedstrategiesof player i with Carrier Bi (slxj). 
Namely, it immediately follows from (5.2.3)-(5.2.4) that the aggregate sof an equi-
librium a of f(\1) satisfies (5.2.8) and, conversely, if s E s satisfies (5.2.8), then 
every behavior strategy combination , defined by 
if X. E A., 
l. l. 
for i E N, 
a.(x.) E conv B.(slx.) 
l l l 1 
otherwise, 
is an equilibrium of f(\1). Hence, to prove that f(\1) possesses an equilibrium, it 
suffices to show that there exists some s E S for which (5.2.8) is satisfied for every 
i E N. Now, for i E N and s E S, define the subset Bi (s) of Si by 






conv B.(slx.) + (1- a.){b~c(s)} 
l l l l 
and let B(s) := (B
1 
(s) , ... ,Bn(s)). Then the fixed points of B correspond to the solu-
tions of (5.2.8), hence, f(\1) has an equilibrium if B possesses a fixed point. This 
however follows from the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem (KAKUTANI [1941]): Since A. is 
l. 
finite, Bi (s) is nonempty compact and convex, for every s E S, while the finiteness 
ac 
of Ai and the continuity of the density of \li imply that the correspondence Bi is 
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upper semi continuous. Hence, we have proved 
THEOREM 5.2.3. Every disturbed game possesses at least one equilibrium. 
Note that it follows from (5.2.7) that, if every yi is atomless (the case which is 
considered in HARSANYI [1973a]), then, in every equilibrium of f(y), each player will 
choose a pure strategy (an element of ~i) almast everywhere. Moreover, in this case, 
there exists for every equilibrium o of f(y) another equilibrium o' of f(y) such that 
m* 
o' is equivalent to o and such that o~ (x.) E ~. for all iE N and x. E ~ Such o' 
l l l l 
is called a purification of o. Hence, we have 
THEOREM 5.2.4. (HARSANYI [1973a]). If every yi is atomless, then every equilibrium 
of f(y) has a purification. 
For more results on purification we refer to MILGROM AND WEBER [1980], AUMANN et al. 
[1981] and to RADNER AND ROSENTHAL [1982]. We will return to this subject in section 
5.6. 
Abcve, we have seen that there is a one-to-one correspondence between equivalence 
classes of equilibria of f(y) and elements s E s for which (5.2.8) is satisfied. 
Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter, when we speak of an equilibrium of 
f(y), we will mean an element sE S for which 5.2.8 is satisfied. Thesetof equilib-
ria of f(y) will be denoted by E(f(y)). 
5.3. STABLE EQUILIBRIA 
In order to investigate which equilibria of an ordinary normal farm game are still 
viable in the case where each player has some slight uncertainty abcut the exact pay-
offs of the other players, we will approximate a normal farm game r with disturbed 
games {f(yE)} + in which the disturbances go to 0 as E tends to 0. 
E 0 
We will first consider the case in which yE converges weakly to 0 as E tends to 0 
or more precisely the case in which yE converges weakly to the probability distribu-
·tion which assigns all mass to 0 )cf. BILLINGSLEY [1968]). We say that yE converges 
weakl~ to 0 as E tends to 0 (which we denote by yE ~ O(E~O)) if 
lim y~(A) 
E+o 1 
~ l. 1 for all neighborhoods A of 0 in ~ and all E N. 
If yE ~ 0 (E~O), then forsmallE the players are almast sure that the payoffs in 
f(yE) are very close to the payoffs in r. Note that, ifyE is the distribution of the 
random vector XE, then yE ~ 0 (E~O) corresponds to XE converges in probability to 0 
as E tends to 0. 
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THEOREM 5.3.1. Let r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R 1 , ... ,Rn) be a normal form game and, for E > 0, E E E E W 
let~ = (~ 1 , ••• ,~n) be an n-tuple of probability distributions such that ~ ~ 0 
(E~O). LetsE S and asswne that, for E > 0, there exists s(E) E E(f(~E)) such that 
s = lim s(E). Then sE E(f). 
E+o 
PROOF. Let i E N and asswne k,~ E ~. are such that R. (s\k) < R. (s\~). \~e have to 
~ ~ k k ~ 
show that s. lim s. (E) = 0. It follows 
~ E+o ~ m* 
from our asswnption, that there exist neigh-
borhoods U of s in JRm and V of 0 in lR , such that, for all § E U and xi E V 
If Eis sufficiently small, then s(E) EU and X~(s(E)) n V 
~ 
E m* 
<; ~. [JR \V], 
~ 
from which we see that indeed lim s~(E) 
E+o ~ 
o. 
0, which implies that 
D 
In the introduetion of the chapter, we have seen that, in general, not all equilibria 
of a normal form game can be obtained as a limit in the way of Theorem 5.3.1. This 
observation motivates the following definition. 
DEFINITION 5.3.2. Let r be a normal farm game and let P = {~E ;E > O} be a net of 
probability distributions such that JlE ~ 0 (E-> 0). An equilibriwn s of r is said to 
be P-stable if s = lim s(E), where s(E) E E(f(~E)) for allE> 0. 
E+o 
Similarly as in the previous chapter (Definition 4.3.2), one can also define the 
notions weakly P-stable and continuously P-stable. In this chapter, however, we will 
restriet our attention to P-stable equilibria (although various results can be gener-
alized to weakly stable equilibria :>r continuously stable equilibria). 
A main topic in this chapter is, to investigate whether a P-stable equilibrium is 
perfect. A simple example can already show that, to establish perfectness, P has to 
have some additional properties. Namely, consider the game r of figure 4.3.1 and, for 
E E E E E 
E > 0, let~ = (~ 1 ,~ 2 ) be such that ~ 1 ~ 2 is the uniform distribution on the sphere 
(in JR4 ) with radius E and centre 0. If E is small, player 2 will play his first 
strategy with probability 1 in f(~E) and, so, due to symmetry, player 1 will play 
both his pure strategies with probability ~. This shows that, if P := {~E; E>O}. 
then only the non-perfect equilibriwn in which player 1 chooses both strategies with 
the same probability is P-stable. 
Obviously, the reason that in this example the perfect equilibrium is nat obtained, 
is the fact that ~ E has a bounded support. One can reasonably expect every P-stable 
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equilibrium to be perfect only in the case in which P = {~E : E > O} is such that 
every equilibrium of f(~E) is completely mixed. This is assured by the following 
assumption, which we assume throughout the remainder of the chapter. 
m* 
ASSUMPTION 5.3.3. For every i E N we have that Lebesgue measure on F is absolutely 
continuous with respect to ~i (i.e. if À(A) > 0, then ~i (A) > 0 for every A EB). 
k 
Let f(~) be a disturbed game. Since the set Xi (s) has positive Lebesgue measure, for 
all i,k and s this set also has positive ~i-measure (and, hence, positive ~:c-measure) 
if Assumption 5.3.3 is satisfied. Hence, from (5.2.8), we see 
COROLLARY 5.3.4. If Assumption 5.3.3 is satisfied, every equilibrium of f(~) is com-
pletely mixed. 
We will also assume that a player does not know one component of another player's 
payoff vector better than another component of this player's payoff vector. Hence, 
throughout the remainder of the chapter, we assume: 
ASSUMPTION 5.3.5. For every i E N, the distribution ~i is invariant with respect to 
coordinate permutations of Fm*, i.e. for every permutation TI of {1, ... ,m*} and for 
m* 
every A EB, we have ~i (A) =~i (rrA), where rr is the transformation of F which per-
routes the coordinates according to TI. 
As a consequence of this symmetry assumption, equilibria of f(~) possess a natural 
monotonicity property: 
THEOREM 5.3.6. Let r = (~ 1 •...• ~n'R 1 , ... ,Rn) be a normal form game and let~= 
(~ 1 •... ,~n) be such that Assumption 5.3.5 is satisfied. Then, forsE E(f(~)), iE N 
and k,~ E ~i' we have 
(5. 3.1) if R. (s\k) < R. (s\~), then s~ 




PROOF. Assume sE E(f(~)) is such that the condition of 
intX~(s) be the interior of X~(s), i.e. intX~(s) is the 
~ ~ ~ 
(5.3.1) is satisfied. Let 
set of all x. where ~ is the 
unique best reply.of player i against s and let 
~ * 
if be the transformation of Fm which 
interchanges, for every cp E ~, the (cp \k) th and 
X~(s) is mapped into intX~(s) and, therefore, 
(cp\~)th coordinate. Under this mapping 
~ ~ 
~. (if/(s)) < ~. (int/(s)) 






5.4. PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
In this section it is investigated under which conditions on P only perfect equilibria 
are P-stable. First, it is shown that a P-stable equilibrium may be imperfect if 
P = {~s; s > O} is such that ~E converges weakly to 0 as s tends to 0. After that, it 
is shown that a stronger mode of convergence leads to perfect equilibria. 
EXAMPLE 5.4.1. A P-stable equilibrium is not necessarily perfect if P 
is such that ~s converges weakly to 0 as s tends to 0. 
Let r be the game of figure 4.3.1, let x be a continuous random variable withapositive 
density and let P = {~s; s > 0} be such that 11~ is the product measure on lR ~ of the 
1 
distribution of sx, for every i E {1,2} and s > 0. Note that indeed ~s converges 
weakly to 0 as s tends to 0. \'ie will, however, show that the perfect equilibrium of 
r is not P-stable if the expectation of X exists. 
Fors> 0, let s(s) be an equilibrium of f(~sl. Write p(s) 2 s
1 





Since ~s is nonatomic, we have 
(5 .4 .1) p(E) q(E) 
Let Y be a random variable which is distributed as the difference of two independ~nt 
random variables which are both distributed as X, and let Z be independent from Y and 
having the same distribution as Y. Then (5.4.1) is equivalent to 
(5 .4. 2) p(s) lP [ ( 1 - q ( E) ) Y + q ( E) z -<: -q ( E) Is ] , and 
(5. 4. 3) q(E) lP [ (1- p(E) )Y + p(E)Z S -1/s] . 
Let F (resp. f) be the common distribution (resp. density) function of Y and z. From 
( 5 . 4 . 2) , we see 




which shows that lim p(E) 
s+o 
0 (in which case the perfect equilibrium of r is P-stable) 
only if 
( 5.4. 4) lim 
s+o 
By (5.4.3), we have 
q(E) SJP[YS-1/E or ZS-1/E]SIP[YS-1/EJ + IP[ZS-1/E] 
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2F(-1/E), 
from which we see that (5.4.4) is fulfilled only if 
(5 .4. 5) 
However, if 









lim $ lim x jf(t)dt 
x+-oo x+-oo 
lim XF(x) -oo , 
x+-oo 
which means that the expectation of Y (and, hence, of X) does not exist. Hence, 
every P-stable equilibrium of r is imperfect, if the expectation of X exists, which 
leads to the conclusion that, in general, weak convergence is not sufficient to es-
tablish perfectness. 
The actual reason why the perfect equilibrium is not obtained in the example above 
is the following. From (5.4.2), we see that player l's strategy choice in f(~E) is 
determined by two factors: 
(i) his a priori uncertainty about his own payoffs, represented by s, and 
(ii) his uncertainty about the exact payoffs of player 2, represented by q(s). 
Now, our aim in this chapter is to model the situation in which player l's strategy 
choice is determined by his own payoff in r and by his slight uncertainty about the 
payoffs of player 2 (and not by his a priori uncertainty about his own payoffs). 
Hence, we actually wantour model to be such that q(s) is much larger than s (i.e. 
we want that (5.4.4) is satisfied). But, as we have seen above, this property cannot 
be expected if ~s converges only weakly to 0. Hence, a collection {f(~E)}s+o of dis-
turbed games for which ~E converges weakly to 0 as E tends to 0 is not a good model 
for the situation we want to describe. 
To obtain a model which fills our needs, we have to decrease a player's a priori 
uncertainty about his own payoffs. This can be accomplished by looking at collections 
of disturbed games { r (~ s) } , for which ~ E (0) converges to 1 as s tends to 0 for every 
EYO l 
i E N. In this case, if s is small, the players are almast certain that the payoffs 
in f(~E) are the same as the payoffs in r and, moreover, each player's strategy choice 
in r (~ s) is almast solely determined by his own payoffs in r and by his uncertainty 
about the payoffs of the other players. We will prove that if the uncertainty (about 
the payoffs) is of. this kind, only perfect equilibria can be obtained. 
THEOREM 5.4.2. Every P-stable equilibrium is perfect if P 
E 
lim ~i (0) = 1 for all i EN. 
s+o 
{~E; s > 0} is such that 
PROOF. Let r be a normal farm game and let P satisfy the condition of the theorem. 
For E > 0, let s(E) E E(f(~E)) be such, that s{s) converges to sEE{f) as tends to 0. 
By rewriting (5.2.8) a little, we see that for every i E N and E > 0 
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(5.4.6) S. (E) 
l 
)l~(O)s.(E) + (1- )l~(O))s.(E) 
l l 1 l 
wi th s. ( E) E conv B. ( s ( E) I 0) 
l l 
which, since Bi (s(E) IO) is nothing else than thesetof pure best replies of player 
i against s(E) in r, is equivalent to 
(5.4.7) S. (E) 
l 
)1~(0)5. (E) + (1- )1~(0))~. (E) 
l l l l 
with s. (E) a best reply 
l 
against s(E) in f. 
Since )1~(0) converges to 1 as E tends to 0, we have that si (E) converges to si as E 
tends to 0 and, therefore every si is a best reply against s(E) for all sufficiently 
small E. Since, furthermore, every s(E) is completely mixed by Corollary 5.3.4, s is 
a perfect equilibrium. 0 
Theoreom 5.4.2 shows that, in order to justify the restrietion to perfect equilibria 
for normal farm games, one does not have to rely on the assumption that the players 
with a small probability make mistakes, rather one can refer to the fact that a player 
always has some slight uncertainty about the payoffs of the other players. However, 
note that perfect equilibria are obtained only if this uncertainty is of a very 
special kind. Note, furthermore, that the converse of Theorem 5.4.2 is not correct: 
there exist perfect equilibria which for every choice of P fail to be P-stable. 
Namely, because of the monotonicity property of equilibria of disturbed games (Theorem 
5.3.6) the unreasonable perfect equilibria in which a player assigns a greater prob-
ability to a more costly mistake than to a less costly one can never be P-stable. 
So, for instance, in the game of figure 3.1.1 withM = 1, the perfect equilibrium in 
which player 1 plays his second strategy can never be P-stable. 
THEOREM 5.4.3. There exist perfect equilibria which fail to be P-stable whatever Pis. 
In the next section, it will be investigated whether the result of Theorem 5.4.2 can 
be strenghtened in the sense that every P-stable equilibrium is proper (or weakly 
proper) if P satisfies the condition of the Theorem. For the sake of a clear exposi-
tion, we will restriet ourselves to disturbed games f()l) in which every )li has no 
atoms except possibly at 0. Hence, throughout the remainder of the chapter, we will 
assume 
ASSUMPTION 5.4.4. For every i E N the distribution )li has at most an atom at 0. 
It should, however, be stressed that our results hold also in the case in which this 
assumption is not satisfied. If f()l) is a disturbed game for which Assumption 5.4.4 
is satisfied, then we see from(5.2.8)that sis an equilibrium of f()JE) if and only 





where b~c(s) is as in (5.2.5). 
l 
5.5. WEAKLY PROPER EQUILIBRIA 
with si a best reply against sin r, 
In this section, it is investigated under which conditions on P every P-stable equi-
librium is weakly proper. We start by showing that a P-stable equilibrium is not 
necessarily weakly proper if P = {/:;E > O} is such that \1~ (0) converges to 1 as E tends 
to 0. The example used to demonstrate this fact (Example 5.5.1), however, suggests 
that some strenger mode of convergence (which we call strong convergencel might lead 
to weakly proper equilibria. It will then be investigated whether this is indeed the 
case. 
EXAMPLE 5.5.1. A P-stable equilibrium need ~ot be weakly proper if P 
E 
is such that lim \li (0) = 1 for all i E N. 
Efo 
Let r be the game of figure 4.1.1 and let P ={\JE; E > O} be such that, for iE {1,2} 
and E > 0 the distribution \1~ is given by \1~ = (1- E)o + EV, where o is the probabil-
l l 
ity measure which assigns all mass to 0 and where v is an arbitrary nonatomie prob-
ability measure on JR
6 
. 
We claim that, for M sufficiently large, only the non-weakly proper equilibrium in 
which player 1 uses his second pure strategy is P-stable. Namely for E > 0, let s(E) 
be an equilibrium of f(\lE). Since player 2 will play his first pure strategy, if his 
exact payoff is as in r, we have 














\) [X2 ( s ( E) ) J 
Now, for all s E S, we have 
for k E {2,3} , 
for all E > 0. 








for all E > 0. 
If (5.5.2) is satisfied, then player 1 will play his second pure strategy in f(~E) 
if hegets to hear that his actual payoff is as described by r. This shows that, if 
M is sufficiently large, only the non-weakly proper equilibrium in which player 1 
plays his second strategy is P-stable. 
The actual reason why, in the example above, the weakly proper equilibrium is not 
obtained, is the fact that the ratio in (5.5.1) does not directly depend on E but 
only indirectly via s(E). In the example above, the measure V represents the beliefs 
player 1 has about the payoffs of player 2 in f(~E), once he knows that these payoffs 
X
E: E: 
are notasin r. More precisely if 
2 
generates ~2 , then 
V(A) for all A E Band E > 0, 
and, hence, these beliefs are independent of . But is a player has only slight uncer-
tainty about the payoffs of another player, then in the case in which he knows that 
this player's payoffs are not as in r, he will still think that these payoffs are 
close to 
let ~ E ~ 
those of r. This idea leads to the notion of strong convergence. For E > 0, 
(~E·····~E) be an n-tuple of probability distributions on ~m* for which 
1 n 
Assumption 5.4.4 is satisfied. We say that ~E converges strongly to 0 as E tends to 
0 (which is denoted by ~E ~ 0 (E ~ 0)) if the following two conditions are satisfied: 
(5. 5. 3) 
(5.5.4) 
wE(O) converges to 1 as E tends to 0, for all i EN, 
l 
vE :~ ~E,ac (the absolute continuous component of ~E) converges weakly to 
0 as E tends to 0. 
E S E E 




JO with probability ~~(0) (which tends to 1 as E tends to 0), 
LY~ with probability 1- w~(O), where yEl. converges in probability 
l l 
to 0 as E tends to 0. 
Hence, strong convergence expresses that the disturbance occur with a small probabil-
ity and that disturbances are small. 
For the remainder of the section, let P ~ {wE; E > 0} be such that ~E ~ 0 (E ~ or 
and let US investigate whether,for every game r, every P-stable equilibrium is proper 
or weakly proper. Let us first consider weakly proper equilibria. Assume s is a 
P-stable equilibrium of a game rand, for E > 0, let s(E) c E(f(WE)) be such 
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that s(E) converges to s as E tends to 0. In the proof of Theorem 3.4.2, we have seen 
that every s(E) is completely mixed and that sis a best reply against s(E) if Eis 
sufficiently small. Hence, s is weakly proper whenever s(E) satisfies condition (2.3.2). 
Let i EN and k,9, E <P. be such that R. (s\k) < R. (s\9,). In this case, if E is small, 
E k ~ ~ 9, ~ X. (s(E)) is much further away from 0 than X. (s(E)) is and, therefore, if v. is tightly 
~ 9, ~ ~ k 
concentrated around 0, one may expect that s. (E) 
~ 
will be of smaller order than s. (E). 
~ 
An example of a measure which is tightly concentrated is a measure with a normal 
(Gaussian) density and, in fact, we have: 
E 
THEOREM 5.5.2. Let p = {~E; E > 0} be such that ~ converges strongly to 0 as E tends 
to 0 and such that, for i E N and E > 0, the distribution v~ (as in (5.5.4)) is the 
~ 
product measure of a measure on ~ with a normal density with parameters 0 and E (see 
section 5.7.). Then every P-stable equilibrium is weakly proper. 
The proof of this theorem is postponed till section 5.7, since it is rather technical. 
E 
Another extreme case is the one in which Vi is widespread (has a density with a heavy 
tail). In this case, if R. (s\k) < R, (s\9,), it might occur that s~(E) is not of smaller 
Q, l E ...!... l 
order than si (E). Namely, if vi is widespread, then there is a relatively large prob-
ability of the actual payoffs of player i in f(~E) being far away from his payoffs 
in r, which implies that his payoffs in r will have only a relatively small influence 
on the probabilities associated with any of his equilibriumstrategiesin f(~E). An 
example of a measure which is widespread is a measure with a Cauchy density and, in 
fact, we have 
THEOREM 5.5.3. Let P E be such that ~ converges to 0 as E tends to 0 
E 
and such that, for i E N and E > 0, the distribution vi (as in (5.5.4) is the product 
measure of a measure on ~ with a Cauchy density with parameters 0 and E (see section 
5.7.). Then there exists a game for which every P-stable equilibrium fails to be 
weakly proper. 
Again, we refer to section 5.7 for the proof. 
Next, let us turn to proper equilibria and let us investigate whether Theorem 5.5.2 
can be strengthened to yield that every P-stable equilibrium is proper, if P is as 
in that theorem. This will be the case if every equilibrium s(E) of f(~E) satisfies 
condition (2.3.1). However, this cannot be expected. Namely, if the pure strategy k 
of player i 
X~ (s (E)) is 
~ 
is only a little bit worse than the pure strategy 9, against s(s), then 
only a little bit smaller than X~(s(E)), which implies, by Assumption 
k ~ 9, 
5.3.5, that s. (E) will not be of smaller order than s. (E). Hence, we have the fol-
~ ~ 
lowing theorem, which is proved insection 5.7. 
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THEOREM 5.5.4. Under the conditions of Theorem 5.5.2, there exists a game for which 
every P-stable equilibrium fails to be proper. 
5.6. STRICTLY PROPER EQUILIBRIA AND REGULAR EQUILIBRIA 
We have already seen that the set of equilibria of a normal form game which are 
P-stable may depend upon the choice of P (cf. Theorem 5.4.2 and Example 5.4.1). This 
raises the question of which equilibria are P-stable for every choice of P. In this 
section, it is shown that the answer to this question is related to strictly proper 
equilibria and to regular equilibria. 
As a first result, we have: 
THEOREI1 5.6.1. A strictly proper equilibrium is P-stable for all P 
E 
which are such that lim ~, (0) = 1 for all i E N. 
c-1-o ~ 
PROOF. Let r be an n-person normal form game and let P = {~E; E > 0} satisfy the con-
dition of the Theorem. For s E S and E > 0, define ~(s,E) by 
ll. (s, E) := (1 - ~~ (0) )b~ (s) 
~ ~ ~ 




for i E N, 
for k E <ll. 
~ 
From (5.4.8) we see that s is an equilibrium of f(~E) if and only if every s. can 
~ 
be written as 
(5. 6.1) S, 
~ 
with s. a best reply against s in r, 
~ 
from which it follows, by means of (2.2.3), that 
sE E(f(~E)) if and only if sE E(f,n(s,E)), 
where the perturbed game (f,n(s,E)) is as in Definition 2.2.1. Next, assume §is a 
strictly proper equilibrium of rand let n be as in Definition 2.3.7. If Eis suffi-
s (since lim "~{0) = 1 and, in this ciently small, then ll(S,E) < n for all S E~O P~ 
case there exists, for every sE S an equilibrium §{n{s,E)) of (f,n{s,E)) which is 
close to § and which depends continuously on n{s,E). Consider the mapping s ~ §(n(s,E)). 
ac 
Since ~i has a continuous density (by Assumption 5.2.2), this mapping is continuous, 
which implies (by Brauwer's Fixed Point Theorem, SMART [1974]) that it has a fixed 
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point §(s). Hence, we have that §(s) is an equilibrium of (f,n(s(s) ,s), which implies 
(by 5.6.1), that §(s) is an equilibrium of f(~s). This shows that §is a P-stable 
equilibrium of r, since §(s) converges to §as s tends to 0. 
A simple example can show that the statement in Theorem 5.6.1 is incorrect if the 
condition of the Theorem is replaced by "~r:: converges weakly to 0 as s tends 
to 0". Namely, consider the 2-person normal form game in which both players have 2 
pure strategies and in which all payoffs are 1. Then all equilibria are strictly 
proper, but, due to the symmetry assumption 5.3.5 only the symmetrie equilibrium in 
which both players play (~,~) is P-stable, if P = {~E; E > 0} is such that every ~E 
is atomless and such that ~E ~ 0 (s + 0). 
n 
Next, we will show that every regular equilibrium is P-stable for all P = { ~ E; s > 0} 
for which ~E ~ 0 (s + 0) and which are such that ~E depends continuously on s (This 
latter assumption is made only to keep the analysis tractable, as the reader will 
see from the proof of Theorem 5.6.2). The proof of Theorem 5.6.2 has the same struc-
ture as the proof of Theorem 4.6.1: it is an application of the Implicit Function 
Theorem in combination with Brauwer's Fixed Point Theorem. The proof is a generali-
zation of the proof of Theorem 7 of HARSANYI [1973a]. Presenting it gives us the 
opportunity to correct a mathematical error in Harsanyi's proof (which occurs in his 
Lemma 7). 
THEOREM 5.6.2. A regular equilibrium is P-stable for all collections P = {~E; s > 0} 
for which there exists a random vector X= (X
1
, ..• ,Xn) such that v~ (as in (5.5.4)) 
is the distribution of sX., for every i E N and E > 0. 
l 
PROOF. Let r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n,R1 , ... ,Rn) be a normal form game and letPand X be as in 
the theorem. We will restriet ourselves to the case in which ~~ is atomless, for 
every i and E. Hence, we have~~= vs. The reader can easily adjust the proof to the 
l l 
situation in which there are atoms. Assume § is a regular equilibrium of r and, with-
outlossof generality, assume (1, ... ,1) E C(§). Lets> 0. From (5.2.8), we see that 
s is an equilibrium of f(~E) if and only if 
(5.6. 2) k S, 
l 
for all i,k, 
which by the condition of the theorem,is e~uivalent to 




lP [R. (s\k) + sX. (s\k) :o- R. (s\2) + sX. (s\2) for all 9, E <l>.] for all i,k. 
l l l l l 
In order to facilitate the application of the Implicit Function Theorem, we will re-










A := TT A. 
i=1 l 
and for s E S and a E A, define F(s,a) by 
JP[l-a::>x.(s\9,)-X.(s\k) forall tEC(s.)] 
l l l l l 
. (i EN, k E C ( §. ) ) . 
l 
Then we see from (5.6.3) that sis an equilibrium of f(~E) if and only if there exist 
a,S E A such that 




k k Bk i k c (§,), k 1 ' S, F. (s,a) for ~ N, E 7' 
l l l l 
(5 .6.6) 
k 
lcR. (s\kl R. (s\1)] for i k C(s.)' k 1, a. E N, E 7' 
l E l l l 
s~ k ~E[X~(s)] i k c(s. l, 1' and (5.6.7) F. (s,a) for E N, E k 7' 
l l l l l 
(5.6.8) 
k ~~[X~(s)] for i N, k i c(s. l. S, E 
l l l l 
Note that, if § is completely mixed, then s is an equilibrium of r(~El if and only 
if there exists some a E A such that (5.6.4)-(5.6.6) are satisfied with s = o. The 
application of the implicit function theorem can already be se en by camparing (5.6 .4) 
and (5.6.6) with (4 .6. 2) and (4. 6.3). To apply this theorem we need some a E A for 
which F~(s,él) = §k for all iE N and k E C(s.) with k 7' 1. \i/e claim that such a exists. 
l l l 
Namely, consider the mapping E: A~ A defined by 
k ]< ~ 
{





By using that ai 0 for all ai E Ai, the reader can verify that 
0 and 0, 
(i E N, k E C ( § .) , k 7' 1 ) , 
l 
(iEN,k=1). 
which implies that there exists a nonempty, compact and convex set K in A such that 
E(K) c K. Since E is continuous, there exists a fixed point & of E, as follows from 
Brauwer's Fixed Point Theorem (SMART [1974]). For every i EN and kc C(s.) with 

















that indeed Fk(s,êt) s~ for all iE N and k E C(s.). 
~ ~ ~ 
Next, consider the mappings G and H defined by 
G: (s,a, S, c) I k 1 S, -
~ ~ 
k 
G~ ( s , a, S , E) R. (s\k) R. (s\ 1) k ::::::: - ca. 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
H~(s,a,S,c) k F~(s,a) s~ S, + 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
for i E N, 
for i E N, k E C ( S,), k 7' 1' 
~ 
for i E N, k E C (§,), k 7' 1. 
~ 
Note that the definitions of these mappings are motivated by (5.6.4)-(5.6.6). Since 
X has a continuous density by Assumption (5.2.2), the mappings G and H are differen-
tiable. ForsE S, let us write s = (o,T), where o is the restrietion of s to C(§) 
and where T is the vector consisting of the remaining components of s. Since § is a 
regular equilibrium of r and since the density of X is positive everywhere (by 
Assumption 5.3.3), we have that 
3(G,H) I 





Therefore, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem (DIEUDONNÉ [1960], p.268), 
that there exist neighborhoods U of T = 0, V of 8 = 0 and W of c = 0 and, for every 
(T,S,c) EU x V x W, some o(T,8,c) close to § and a(T,8,c) closetoa such that 
(5.6. 9) (o(T,8,c), T, a(T,8,c). 8,c) is a salution of (5.6.4)-(5.6.5) 
Let us write s(T,S,c) for (O(T,8,c),T) and let c E w. Motivated by (5.6.7)-(5.6.8), 
define mappings M and N with domain U x V by 
(5 .6 .10) M~(T, 8) j_/[Xk (s (T, S, c))] for iEN,k{<l>., and 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
(5 .6.11) N~(T, f3) 
~ 
F~ ( S ( T, 8, E) , a ( T, 8, E) ) 
~ 
- ].1 E [X~ ( s ( T, 8, E) ) ] for iEN,kE<I>.,k 7' 
~ ~ ~ 
Since §is a quasi-strong equilibrium (Corollary 2.5.3), it follows that for suffi-
ciently small c 
(M(T,f3),N(T,f3)) EU x V for all (T,8) EU x V. 
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1. 
Since U and V can be chosen compact and convex and since H and N are continuous, we 
can conclude from Brauwer's Fixed Point Theorem (SMART [1974]) that there exists a 
fixed point (T(E),S(E)) of (M,N). Let us write s(E) for s(T(E),S(E),E) and a(E) for 
a(T(E),S(E),E). Then it follows from (5.6.9)-(5.6.11) and the fixed point property 
of (T(E),S(E)), that (s(E),a(E),S(E)) is a salution to (5.6.4)-(5.6.8), which shows 
that s(E) is an equilibrium of f(~E). This completes the proof, since s(E) converges 
to § as E tends to 0. 
Next, let us return to the instability of mixed strategy equilibria which was con-
sidered insection 1.6. In that section, we said that this instability is only a 
seeming instability. This view is justified by the Theorems 2.6.2, 5.2.4 and 5.6.2: 
For almast all equilibria (viz. for the regular ones) this instability disappears 
if the slight uncertainty which each player has about the other players' payoffs is 
taken into account. 
5.7. PROOFS OF THE THEOREMS OF SECTION 5.5 
D 
In this section, we write f (resp. F ) for the normal density function (resp. normal 
distribution function) with parameters a and 8, hence 
(5. 7.1) f~(x) 1 -x% 
1/211 
Furthermore, we write g (resp. G ) for the Cauchy density (resp. distribution) func-
tion with parameter and , i.e. 
x 
(5.7.2) J g!(t)dt. 
We u se - to denote asymptotic equi valenee, i.e. for a E lR u { -oo} u { oo} and functions 
f and g, we write 





Weneed the following standard results from asymptotic analysis (cf. DE BRUYN [1961]), 




(x) (x+-oo) , and 
x 
1 -1 





Now, we are ready to prove our theorems. 
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PROOF OF THEOREM 5.5.2. Let r = (~ 1 , ... ,~n'R1 , •.. ,Rn) be an n-person normal form 
game, let P = {]./; E >0} satisfy the condition of Theorem 5.5.2, let s be P-stable 
and, for s > 0, let s(E) E E(f(].JE)) be such that s(s) converges to s as s tends to 0. 
Since s(s) is completely mixed, for every s > 0 and since s is a best reply against 
s(s) for all sufficiently small s, it suffices to show that 
(5.7.5) lim 
E-!-0 
0 if R. (s\k) < R. (s\1) 
l l 
for all i,k,1 . 
Assume i EN, k, 1 E ~. are such that the condition of ( 5. 7. 5) is satisfied and let v E 
l 
be as in (5.5.4). For s > 0, we have 
hence, it suffices to show that 





l l l 
For s > 0, let YE be a random vector 
l 




+ Ys(s). For every k' 
l 





JP [z~(s(s)\k') ma x 





Now, Z~(s(s)\k') has a normal distribution with parameters R. (s(s)\k) ander. (s), 
l l l 
where cri (s) is given by 
(5. 7. 7) (s . (s, cp . ) ) 
-l -1. 
2] ~ 
in which s_i (s,cp_i) denotes the probability which s_i (s) = 
(s1 (s), ... ,si_1 (E),si+l(s), .•. ,sn(s)) assigns to ljli E ~-i:= j~i ~j. Note that cri(s) 
converges to 0 as s tends to 0 and, therefore, after suitable transformations, 
(5.7.6) follows the following Lemma. 
LEMMA 5.7.1. For E > 0, 
each z~ having a normal 
l 
(5. 7 .8) lim 
sto 
E E . 
let (Z
1
, ••• ,Zm) be an n-tuple of 1ndependent random variables, 







PROOF. (5.7.8) follows easily if a
2 





. Furthermore, assume, without lossof generality that a
1 
~ 0. 
Define ZE by 
The reader can verify that, in order to prove (5.7.8), it suffices to show that 
lim 
E-1-0 
[ E z EJ JP zl " 
For i c { 1 , 2}, we have 
o. 
(5. 7. 9) f FE(x)fE (x)dx a. l 
where the dis tribution function FE of ZE is 
m 
FE(x) ïT FE ct (x). 
k~3 k 
For E > 0, define 
C ( E) 
then the reader can verify that 




(x + a2) F s; ao a3 5 
( 5. 7. 11) fE (x) s; c(E)fE (x) 
al a2 
given by: 
if 2x s; a3, and 
if 2x " a3. 
By using the monotonicity of FE, it follows from (5.7.10) that 
ak 
(5.7.12) 
By splitting the integral of (5.7.9) for i 1 into two parts and by using (5.7.11)-
(5.7.12), it follows that 
E 
$ c(E) JP [z
2 
Since c(E) converges to 0 as c tends to 0, this completes the proof of the Lemma and, 
hence, the proof of Theorem 5.5.2. D 
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PROOF OF THEOREM 5.5.3. Let r be the game of figure 4.1.1 and let P be as in Theorem 
5.5.3. We will show that, for sufficiently large M, only the equilibrium in which 
player 1 plays his second strategy is P-stable. For E > 0, let s(E) be an equilibrium 
of r(~E). Since player 2 will play his first strategy if his payoff is as in r, we 
have 
(5.7.13) for k E {2, 3} 
E E E 
For E > 0 and s E S, let Y
2 










(s). Then (5.7.13) is equivalent to 
(5. 7 .14) 
E 
max z 2 (s(E)\~)] 
td1 '2' 3} 
Since Z~(s\~) has a Cauchy distribution with parameters R2 (s\~) and o 
by (5.7.7), it follows from (5.7.14), that 
If E is small, o is close to 0, in which case 
With the consequence that 
(5. 7 .15) s~(E) ::0: (1-~~(0)) I ~g~(x)dx 
3 
On the other hand we have 
for all x ::0: 3, 




hence, since the difference of two random variables, bcth having a Cauchy distribu-
tion, again has a Cauchy distribution 
(5. 7. 16) 








E+o ( ) s
2 
E 
1 ,,-12 v2 , 
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hence, if M > 6V:2, then only the non-weakly proper equilibrium in which player 2 
plays his second strategy is P-stable. D 
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.5.4. Let r be the game of figure 2.3.2 and let P be as in Theorem 
5.5.4. We claim that, if s(E) is an equilibrium of f(~E), then 
(5 0 7 .17) (E+o) • 
Obviously, (5.7.17) has the consequence that player 1 will play his second strategy 
if his payoff is as in r and if E is small, which implies that the unique proper 
equilibrium of r (which has player 1 playing his first strategy) is not P-stable. 
Formula (5.7.17) can be proved by using the same methods as in the proof of Theorem 
5.5.2. Let us give a more instructive proof of the related result 
(5 0 7 .18) 
E z
2 




(s), for E > 0 and sE S, is as in the proof of Theorem 5.5.2. Let us write 
a for a
1 
(E) as defined in (5.7.7). Then 







( E)) , and 
Now, if we write G for a
2
(E) as defined in (5.7.7), then 
2: Z~(S(E)\1)] 
which implies that s~(E) is much smaller than G and, hence, than a, since cr-er-E E+o). 
From this fact it follows, by combining (5.7.19)-(5.7.20) with (5.7.3), that (5.7.18) 
is indeed correct. D 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES 
The most profound reason why the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined lies in 
the fact that a Nash equilibrium of an extensive form game may prescribe irrational 
behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Until now, however, we have mainly 
studied games in normal form. This comprehensive study yielded a deeper insight into 
the relations between various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Our goal 
in this chapter is to investigate to what extend this study has yielded results which 
are also relevant for extensive form games. It will turn out that the insights we 
obtained are valuable, but that many results we proved for normal form games cannot 
be generalized to extensive form games. 
Insection 1, the formal definition of a (finite) n-person game in extensive form is 
given and several notions related to such a game are introduced. The discussion in 
this chapter is confined to games having perfect recall. 
Section 2 considers equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria. It is shown that an 
equilibrium has to prescribe rational behavior only at those information sets which 
can be reached when the equilibrium is played. Furthermore, it is shown that every 
game possesses at least one subgame perfect equilibrium. 
The concept of sequential equilibria is the subject of section 3. The formal defini-
tion of this concept is given and some basic properties of it are derived. 
Section 4 contains a discussion concerning perfect equilibria. It is shown that every 
game possesses at least one perfect equilibrium and the relation with the sequential 
equilibrium concept is studied. Also the difference between perfectness in the normal 
form and perfectness in the extensive form is stressed. 
Proper equilibria are considered in section 5. Every proper equilibrium is sequential, 
but many sequential equilibria fail to be proper. Furthermore, it is demonstrated 
that there is a close conneetion between equilibria which are proper in the extensive 
form of a qame and equilibria which are proper in the normal form of this game. It 
is shown that althouqh,some intuitively unreasonable sequential equilibria can be 
eliminated by restricting oneself to proper equilibria, not all such equilibria are 
eliminated by this concept. 
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Extensive form games with control casts are studied in section 6. It is shown that, 
if control casts are present, the players will play a sequential equilibrium. 
I~ section 7, it is investigated what the influence is of incomplete knowledge of 
the payoff functions on the strategy choices in an extensive form game. It is demon-
strated that only very specific uncertainty will force the players to play a sequen-
tial equilibrium. It should, however, be noted that many challenging problems con-
cerning the incomplete information approach are still unsolved. 
The results in this chapter arebasedon VAN DAMME [1980c], KREPS AND WILSON [1981a] 
and SELTEN [1975]. 
6.1. DEFINITIONS 
In this section, the formal definition of a (finite) game in extensive form is given. 
Furthermore, several concepts which are related to such a game are introduced. The 
exposition follows SELTEN [1975]. 
The extensive form representation of a game is the representation which explicitly 
displays the rules of the game, i.e. it specifies the following data (cf. the examples 
in the sections 1.2 - 1.4): 
(i) the order of the moves in the game, 
(ii) for every decision point, which player has to move there, 
(iii) the information a player has, whenever it is his turn to move, 
(iv) the choices available to a player, when he has to move, 
(v) the probabili ties associated with the chance moves, and 
(vi) the payoffs for all players. 
Mathematically, this specification is provided by a sextuple (K,P,U,C,p,r) of which 
K specifies the order of the moves, P specifies the player who has to move, etc. 
Formally, a ([inite) n-person game in extensive form is defined as a sextuple r = 
(K,P,U,C,p,r) of which the constituents are as follows: 
(6.1.1) The game treeK: 
The game treeK is a finite tree with a distinguished node 0, the origin (or root) 
of K. The unique sequence of nodes and branches connecting the root 0 with a node x 
of K is called the path to x, and we say that x comes before y (to be denoted by 
x < y) if x is on the path toy and different from y. Note that < is a partial order-
ing. The terminology which will be used wi th respect to K is summarized in Table 6.1.1. 
The interpretation of Kis as follows: the game starts at the root 0 and proceeds 
along a path from node to immediate successar until an endpoint is reached. The 
various paths give the "plays" that might occur. 
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Notatien Definition Terminology 
x < y x on the path to y and x ;t y y comes af ter x, x comes before y 
P(x) ma x {y; y < x} (x ;t 0) the immedia te predecessor of x 
S(x) {y; x E p ( ) } the immedia te successors of x 
z {x; S(x) = 0} the endpoints of the tree 
x the complement of z the decision points 
Z(x) {y E Z; x < y} the terminal successors of x. 
Table 6.1.1. The terminology used with respect to the game tree. 
(6.1.2) The player partition P: 




, ... ,Pn. The set Pi 
is the set of decision points of player i. Player 0 is the chance player responsible 
for the random moves occurring in the game. 
(6.1.3) The information partition U: 
The information partition U is an n-tuple (U
1
, ... ,Un) where Ui is a partition of Pi 
(into so called information sets of player i) such that for every information set 
the following two conditions are satisfied 
(i) every path intersects the information set at most once, and 
(ii) all nodes in the information set have the same number of immediate successors. 
The information set u c Ui which contains x E Pi represents the set of nodes player 
i cannot distinguish from x based on the information he has when he has to move at 
x. In our figures we depiet information sets by connecting the nodes in this set by a 
dotted line and we label the set with i whenever it is an information set of player i. 
(6.1.4) The choice partition C: 
n 
The choice partition C is a colleetien C = {Cu; u c i~ 1 ui}, where Cu is a partition 
of x~uS(x) into so called choices at u, such that every choice contains exactly one 
element of S(x) for every x c u (note that this is possible because of condition 
( 6. 1 . 3) (i i) ) . 
The interpretation is that, if player i takes the choice c E Cu at the information 
set u c Ui, then, if he is actually at x Eu, the next node reached by the play is 
that element of S(x) which is contained in c. We identify the choice c at u with 
the colleetien of branches leading out of u and having an element in c as endpoint 
and in our graphical representations we label the choices along these branches. So, 
in the game of figure 1.4.2, the choice L
2 
of player 2 consistsof the two left-hand 
branches leading out at the information set of player 2. 
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(6.1.5) The probability assignment p: 
The probability assignment p specifies for every x c P
0 
a completely mixed probabil-
ity distribution px on S(x). 
The interpretation is, that if x is reached, then y E S(x) is reached with the (posi-
tive) probability px(y). In the figures the probabilities are depicted along the 
branches. 
(6.1.6) The payoff function r: 
The payoff function ris an n-tuple (r
1
, ... ,rn) where ri is a real valued function 
with domain z. 
If the endpoint z is reached, then player i receives the payoff (Von Neumann Morgen-
stern utility) ri (z). In our pictures, we write the vector r(z) at the endpoint z, 
first the payoff of player 1, etc. 
Throughout the chapter, we will restriet ourselves to extensive form games in which 
every player never forgets anything, i.e. at every point where a player has to make 
a decision, he knows what he previously has known (i.e. which of his information 
sets have been reached) and what he previously has done (i.e. which choices he has 
taken). To formalize this, let us say that a choice c comes before a node x (or c <x) 
if one of the branches in c is on the path to x. Throughout the chapter, we will 
assume: 
ASSUMPTION 6.1.7. The gameris a game with perfect reeall (KUHN [1953]), i.e. for 
all iE {1, ... ,n}, u,v EU., c E C and x,y cv, we have that c comes befare x if and 
l u 
only if c comes before y. 
Foradiscussion of Assumption 6.1.7 we refer to SELTEN [1975]. As a consequence of 
this assumption it makes sense to say that the choice c comes before the information 
set v (c < v) and that the information set u E U. comes before 
l 
by u< v). Note that the relation <is a partial ordering on 
that player i can represent his decision problem by means of 
v c U. (to be denoted 
l 
U., from which it follows 
l 
a decision tree, once he 
knows the strategies chosen by his opponents (see WILSON [1972]). 
Another important consequence of Assumption 6.1.7 is that a player doesnothave to 
correlate his choices at different information sets, but that he can restriet him-
self to behavior strategies (KUHN [1953], see (6.1.11)). 
In the remainder of this section, we introduce several concepts which are related to 
an extensive form game r. 
(6.1.8) Strategies. 
A pure strategy ~i of player i is a mapping which assigns a choice c c Cu to every 
information set u c Ui. Thesetof all purestrategiesof player i is denoted by ~i. 
A mixed strategy si of player i is a probability distribution on ~i and the set of 
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all such strategiesis denoted by si. A behavior strategy of player i assigns a 
probability distribution on C to every information set u E U .. The set of all these 
u l 
strategies is B .. Mixed strategies correspond to prior randomization, behavior strat-
l 
egies to local randomization. A strategy combination is an n-tuple of strategies, one 
for each player. B denotes the set of all behavior strategy combinations, the ones 
which are relevant for games with perfect reeall (see (6.1.11). If bi r: Bi and c ECu 
with u E Ui, then bi\c denotes the strategy bi changed so that cis taken with cer-
tainty at u. For b E B and b~ r: B., we denote by b\b~ that strategy combination in 
l l l 
which all players play in accordance tob, except player i who plays bi. Finally, if 
c is a choice of player i, then b\c = b\bi where bi 
(6.1.9) Realization probabilities. 
b'\c. 
i 
If b E B, then for every z E z one can compute the probability Fb(z) that z will be 
reached when b is played. Hence, every b E B induces a probability distribution Fb 
onZ. If A is an arbitrary set of nodes, then we write Fb(A) for Fb(Z(A)) where 
Z(A) denotes the set of endpoints coming after A. Hence, Fb(A) is the probability 
that A will be reached when b is played. 
A node x is said to be possible when playing bi E Bi if there exists some b E B with 
ith component b. such that Fb(x) > 0. An information set u is said toberelevant 
l 
when playing bi if some node in u is possible when playing bi. Poss(bi) (resp. 
Rel(bi)) denotes thesetof allnodesof the tree (resp. u E Ui) which are possible 
(resp. relevant) when playing bi. The following lemma is an immediate corollary of 
Assumption 6.1.7. 
LEMMA 6 • 1 • 1 0 • 
(i) If u E U. is relevant when playing bi, then every no~1e is possible when playing b .. 
l b\b: b\b' l 
(ii) If x Eu and bi,bj' E Rel(u), then F l (xlul = F l (xlu) for every b EB for 
which these conditional probabilities are well-defined. 
(6.1.11) The restrietion to behavior strategies. 
If player i uses the mixed strategy si' then if u E Ui is reached, he will take the 





S, (cp.y L S, (cp,) , 
l l cp.ERel(u) l l 
l 
where Rel(u) denotes thesetof all pure strategies for which u is relevantand Rel(c) 
is the subset of Rel(u) consisting of those strategies which choose c at u. Let bi 
be a behavior strategy defined by (6.1.12) whenever this quantity is well-defined 
and defined arbitrary for those u which cannot be reached when si is played. In KUHN 




for any (mixed or behavior) strategy combination ~. This shows that whatever can be 
achieved by using a mixed strategy can also be achieved by using a behavior strategy 
and so, since there is no reason whatever for a player to use a strategy more general 
than a behavier strategy, we will restriet ourselves to this class of strategies. 
(6.1.14) Expected payoffs and the normal farm. 
If b is played, then the expected payoff Ri (b) to player i is given by Ri (b) ~ 
l:
2




, ... ,Rn). 
To compute the expected payoff for a mixed strategy combination, knowledge of the 
normal farm is sufficient, but this is nat true for behavior strategy combinations. 
(6.1.15) Conditional realization probabilities 
Let b be a behavier strategy combination and let x E X. For every z E Z one can com-
pute the probability Fb(z) that z will be reached if bis played and if the game is 
started at x. If Fb(x): 0, then JPb(z) is just the conditional probability Fb(zlx), 
but JPb(z) is also well-defined ifx Fb (x) ~ 0. (Note that for JPb to be well-defined 
x x 
it is nat necessary that the subgamestarting at x (see 6.1.16) is well-defined). 
The expectation of r; wi th respect to JPb will be denoted by R. (b) . 
~ X lX 
(6.1.16) Subgames. 
Frequently it is the case that a game naturally decomposes into smaller games. This 
is formalized by the notion of subgames. Let x E X and let Kx be the subtree of K 
rising at x. If it is the case that every information set of r either is completely 
contained in K or is disjoint from K , then the restrietion of r to K constitutes 
x x x 
a game of its own, to be called the subgame rx starting at x. In this case every 
behavior strategy combination b decomposes into a pair (b_x,bx) where bx is a behavior 
strategy combination in !'x and b_x is a behavior strategy combination for the re-
maining part of the game (the truncated game). If it is known that bx will be played 
in !'x' then, in order to analyse r, it suffices to analyse the truncated game r_x(bx) 
which results from r by replacing the subtree K by an endpoint with payoff R. (b ) 
x ~ x 
to every player i. 
6.2. EQUILIBRIA AND SUBG&~E PERFECTNESS 
Let I' be an extensive form game and let b be a behavior strategy combination in r. 
We say that bi E Bi is a best reply (of player i) against b, if 
(6 0 2.1) R. (b\b~) 
~ ~ 
max R. (b\b'.') 
b.ifBi l l 
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where the expected payoff R. (.) is as in (6.1.14). The strategy combination b' is 
l 
said to be a best reply against b if every component of b' is a best reply against 
b and a strategy combination which is a best reply against itself is called a (Nash) 
equilibrium of r. Since the normal form of r possesses an equilibrium in mixed strat-
egies and since for every mixed strategy there exists an equivalent behavior strategy 
(see (6.1.11)), r has at least one equilibrium. 
If an equilibrium is played, then each player uses a strategy which maximizes his 
a priori expected payoff. However, once the information set u E Ui is reached, only 
the payoffs after u are relevant to player i and, therefore, in the remainder of the 
game,player i will use a strategy which is a best reply at u, i.e. a strategy bi 
which satisfies 
(6. 2. 2) R. (b\b~) 
lU l 
ma x 




where the conditional expected payoff Riu(b) is defined by 
(6. 2. 3) R. (b) 
lU I 
zEZ 
JPb ( z I u) r. ( z) 
l 
XEU 
JPb (x lu)R. (b) 
lX 
Note that it follows from Lemma 6.1.10 that Riu(b\bi) depends only on what bi pre-
scribes at the information sets v with v ~ u. 
' 
In the following theorem the two "best reply" concepts which have been introduced 
are related to each other. 
THEOREM 6.2.1. bi is a best reply against,b if and only if bi is a best reply against 
b at all information sets u E Ui which are',reached with positive probability when 
b\b~ is played. 
l 
PROOF. Let {ua; a E A} be a collection of information sets of player i such that 
{z(ua); a E A} is a partition of Z(Pi), where Pi is the set of decision points of 
player i. Then, for every b E B, we have 
R. (b) 
l 
(b) + "i 
ziZ (P.) 
l 
where the summatien ranges over all a for which JPb(u ) > 0. 
a 
From this the statement of the theerem follows immediately. 0 
Theorem 6.2.1 shows that for a strategy combination to be an equilibrium it is only 
necessary that rational behavier is prescribed at every information set which might 
be reached when the equilibrium is played; at every other information set the behavier 
may be more or less arbitrary. This is the cause for the existence of unreasonable 
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equilibria of extensive form games as we have seen in chapter 1 and the reason why 
the Nash equilibria concept has to be refined. For extensive form games, the need 
to refine the equilibrium concept is much more severe than for normal form games, 
since there are "maroy" extensive form games with unreasonable equilibri , whereas 
we have seen that for almast all normal form games all equilibria are nice (Theorem 
2.6.2).Todemonstrate this, consider the game of figure 1.2.1. Allgames close to this 




) is reasonable. Hence, for extensive 
form games, it is definitely not true that for almast all games all equilibria are 









) is an essential equilibrium of this game 
(where essentiality is defined similarly as in Definition 2.4.1). Hence, for exten-
sive form games an essential equilibrium need not be nice and Theorem 2.4.3 cannot 
be generalized to extensive form games. In fact, by using the methods of the proof 
of Theorem 2 of KREPS AND WILSON [1982a], one can show: 
THEOREM 6.2.2. For almast all extensive form games all equilibria are essential. 
This theorem shows that many essential equilibria are unreasonable and, therefore, 
we will not consider the concept of essential equilibria any more. 
The first concept we considered in chapter 1 to eliminate Nash equilibria which pre-
scribe irrational behavior at unreached information sets was the subgame perfectness 
concept (SELTEN [1965]). An equilibriumbofris said to be a subgame perfect equi-
librium of r if, for every subgame r of r, the restrietion b of b to r constitutes 
x x 
a Nash equilibrium of rx. The following lemma is essential in establishing that 
every game possesses at least one subgame perfect equilibrium. 
LEMMA 6.2.3. (KUHN [1953]). If bx is an equilibrium of the subgame rx and b_x is an 
equilibrium of the truncated game r (b ) ' then (b ,b ) is an equilibrium of r. 
-x x -x x 





L lPb ( z) r . ( z) 
ziZ(x) l 
and that, if rx is well-defined, Rix(b) depends only on bx. Lemma 6.2.3 implies that 
a subgame perfect equilibrium of r can be found by dynamic programming: first one 
considers all smallest subgames of r and then one truncates r by assuming that in 
any such subgame an equilibrium will be played. This procedure is repeated until 
there are no subgames left. In this way one meets all subgames and lemma 6.2.3 as-
sures that in every subgame an equilibrium results. 
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THEOREH 6.2.4. Every game possesses at least one subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Since there are many games with unreasonable subgame perfect equilibria (e.g. all 
games close to the game of figure 1.4.1 have this property), the equilibrium concept 
has to be refined further. One such refinement is considered in the next section. 
6.3. SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 
The concept of sequential equilibria has been proposed in KREPS AND WILSON [1982a] 
in order to exclude the unreasonable Nash equilibria. In this section, we give the 
formal definition of this concept and derive some elementary properties of it. 
Throughout the section, we consicter a fixed extensive form game r. The section con-
tains no results which are not already contained in KREPS AND WILSON [1982a]. 
Suppose the players have agreed to play the equilibriumbof r. It seems reasonable 
to suppose that player i, upon reaching an information set u with prior probability 
0, will try to reconstruct what has happened and will choose a strategy which is a 
best reply at u against b, with respect to his beliefs about how the game has evolved 
thus far. The basic assumption underlying the sequential equilibrium concept,is that 
the players indeed behave in this way (which corresponds to the notion of rationality 
of SAVAGE [1954]). According to this concept, a rational salution of the game, there-
fore, not only has to prescribe the strategies used by the players, but also has to 
prescribe the beliefs the players have. This leads to the following definitions. 
A system of beliefs is a mapping ~= x -> [ 0 , 1 ] wi th l: ~(x) = 1 for all information 
XEU 
sets u. An assessment is a pair (b,~) where b is a behavior strategy combination and 
~ is a system of beliefs. 
In an assessment (b,~), the system of beliefs ~ represents the beliefsof the players 
when bis played, i.e. if x Eu with u E Ui' then ~(x) is the probability player i 
assigns to being at x if he gets to hear that u is reached. An assessment (b,~) to-
gether with an information set u, determine a probability distributionFb,~ on Z by 
u 
XEU 
The expectation of r. with respect to Fb,~ will be denoted by R~ (b), hence 




If player i expects b to be played and if his beliefs are given by ~' then, if u EUi 
is reached, he will choose a strategy bi satisfying 
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max 




Such a strategy is called a best reply at u against (b,lJ). Obviously, for an assess-
ment (b,11) to be an equilibrium, it is necessary that b is a sequential best reply 
against (b,11), i.e. that b prescribes a best reply at every information set, but this 
is not sufficient, since the beliefs 11 also have to be consistent with b. In partic-
ular, the beliefs should be determined by b, whenever possible, i.e. 
(6. 3.1) 11(X) if x E u and JPb (u) > 0 . 
Note that (6.3.1) determines 11 completely if bis completely mixed. But also if 
JPb(u) = 0 the beliefs at u cannot be completely arbitrary, since they have to respect 
the structure of the game. For instance, if the beliefs of player i are given by 11 
and if b is played, then at an information set v 2 u his beliefs should satisfy. 
lJ(X) if x E v and JPb' 11 (v) > 0. 
u 
To ensure that all such conditions are satisfied, Kreps and Wilson adopt the following 
definition of consistency which in essence means that the beliefs 11 can be explained 
by small deviations from b, i.e. by means of mistakes. 
DEFINITION 6.3.1. An assessment (b,11) is consistent if there exists a sequence 
{b(E),11(E)}E~O where b(E) is a completely mixed behavior strategy combination and 
11(E) is the system of beliefs generated by b(E) (i.e. is given by (6.3.1)) such that 
lim (b ( E) , 11 ( E) ) = ( b, 11) . 
E~O 
A sequential equilibrium is a consistent assessment (b,11) for which b is a sequential 
best reply against (b,11). 
For an extensive discussion concerning the definition of consistency, we refer to 
KREPS AND WILSON [1982a] It is a consequence of the Theorems 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 that 
every game possesses at least one sequential equilibrium. Sametimes we will abuse 
terminology a little and call a strategy combination b a sequential equilibrium if 
some 11 can be found for which (b,11) is a sequential equilibrium. Note that for b 
to be sequential it is only necessary that b is supported by ~ system of beliefs; 
it might very well be the case that another system of beliefs which is also consistent 
with b completely upsets the equilibrium (this is the case for the equilibrium (A,R
2
) 
in the qame of figure 6.5.2). 
Reeall that the perfect reeall assumption 6. 1. 7 implies that the set of information sets 
of player i is partially ordered and that it is possible to construct a decision tree 
for player i once the opponents of i have fixed their strategies. For a choice c E Cu 
- 122 -
with u E Ui, let us denote by S{c) the set of all those information sets and endpoints 
of player i's decision tree which come directly after c, hence 
S ( c) : ~ { v E U . LÎ Z ; c < v and ( if w E U . u Z and c < w <:; v, then w ~ v) } . 
~ ~ 
Let (b,~) be a consistent assessment. Perfect reeall implies that the beliefs of 
player i are not influenced by his own strategy and, therefore, for all u E Ui and 




lPb\c .~ {v) lPb, ~ 
U V 
where lPb,~ is the degenerate distribution at z for z E Z. This implies that for all 
z 
u E u. and c E C 
~ u 




Let R~ (b) (resp. R~ (b)) be the maximum expected payoff player i can get against 
lil lC 
(b,~) if u is reached (resp. u is reached and c is played at u). Then it follows 
from (6.3.2) that these quantities can be iteratively computed by the dynamic pro-
gramming scheme 
(6.3. 3) R~ (bl 
~c 







JPb\c '~ (v) R~ {b) 
U ~V 
which is initialized by setting R~ (b) ~ r. (z) for z E Z. Therefore, b: is a sequen-
lZ l l 
tial best reply against (b,~) if and only if for all u E Ui and c E Ci: 
(6. 3. 5) if b: {c) > 0, then c attains the maximum in (6.3.4) 
~u 
and so checking whether a consistent assessment is a sequential equilibrium is very 
easy. Since, furthermore, verifying whether an assessment is consistent can be exe-
cuted by an efficient labelling procedure (KREPS AND WILSON [1982a], Appendix 1), it 
is easy to check whether an assessment is a sequential equilibrium. This is a great 
advantage of this concept, when compared to Selten's perfectness concept, which will 
be considered in the next section. 
To conclude our preliminary discussion on sequential equilibria, we note that the 
following theorem can easily be proved by the methods of Theorem 6.2.1. 
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THEOREM 6.3.2. Every sequential equilibrium is subgame perfect. 
In section 5, we will see that not all sequential equilibria are sensible and that, 
therefore, this concept has to be refined further. The perfectness concept, which 
will be considered in the next section, is such a refinement, but as we will see,this 
concept refines the sequential equilibrium concept only slightly. 
6.4. PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
The perfectness concept has been proposed in SELTEN [1975] in order to eliminate the 
equilibria which prescribe irrational behavior at unreached information sets. In this 
section, we show that every extensive farm game possesses at least one perfect equi-
librium. The relation between perfect equilibria and sequential equilibria is studied 
and the difference between perfectness in the normal farm and perfectness in the 
extensive farm is illustrated. 
An equilibrium strategy can prescribe irrational behavior only at those information 
sets which cannot be reached when the equilibrium is played. Selten has argued that 
virtually all information sets are reachable, whatever equilibrium is played, as a 
consequence of the possibility that mistakes might occur. Each player should incor-
porate this possibility in choosing his strategy and, therefore, he should prescribe 
a rational choice at every information set. Mathematically, the idea of mistakes is 
formalized in the same way as for normal farm games, i.e. by a perturbed game. In 
such a perturbed game, every choice at every information set has to be chosen with 
a strictly positive (mistake) probability. 
DEFINITION 6.4.1. Let r be an extensive farm game. If n is a mapping which assigns 
to every choice in ra positive number n such that Z n < 1 forevery informatiqn 
c CéCu c 
set u, then the perturbed game (f,n) is the (infinite) extensive farm game with the 
same structure as r, but in which every player i is only allowed to use behavior 
strategies bi which satisfy biu(c) ~ nc for all u EU. and c E C . 
~ u 
Let (f,n) be a perturbed game and let B(n) be thesetof admissible strategy combi-
nationsin (f,n). An admissible strategy combination bis said to be an equilibrium 
of (f,n) if it is a best reply against itself, i.e. if it satisfies 
(6 .4 .1) R. (b) 
~ 
max 




for all iE {1, ... ,n}. 
From Theorem 6. 2. 1 i t is se en tha t b is an equilibri urn of ( r, n) if and only if b pre-
scribes a best reply at every information set, i.e. 
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(6.4.2) R. (b) 
lU 
ma x 
b: E B.(n) 
l l 
R. (b\b:) for all i, u . 
lU l 
An equilibrium of r is said to be a perfect equilibrium if it is still sensible to 
play this equilibrium if slight mistakes are taken into account. Formally 
DEFINITION 6.4.2. b is a perfect equilibrium of r if b is a limit point of a sequence 
{b(n)} + where b(n) is an equilibrium of (f,n). 
11 0 
Assume b is a perfect equilibrium of r and, for t E N, let b(t) be an equilibrium 
of (f,n(t)) such that lim b(t) =band limn(t) = 0. FortE lN, let )J(t) be the 
t-+m t->= 
system of beliefs generated by b(t) and, withoutlossof generality, assume )J=lim)J(t) 
t->oo 
exists. Since for all i E u, u E Ui and bi E Bi 
lim R. (b(t)\V) R~ (b\b:) 
t--+<x> lU l lU l 






for all i,u, 
which shows that (b,)J) is a sequential equilibrium. Hence, every perfect equilibrium 
is sequential. Insection 1.4, we have seen that the converse of this statement is 
not correct. This is also clear by camparing the definitions of sequential equilibria 
and perfect equilibria: whereas sequential equilibria only have to be optimal with 
respect to mistakes made in the past, perfect equilibria also have to be optimal 
with respect to mistakes that might occur in the future. Hence, a perfect equilibrium, 
in addition to being sequential, also has to satisfy some robustness condition (cf. 
normal form games, in this case every equilibrium is sequential). As for normal form 
games, one might expect that almost all sequential equilibria possess this robustness 
condition and, in fact, we have 
THEOREM 6.4.3. (KREPS AND WILSON [1982]). 
(i) Every perfect equilibrium is sequential. 
(ii) For almost all extensive form games, almost all sequential equilibria are per-
fect. 
(iii) For almost all games, the set of sequential equilibrium outcomes (i.e. the set 
of probability distributions over the endpoints, resulting from sequential 
equilibria)coincides with the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes. 
Note the difference between the parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 6.4.3: for generic 
games, the paths generated by sequential equilibria are the same as the paths 
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generated by perfect equilibria (by part (iii)), but a (by part (ii)) small set of 
sequential equilibria may fail to prescribe a robust choice at the information sets 
which are not reached. Theorem 6.4.3 shows that generically there is little dif-
ference between the sequential equilibrium concept and the perfectness concept. 
Kreps and Wilson claim that exact coincidence can be obtained by slightly modifying 
Selten's definition of perfectness. More precisely, Proposition 6 of KREPS AND WILSON 
[1982] states that for every extensive form game, the set of sequential equilibria 
coincides with the set of weakly perfect equilibria. A hleakly perfect equilibrium 
of ris a strategy combination b which is a limit point of a sequence {b(n)} + for n a 
which b(n) is an equilibrium of a perturbed game (f(n) ,n) where f(nl is an extensive 
form game for which the payoffs converge to those of f as n tends to 0. This result, 
however, is incorrect as can beseen from the game of figure 4.3.1: All equilibria 
of this game are sequential, but only the two pure equilibria are weakly perfect. 
From Theorem 6.4.3, the reader might get the impression that for extensive form games 
i t is not necessary to con si der more stringent refinements than sequential equilibria, 
in the sense that almast always all sequential equilibria have all nice properties 
one wants equilibria to have. In the next section, it will be shown that this impres-
sion is wrong. 
We will now show that every extensive form game possesses at least one perfect equi-
librium (and, hence, also at least one sequential equilibrium). It suffices to show 
that every perturbed game possesses at least one quilibrium. It will be clear that in 
an equilibrium of a perturbed game a choice which is not optimal has to be taken with 
minimum probability. Hence, for an admissible strategy combination b to be an equi-
librium of (f,~), it is necessary that 
(6.4. 3) if b. (c) 
lU 
> n , 
c 







for all i,u,c. 
By using a dynamic programming argument, one easily sees that (6.4.3) implies (6.4.2), 
hence, b E B(n) is an equilibrium of (f,n) if and only if b satisfies (6.4.3). Notice 
that, since the choices at u do not influence the payoffs at the information sets 
v E Ui which do not come after u, formula (6.4.3) is equivalent to 
(6.4.4) if R. (b\c) < R. (b\c'), then b. (c) 
l l lU 
n 
c 
for all i,u,c,c'. 
Now consider Kuhn's interpretation of how an extensive form game is played (KUHN 
[1953]). Kuhn views a player as a collection of separated agents, one agent for each 
information set of this player, each agent having the same payoff as the player to 
whom he belongs. The normal form game AN(f) corresponding to this interpretation is 
called the agent normal form of r (SELTEN [1975]). The players in AN(f) are the 
agentsof r, agent iu (i.e. the one corresponding to the information set u E Ui) has 
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Cu as pure strategy set and Ri as payoff. By cernparing (6.4.4) with (2.2.3), it is 
seen that bis an equilibrium of (f,n) if and only if bis an equilibrium of (ÁN(r),n). 
Therefore, we can conclude from Theerem 2.1.1 that (f,n) possesses at least one equi-
librium, hence, that r has at least one perfect equilibrium. 
THEOREM 6.4.4. (SELTEN [1975]). Every extensive form game possesses at least one 
perfect equilibrium. The set of perfect equilibria of r coincides with the set of 
perfect equilibria of the agent normal form of r. 
In general, the perfect equilibria of r do not coincide with the perfect equilibria 








Figure 6.4.1. A perfect equilibrium of r need not be a perfect equilibrium of the 
normal form of r. 
The unique perfect equilibrium of the normal form of the game of figure 6.4.1 is 
(L 1 ~,L2 ). In the extensive formalso the equilibrium (R 1 ~,L 2 ) is perfect: if player 
1 expects that player 2 makes mistakes with a smaller probability than he himself 
does, then it is indeed rational for him to choose R
1 
at his first information set. 
The game of figure 6.4.1 shows that a perfect equilibrium of an extensive form game 
may involve dominated strategies. It fellows from (6.4.4) that a perfect equilibrium 
cannot involve dominated choices, but Theerem 3.2.1 cannot be generalized to exten-
sive form games: for 2 person games, an equilibrium which is in undominated choices 
need not be perfect (caused by the fact that a 2-person extensive form game may have 
more than 2 agents). 
The game of figure 6.4.1 might be called a degenerate game and, in fact, it can be 
shown that almost always a perfect equilibrium of r will be perfect equilibriumin the 
normal formof this game. The game of figure 6.4.2,however, shows that it is frequently 
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the case that a perfect equilibrium of N(f) is nat a perfect equilibrium of r (Also 
see SELTEN [1975]. section 13) 












2 2 2 
2 2 
L1 
Extensive farm game r Normal farm game N(f) 
Figure 6.4.2. A perfect equilibrium of the normal formof ris nat necessarily a 
perfect equilibrium of r. 
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of ris (L 1 ~,L2 ). In the normal farm of r, 
also (R 1 ~,R2 ) is perfect: if player 2 expects player 1 to make the mistake L1r with 
a larger probability than the mistake L 1 ~, then it is optimal for him to choose R2 , 
thereby forcing player 1 to choose R1 ~ or R1r. Note that the perfectness concept 
for normal farm games does nat exclude the possibility that L
1
r occurs with a larger 
probability than L 1 ~. In r, however, player 2 should nat think that L1r occurs with 
a greater probability than L 1 ~: if the second information set of player is reached, 
then ~ is better for player 1 than r and, therefore, player 1 will intend to choose 
~ and so ~ will occur with the largest probability. 
Note that the equilibrium (R 1 ~,R2 ) is nota proper equilibrium of M(f). The proper-
ness concept prevents player 2 from thinking that L
1
r occurs with a greater probabil-
ity than L 1 ~. The only proper equilibrium of N(f) is (L 1 ~,L 2 ) and so, in this example, 
the proper equilibrium of r prescribes sensible behavior in r. In the next section, 
it will be shown that this is generally true. 
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6.5. PROPER EQUILIBRIA 
In MYERSON [1978] the properness concept has been introduced for normal farm games. 
In this section, the properness concept for extensive farm games is considered. First 
it is shown that unreasonable sequential equilibria can be eliminated by restricting 
oneself to proper equilibria of the agent normal farm. After we show that also proper 
equilibria of the normal farm of r induce sequential equilibria in r and that the 
restrietion to such equilibria also eliminates unreasonable sequential equilibria. 
The concluding example of the section shows that not all unreasonable sequential 
equilibria are eliminated by the properness concept. 
Consider the game of figure 6.5.1 which is a slight modification of the game of fig-





Figure 6.5.1. Nat all sequential equilibria are sensible. 
0 
A sequential (and perfect) equilibrium of this game is (A,R
2
). This equilibrium is 
supported by the beliefs of player 2 that the mistake R
1 
occurs with a larger prob-
ability than the mistake L
1
• In our view these beliefs are not sensible. Since for 
player 1 the choice L
1 
is better than the choice R
1
, player 2 should expect L
1 
to 
occur with the largest probability and, therefore, if his information set is reached, 
he should play L
2
, thereby inducing player 1 to play L
1




) is a 
sensible equilibrium. Notice that all games close to the game of figure 6.5.1 have 
(A,R
2
) as a sequential (yet nat sensible) equilibrium and so there exists an open 
set of games for which not all sequential equilibria are sensible, which shows that 
the sequential equilibrium concept has to be refined further. 
In the game r of figure 6.5.1, the equilibrium (A,R
2
) can be excluded by restricting 
oneself to proper equilibria of the agent normal farm of r. A proper equilibrium of 
E 
AN(f) is a strategy combination b, which is the limit of a sequence {b }E+o of com-
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pletely mixed behavior strategy combinations which satisfy 
(6. 5. 1) if R. (b\c) < R. (bE\c') then b~ (c) s sb~ (c') 
~u ~u lU lU 
for all i,u and c,c' EC. 
u 
(cf. Definition 2.3.1). Note that every proper equilibrium of A/J(r) is a perfect 
equilibrium of r (Theorem 6.4.4). The converse is not true as we have seen above. 
Formule (6.5.1) expresses the idea that if some choice c is worse than a choice c' 
at the ~ information set, then c is mistakenly chosen with a much smaller probabil-
ity than c'. However, the fact that only choices at the same information set of a 
player are compared has the consequence that not all unreasonable sequential equilib-
ria are excluded by restricting oneself to proper equilibria of AN(f). This is demon-
strated by means of the game of figure 6.5.2, which is a slight modification of the 







Figure 6.5.2. A proper equilibrium of AN{f) need not be sensible in r. 




). Since at each infor-
mation set there are just two choices, every perfect equilibrium of AN ( f) (hence, 




) is a proper equilibrium of 
AN(f). We do not consider this equilibrium as being reasonable. Upon reaching his 
information set, player 2 should realize that for player 1 the choice ~ at v is 
worse than his choice L
1 
at u. Therefore, he should assign the largest probability 
to being in the left hand node of his information set and, consequently, he should 
play L 2 , thereby inducing player 1 to play L 1















Figure 6.5.3. The normal form of the game of figure 6.5.2. 
The proper equilibria of this game are the equilibria in which player 2 plays L
2 
and 





being played in r and so yields the unique sensible outcome of r. Note, 
however, that a proper equilibrium of N{f) may prescribe irrational behavior off the 
equilibrium path: (L 1 ~,L2 ) prescribes irrational behavior at the information set v 
of player 1. Off the equilibrium path, rational behavior can be obtained by looking 
at limit points of (behavior strategy combinations induced by) E-proper equilibria as 
E tends to 0. If sE is an E-proper equilibrium of IJ(f) close to (L 1 ~,L 2 ) and if bE 
is the behavior strategy combination induced by sE (i.e. b~ is given by (2.1.12) for 
l 





of r, as follows easily from the definition of an E-proper equilibrium of N ( f) and 
(2.1.12). 
In the game r of figure 6.5.2, proper equilibria of N(r) give rise to sensible out-
comes in r and limit points of E-proper equilibria of IJ(f) prescribe rational be-
havior everywhere in the game tree. Next, it will be shown that this is true for any 
extensive form game r. In fact, it will be shown that a behavior strategy combination 
bE induced by an E-proper equilibrium of N(f) possesses a property similar to (6.5.1) 
(see (6.5.5)). Let r be an extensive form game and let b be a completely mixed be-
havior strategy combination. For c E C with u E U define R. (b) as the maximum 
U l lC 
payoff player i can get if u is reached, if he plays c at u and if his opponents 
play b, i.e. 







where b\bi\c denotes the behavior strategy combination b\(bi\c). Note that Ric(b) 
can be computed by the following dynamic programming scheme (cf. (6.3.3) ,(6.3.4)): 
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(6.5. 3) R.. Cbl 2: JPb\c (v) R. (b) for c E C , u lC 









which is initialized by setting R. (b) 
lZ 
We have (cf. formula (6.5.1)). 
r. (z) for z E Z. 
l 
LEMMA 6.5.1. If bEis a behavior strategy combination in r which is induced by an 
E-proper equi libri urn sE of ~J ( f) , then 
(6.5.5) E I Rel ( ê) I b ~ ( ê) 
lU 
forall i,u and c,êEC, 
u 
where Rel(ê) denotes the set of all pure strategies which are relevant for ê (see 
(6.1.12)). 
PROOF. Assume i,u,c,ê are such that the condition of (6.5.5) is satisfied and let 
~i E Rel(ê) be a pure strategy which satisfies 
- E 
R. _ (b ) 
lC 
For any strategy ~iE Rel(u), we have 
(6.5.6) 
For ~l E Rel(c), define ~iE Rel(ê) by 
if V ::,::: U , 
~iv 
otherwise . 
Then it fellows from (6.5.6) that 
which, since bE is induced by 
E 
s , is equivalent to 
Hence, from the definition of an E-proper equilibrium, we deduce 
<: Es~(~.) , 
l l 
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which, obviously, implies that 
(6. 5. 7) <; EIEss(ê) I I s~(cpi) 
cp,ERel(ê) 
l 
Dividing both sides of (6.5.7) by I s~(cpi) yields (6.5.5). 
epi ERel(u) 
Lets be a proper equilibrium of N(r), for E > 0, let sE be an E-proper equilibrium 
of r convergingtos as E tends to 0 and let bE be induced by sE. 
Without loss of generality, assume 
E 
system of beliefs generated by b 
that (b,~) lim(bE,~E) exists, where ~Eis the 
E EfO 
(i.e. ~ is given by (6.3.1)). From (6.5.5) and 
(6.5.5) we see that 
if b. {c) > 0, then R. (bE) 
lU lC 
for all sufficiently small E, 
Therefore, we have 
if b. (c) > 0, then R~ (b) R.~ (bl for all i,u,c, 
lU lC lU 
D 
and, so, from the characterization of sequential best replies given in (6.3.5), it 
follows that (b,~) is a sequential equilibrium of r. Since, furthermore, the behavior 
strategy induced by si coincides with bi at all information sets which might be 
reached when s. is played, we have that b generates the same path as s does, i.e. 
b l 
JPs ~ JP . Hence, we have proved. 
THEOREM 6.5.2 
(i) If s is a proper equilibrium of N ( f), then JPs is a sequential equilibrium out-
come in r. 
(ii) If b is a limit point of a sequence {bE}E-1-o where bE is induced by an E-proper 
equilibrium sE of N(r), then bis a sequential equilibrium of r. 
In theorem 6.5.2 "sequential" cannot be replaced by "perfect". Namely, consider the 
game r in which the payoffs are the same as in the game of figure 6.4.1, except for 
the fact that now player 1 always receives 1 if he plays R
1
. The unique perfect equi-
librium of this game is (R 1 ~,L2 ). However, since (L 1 ~,L2 ) is a proper equilibrium of 
the normal form of this game, also this equilibrium can be induced in the way of 
Theorem 6.5.2. Hence, a strategy induced by a proper equilibrium need not be robust 
with respect to mistakes made by the player himself. 
We have already seen that by restricting oneself to proper equilibria (of the normal 
farm, or of the agent normal farm) one can eliminate unreasonable sequential equilib-
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ria. By means of the game of figure 6.5.4, which has the same structure as Kohlberg's 
example in KREPS AND WILSON [1982a] (Figure 14) it is shown that notall intuitively 
unreasonable sequential equilibria can be eliminated in this way. 
4 0 0 
0 




A proper equilibrium of the game of figure 6.5.4 is (A,R
2
): if player 2 expects the 
mistake R
1 
to occur with a larger probability than mistake L
1
, then it is indeed op-
timal for him to play R
2
. However,this equilibrium is not sensible. If the players 
have agreed to play (A,R
2
) and if the information set of player 2 is nevertheless 
reached, then at the outset player 2 should not conclude that player has made a 
mistake, but he should ask himself whether player 1 could have had any reason to 
deviate. Since for rational players only equilibria are sensible, this means that he 





) is the only equilibrium for which the information set of player 2 is reached 
and since, moreover, player 1 prefers this equilibrium to (A,R
2
), he should conclude 
that indeed player 1 has chosen L
1 







) is sensible. 
6.6. CONTROL COSTS 
In this section, it will be shown that, if (infinitesimal) control costs are present 
in an extensive form game, the players will play a sequential equilibrium. 
A game with control costs models the idea that a player makes mistakes as a conse-
quence of the fact that it is too costly to control his actions completely (see 
chapter 4). If every player incurs control costs at any of his information sets in 
an extensive form game, then every choice will be taken with a positive probability 
and, consequently, every information set will be reached with positive probability. 
Therefore, one expects that only sequential equilibria can be obtained as limit 
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points of equilibria of games with control casts as these casts go to 0. We will 
show that this is indeed the case, provided that the control casts are incorporated 
into the model in the correct way 
A naive way to investigate the influence of control casts in an extensive form game 
would be to investigate the influence in the agent normal form. By means of the game 





Extensive form game f 
0 
0 
Agent normal form AN(f) 
Figure 6.6.1. The influence of control casts cannot be investigated by means of the 
agent normal form. 
From the viewpoint of player 1, the game r is much different from Ml(f). In All(f) 
player 1 always has to move (no matter what player 2 does) and his choice R
1 
is not 
much worse than L
1 
(since player 2 willintend to play L
2
). Therefore, if he incurs 
control casts, he will not spend much effort in trying to prevent R
1
, in fact, the 
control casts may force him to choose R
1 
with a pcsitive probability (see section 
4.3). In r, however, player 1 has to move only if player 2 has chosen R2 and in this 
case R
1 
is much worse than L
1
. Therfore, if his information set is reached, player 1 
will try very hard to prevent R
1 
and even if he incurs control casts he will choose 
R
1 
with a very small probability. 
The reason that the influence of control casts cannot be investigated by means of 
the agent normal form is that in the agent normal form one has to move always and, 
hence, always incurs control casts, whereas in the extensive form one incurs control 
casts only if an information set is actually reached. This motivates the following 
definition. 
DEFINITION 6.6.1. Let r be an n-person extensive form game and let f = (f , ... ,f) 
f 1 n 
be an n-tuple of control cost functions (see section 4.1). The game r , which is 
called a game with control costs,is the extensive form game with the same structure 
as r, but in which the payoff to player i if bis played is given by 
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The game rf models the idea that each player i incurs control costs as described by 
fi at any of his information sets. One could also allow the possibility of different 
control costs at different information sets (in this case one just has to replace fi 
by f in formula (6.6.1)), in fact, one can even allow different control costs for 
u 
different choices (in this case (6.6.1) contains a term f ). We will not consider 
c 
these extensions. Note that the term :IPb(u) in formula (6.6.1) ensures that player i 
incurs a cost at u only if u is actually reached when b is played. 
The reader should have no difficulty in proving the following generalization of 
Theorem 4.2.6. 
THEOREM 6.6.2. The game ff possesses at least one equilibrium. All equilibria of ff 
are completely mixed. 
Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 4.2.3, it is seen that a completely mixed strat-
egy combination b is an equilibrium of rf if and only if 






Since, for every u E Ui and c E Cu 




c (b, (ê)) J for all i,u,c,ê 
~ ~u 
we can conclude from (6.6.2) that bis an equilibrium of rf if and only if 
(6.6. 3) R. (b\c) - R. (b\ê) f~ (b. (c)) f ~ (b, (ê) for all i,u,c,ê 
lU lU ~ ~u ~ ~u 
From formula (6.6.3) we can conclude: 
THEOREM 6.6.3. Let r be an n-person extensive form game and let f be an n-tuple of 
control cost functions. If b is a limit point of a sequence {bE}E+o' where bE is an 
equilibrium of rsf, then bis a sequential equilibrium of r. 
PROOF. Without loss of generality, assume bis the limit of {bs}. For E > 0, let ~E 
be the system of beliefs generated by bE and,without lossof generality, assume 
~ = lim ~E exists. From (6.6.3) we can deduce 
s+o 




for all i,u,c,ê 
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Since, furthermore 
R~ (b\c) for all i,u,c, 
lU 
it follows in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, that 
if R~ (b\c) 
lU 
< R~ (b\ê), then b. (c) 
lU lli 
0 for all i,u,c,ê, 
from which one can conclude, e.g. by using a dynamic programming argument, that b 
is a sequential best reply against (b,~). D 
Since for normal form games every equilibrium is sequential, it follows from our 
discussion in section 4.3 that not all sequential equilibria can be obtained as a 
limit in the way of Theorem 6.6.3. Futhermore, it follows from the results in chap-
ter 4 that to obtain perfectness instead of sequentialness the control costs have to 
satisfy more stringent conditions. 
6. 7. INCOMPLETE INFORI-lATION 
In this section, it is investigated what the influences are of inexact knowledge of 
the payoffs on the strategy choices in an extensive form game. To that end, we study 
disturbed extensive form games, i.e. games in which each player, although knowing 
his own payoff function exactly, knows the payoff functions of his opponents somewhat 
imprecisely. One might expect that, under similar conditions as in chapter 5, only 
sequential equilibria can be obtained as limit points of equilibria of disturbed 
games as these disturbances go to zero, i.e. if the information about the payoffs 
beoomes better and better. \'Ie will indicate that this is the case only if the dis-
turbances are of a special kind, but it should be noted that the results are far 
from complete and that many challenging problems are still unsolved. 
Let us start by giving an informal definition of a disturbed extensive form game 
(the formal definition is similar to Definition 5.2.1). Let r be an ordinary (com-
plete information) n-person extensive form game. The situation we have in mind is 
the following: the players have to play a game of which it is common knowledge 
(AUMANN [1976]) that it has the same structure as r, but of which the payoffs may be 
slightly different from those in r, since each player's payoff is subject to small 
random disturbances, the precise effects of which are only known to the player him-
self; it is assumed that the distribution ~. 
l 
of the disturbances of player i's payoff 
is known to all players. The game with these rul es is denoted by r <~l, where ~ is 
the n-tuple (~ , .... ~ ) . 
1 n 
As in chapter 5, it is assumed that ~ satisfies the Assump-
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ti ons 5. 2. 2 and 5. 3. 5. Since we are interested in the case in which the players are 
only slightly uncertain about each other's payoffs, we will investigate what happens 
if the disturbances go to 0, i.e. which equilibria of r can be approximated by equi-
libria of disturbed games f(~E) for which ~E converges weakly to 0 as E tends to 0 
(see section 5.3). 
The first question which has to be answered is: how should an equilibrium of f(~) 
be defined? First of all, a strategy of player i in f(~) is a mechanism which tells 




where Z is the set of endpoints of K and Bi is the set of behavior strategies 
player i in r. We will restriet ourselves to strategies which satisfy: 
of 
(6. 7.1) if r. (z) 
)_ 
> max r. (z'), then z E Poss(o. (r.)) , 
z'~z l l l 
where Poss(oi (ri)) is the set of nodesin the tree which might be reached when oi (ri) 
is played (see(6.1.9)). Obviously, every sensible strategy satisfies (6.7.1). Suppose 
the strategy combination CJ (o
1
, ... ,on) is played in f(~) and let u be an information 
set of player i. If player i gets to hear that u is reached, then he can deduce that 
the payoff of player j must be in the set. 





E JR Poss(o.(r.)) nu~ 0} 
J J 
and, in this case, he will think that the disturbances in the payoffs of player 
have the distribution 
(6. 7 .3) 
u,o 
~j ~. (.IR. (u,o)) J J 
u,o 
Note that ~j is well-defined for every u and o by (6.7.1) and Assumption 5.3.3. 
Also note that this distribution depends only on the component CJj of CJ. Basedon the 
observation that u is reached, player i will predict that player j will choose 
c at the information set v with the probability 
(6.7.4) J 
u,o I o. (c)~. (. R. (v,CJ)), 
JV J J 
where oj(c) is the mapping which assigns toeach payoff rj the probability ojv(c,rj) 
that player j chooses c atv if the payoff is rj. Note that (6.7.4) is well-defined 
for all v which might be reached when u is reached (i.e. Z(u) n Z(v) ~ 0). Let b~' 0 
J 
be a behavior strategy which is defined as in (6.7.4) whenever possible and which is 
arbitrarily defined elsewhere. Let bu,o be a behavior strategy combination in which 
every player j plays b~' 0 . If player i gets to hear that u is reached, he will pre-
J 
dict the behavior of his opponents by bu,o For the strategy combination o to be an 
equilibrium of f(~), we should have that every player at any information set u chooses 
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a best reply against the strategies he expects the others to follow, based on the 
observation that u is reached. Therefore, we define 
DEFINITION 6.7.1. A strategy combination 0 is an equilibrium of f(~) if for all i EN, 




(6 0 7 0 5) R. (bu'
0
\cr.(r.)) 




where Riu(.) denotes the expected payoff for player i afteruif his actual payoff 
vector in f(~) is r .. 
~ 
Note that the conditional expected payoff in (6.7.5) is well-defined, since u is 
reached if bu,cr is played (Assumption 5.3.3 and (6.7.1)) and since bu,cr is defined 
by (6.7.4) in all those partsof the game tree which can effect the expected payoff 
R. (.).We conjecture that a disturbed extensive farm game always (i.e. whenever 
~u 
Assumption 5.2.2 is satisfied) possesses an equilibrium, but a proof is not yet on 
paper. Instead of studying the existence problem, let us consider the question of 
which equilibria of r can be approximated by equilibria of f(~E) if~Econverges 
weakly to 0 as E tends to 0. To be more precise: if the strategy combination a is 
played in f(~), then to an outside observer it will look as if the behavior strategy 
combination b defined by 
(6. 7 .6) b 
i u 
for all i,u 
is played, where b~'0 is as in (6.7.4). bis called the behavior strateqy combination 
~u 
induced by CJ. \'Ie will investigate which equilibria of r can be obtained as limit 
points of a sequence {bE} , where bE is induced by an equilibrium oE of f(~E). Such 
E't'O 
equilibria will be called P-stable equilibria (where P = {~E; E > 0}). 
The game of figure 6.7.1 illustrates that in general non-sequential equilibria might 




Figure 6.7.1. Uncertainty about the payoffs does nat necessarily leadtoa sequential 
equilibrium being played. 
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E 
Assume the payoffs of player 1 fluctuate around (2,1 1 0). Let the random variable Xi 
represent the payoff at he ith endpoint of the tree (counting from left to right). 
If E is close to 0, then an outside observer will see player 1 playing L with a 
probability close to 1, butatv he does not necessarily observe t being played with 
a probability close to 1. If bEis induced by an equilibrium of the E-disturbed game, 
then 





J tends to 0 as E tends to 0, the limit of b
1
v(r) may be pos-
itive. This, for instance, will be true if XE has a Cauchy distribution. Hence, non 
l 
-sequential equilibria may be P-stable. 
The reason why a non-sequential equilibrium may be P-stable in the game of figure 
6.7.1 is that, if vis actually reached, then the payoffs after v may be quite dif-
ferent from those displayed in figure 6.7.1. Hence, in the disturbed game the sub-
game startingat v may be quite different from this subgame in the undisturbed game. 
The game of figure 6.7.2 is another example to demonstrate this. By means of this 
game we illustrate the difference between the incomplete rationality (perfectness) 








Figure 6.7.2. The difference between the incomplete information approach and the 
incomplete rationality approach (M is some real number). 
Consider first the case in which there are no random disturbances in the payoffs, 
but in which the players might be slightly irrational. In this case, if the informa-
tion set of player 1 is reached, this player concludes that player 2 has made a mis-
take. Yet, player 1 will think that player 2 will make mistakes only with a small 
probability at his second information set and, therefore, player 1 will play L1 . 
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Next, consider the case in which there are random disturbances in the payoffs. A 
priori, player thinks that the payoffs of player 2 are as displayed in r and, there-
fore, he expects his information set not to be reached. If his information set is 
reached, then player 1 has to revise his priors and he might as well come to the 
conclusion that the payoffs of player 2 in the subgame are quite different from those 
displayed in figure 6.7.2. Therefore, he might assign a positive probability to player 
2 playing r in the subgame and, consequently, it might be optimal to choose R
1 
if M 
is large. To make the latter statement more precise, note that the normal form of 
the game of figure 6.7.2 is the game of figure 4.1.1 and in Example 5.5.1 we showed 
that it is optimal for player to choose R
1 
in the case in which the disturbances 
have a cauchy distribution. 
In both examples, the reason why a non-sequential equilibrium of r might be P-stable 
is that, upon unexpectedly reaching an information set u E Ui, player i might con-
clude that the payoffs after u are completely different from those in r. Hence, to 
obtain that only sequential equilibria will be P-stable, it is necessary that a 
player does not have to revise his beliefs about the payoffs after u, if u is reached. 
More precisely, let er be a strategy combination in r (iJ E ), let 11 E 'u' er be defined as in 
_E,u,o s,u o 
(6.7.3) and let ]Ji be the conditional distribution of ]Ji ' on Z(u), i.e. 
(6. 7. 7) := 11 ~,u,er(B x JRZ\Z{u)) Z{u) for a Borel subset B of JR . 
If er is played in f(]JE), then, if u is reached, the beliefs about the payoffs of 
-E,u,o 
player i after u are described by ]Ji The condition that a player, upon reaching 
u, should still think that the payoffs of player i afteruin f(]JE) are close to the 
payoff in r requires that 
(6. 7 .8) 
_E,u,o 
lli converges weakly to 0 as E tends to 0 for all i,u,er. 
We conjecture that (6.7.8) is fulfilled if the disturbances at the different endpoints 
of the game are independent and have a normal distribution with parameters 0 and E 
(cf. Lemma 5.7.1). Furthermore, we conjecture that only sequential equilibria are 
P-stable if P ={]JE; s > O} is such that (6.7.8) is satisfied. 
We conclude this section by noting that not all sequential equilibria can be P-stable. 
Consider the game r of figure 6.5.1 and let P ={]JE; s > 0} be such that every 11~ is 
the product dis tribution on JR
5 
of a normal distribution on JR wi th parameters 0 and 
s. By (6.7.8) player 2, when he has to make a choice, believes that the payoffs of 




are close to those of r (he cannot 
conclude anything about the payoffs of player 1 after A). Therefore, he will conclude 
that player 1 has chosen L
1 
and, consequently, he will choose L
2






) is P-stable (cf. the discussionsin the sections 5.5 and 6.5). 
Note that, if (6.7.8) is satisfied, the disturbed game approach in essence means 
that player 2 analyses the game r of figure 6.5.1 by means of the game f' which is 
obtained from r by deleting the choice A of player 1: since the unique equilibrium 
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f-approachable Essential strictly proper ----+ P-stable 
5.6 .1 * 
strictly perfect 
perfect weakly proper 
2.3.5 
An overview of the relations between refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept 
for normal form games. Inclusions go in the direction of the arrows. Numbers repre-
sent the theorem in which the result is proved. A star denotes that the relation 
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Speltheorie is een wiskundige theorie, die zich bezig houdt met het modelleren en 
analyseren van conflictsituaties (ook wel spelen genaamd). Een conflictsituatie is 
een beslissingssituatie waarin meerdere beslissers (spelers) met gedeeltelijk (of 
volledig) tegengestelde belangen een rol spelen. Elke speler tracht de situatie zo-
danig te beïnvloeden dat het voor hem gunstigste resultaat gerealiseerd wordt. Hier-
bij kan men denken aan allerlei economische en politieke situaties, zoals concur-
rentie, onderhandelingen en wapenbeheersing. De speltheorie stelt zich als doel voor 
elk spel een (stabiele) oplossing te geven, dat wil zeggen voor elke speler aan te 
geven welke strategie hij moet volgen om zijn belangen optimaal te behartigen. 
In dit proefschrift wordt een onderwerp uit de niet-coöperatieve speltheorie behan-
deld. Een spel wordt niet-coöperatief genoemd als bindende afspraken tussen de spelers 
niet mogelijk zijn. De oplossing van zo'n spel moet daarom zelf-bekrachtigend zijn, 
dat wil zeggen, zodanig dat geen der spelers zich kan verbeteren door een andere 
strategie te spelen dan die welke de oplossing voorschrijft. In speltheoretische 
terminologie: de oplossing moet een Nash evenwicht zijn. In het algemeen bezit een 
spel echter meerdere Nash evenwichten en prefereren niet alle spelers hetzelfde even-
wicht, zodat er een_probleem ontstaat welk evenwicht als oplossing gekozen moet 
worden. In het proefschrift laten we zien dat bepaalde Nash evenwichten niet als 
oplossing in aanmerking komen, omdat zij instabiel zijn. We richten ons op de vraag 
welke evenwichten wel de gewenste stabiliteitseigenschappen bezitten. 
We concentreren ons op twee soorten stabiliteit, namelijk die met betrekking tot 
kleine verstoringen in de uitbetalingen van het spel en die met betrekking tot kleine 
perturbaties in de evenwichtsstrategieën. De eis dat een evenwicht robuust moet zijn 
in de eerste zin,vloeit voort uit het feit dat men altijd enigszins onzeker is om-
trent de exacte uitbetalingen, in het bijzonder die van de tegenstanders. Het feit 
dat er altijd een kleine kans is dat een speler een fout maakt, verklaart de eis 
dat een evenwicht bestand moet zijn tegen kleine perturbaties in de evenwichtsstra-
tegieën. Aangezien er in het algemeen geen evenwicht hoeft te bestaan dat alle ge-
wenste stabiliteitseigenschappen bezit, moet men zich tevreden stellen als aan be-
paalde stabiliteitseisen voldaan is, hetgeen verklaart waarom er meerdere verfijningen 
van het Nash evenwichtsconcept zijn. Men kan de nadruk leggen op robuustheid met 
betrekking tot bepaalde verstoringen in de uitbetalingen (dit leidt bijvoorbeeld tot 
'essential' evenwichten en •P-stable' evenwichten) of op het bestand zijn tegen 
bepaalde fouten ( het 'perfectness' concept en het 'properness' concept). Doel van 
het proefschrift is na te gaan tot welke resultaten zulke verfijningen aanleiding 
geven en relaties tussen de verschillende concepten af te leiden. De meeste aandacht 
wordt besteed aan spelen in normale vorm (statische spelen). Spelen in uitgebreide 
vorm (dynamische spelen) zijn het onderwerp van het laatste hoofdstuk. 
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In hoofdstuk 1 wordt met behulp van een groot aantal voorbeelden geïllustreerd dat 
niet alle Nash evenwichten als oplossing van een spel in aanmerking komen en dat het 
dus nodig is dit concept te verfijnen. Bovendien worden de verschillende verfijningen 
op een informele manier geïntroduceerd. 
In hoofdstuk 2 beschouwen we n-personen spelen in normale vorm. Een belanrijk resul-
taat in dit hoofdstuk is dat een evenwicht dat bestand is tegen verstoringen in de 
uitbetalingen ook stabiel is met betrekking tot verstoringen in de strategieën. Een 
centraal concept is het reguliere evenwicht, dat alle robuustheidseigenschappen 
blijkt te bezitten die men zich wensen kan. Bovendien wordt aangetoond, dat voor 
veel spelen alle Nash evenwichten regulier zijn. 
Hoewel een aantal relaties tussen de verschillende evenwichtsconcepten al voor 
n-personen spelen afgeleid kan worden, blijkt het toch noodzakelijk een klasse van 
eenvoudiger spelen te beschouwen om meer specifieke resultaten te verkrijgen. Daar-
om richten we in hoofdstuk 3 de aandacht op 2-personen spelen. Voor deze klasse kun-
nen de resultaten uit hoofdstuk 2 aanzienlijk verscherpt worden, hetgeen leidt tot 
karakterizeringen die de basiseigenschappen van de verschillende concepten bloot-
leggen. Ook wordt ingegaan op de vraag hoe men de eventuele fouten van de tegenstan-
der kan uitbuiten in een spel waarin de belangen volstrekt tegengesteld zijn, een 
zogenaamd nulsom spel. 
Aan het 'properness' concept ligt de aanna.me ten grondslag dat een speler een ern-
stige fout met een orde kleinere kans zal maken dan een minder ernstige fout, als 
gevolg van het feit dat hij veel beter zijn best zal doen zo'n fout te voorkomen. In 
hoofdstuk 4 wordt aangetoond dat deze aanname niet gerechtvaardigd is als een speler 
echt moeite moet doen om fouten te voorkomen. In dit geval zal hij een ernstiger 
fout weliswaar met een kleinere, maar niet met een orde kleinere kans maken. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt onderzocht hoe onzekerheid omtrent de exacte uitbetalingen in 
het spel de strategiekeuze van een speler beïnvloedt. We laten zien dat onder be-
paalde omstandigheden deze onzekerheid ertoe leidt dat er een 'perfect', dan wel 
een 'weakly proper' evenwicht gespeeld zal worden. Resultaten welke nogmaals het 
verband illustreren tussen stabiliteit met betrekking tot verstoringen in de uitbe-
talingen en robuustheid met betrekking tot perturbaties in de strategieën. 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt nagegaan in hoeverre de inzichten verkregen door bestudering 
van spelen in normale vorm ook voor spelen in uitgebreide vorm waardevol zijn. Het 
blijkt dat deze inzichten inderdaad bruikbaar zijn en dat een aantal resultaten ook 
wel gegeneraliseerd kan worden, maar dat er toch een fundamenteel verschil bestaat 
tussen deze twee klassen van spelen. 
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STELLINGEN 
I 
Voor het ontstaan van de Speltheorie is Van Neumann's observatie, dat elk spel 
in uitgebreide vorm gereduceerd kan worden tot een spel in normale vorm, van 
essentieel belang geweest. Dit normalisatieprincipe maakt het mogelijk voor 
grote klassen van spelen het bestaan van evenwichten te bewijzen en is daarom 
theoretisch van grote betekenis. Voor de analyse van een spel kan het echter 
nietgebruikt worden, daar twee strategisch volstrekt inequivalente spelen de-
zelfde normale vorm kunnen hebben. 
VON NEUMANN, J. en 0. MORGENSTERN [1944]. Theory of games and economie behavior, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
II 
Lineair-kwadratische differentiespelen worden gebruikt als econometrische model-
len van beleidssituaties waarin meerdere beslissers een rol spelen. De vraag 
wat optimaal handelen in zo'n situatie is, laat zich in het model vertalen tot: 
wat zijn de Nash evenwichten van het spel? Deze vraag wordt beantwoord in 
BA~AR [1976] waar 6 stellingen van het volgende type geformuleerd worden. 
(i) als aan bepaalde regulariteitscondities voldaan is, dan bestaat er een 
Nash evenwicht, 
(ii) als er een Nash evenwicht bestaat, dan is het uniek. 
Van alle 6 stellingen is het tweede deel onjuist. 
BA~AR, T. [1976]. On the uniqueness of the Nash salution in linear-quadric 
differential games. Int. J. Game Theory, ~' 65-90. 
III 
De stellingen 1, 2 en 4 uit het bovenvermelde artikel van Ba7ar kunnen eenvoudig 
gerepareerd worden door (ii) te vervangen door: 
(ii)' als aan de regulariteitscondities van (i) voldaan is, dan is het Nash 
evenwicht uniek. 
Dit geldt echter niet voor de stellingen 3, 5 en 6. Deze stellingen worden cor-
rect als we (ii) vervangen door: 
(ii)" er bestaat een uniek deelspel-perfect evenwicht, als aan de condities van 
(i) voldaan is. 
Een andere manier om de stellingen 5 en 6 te repareren, is (ii) te vervangen 
door: 
(ii)"' als aan de regulariteitscondities van (i) voldaan is en als elke stochas-
tische grootheid die in de bewegingsvergelijking voorkomt een dichtheid 
heeft die overal positief is, dan stemt elk tweetal Nash evenwichten bij-
na overal overeen. 
DAMME, E.E.C. van [1980a]. A noteon Ba~ar's: 'On the uniqueness of the Nash 
salution in linear-quadratic differential games'. Memorandum Cosor 80-06. 
Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven. 
IV 
De 8 postulaten, waar volgens Harsanyi rationeel gedrag aan zou moeten voldoen, 
zijn strijdig. 
HARSANYI, J.C. [1977]. Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games 
and social situations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
DAMME, E.E.C. van [1980b]. Some comments on Harsanyi's postulates for rational 
behavior in game situations. Methods of Operations Research 38, 189-205. 
V 
Het is een ernstige tekortkoming van een studieboek over Speltheorie, als bij 
de bespreking van de algoritme van Lemke en Howson voor de berekening van een 
Nash evenwicht van een bimatrix spel geen aandacht geschonken wordt aan de 
speltheoretische interpretatie van deze algoritme. 
PARTHASARATHY, T. en T.E.S. RAGHAVAN [1971]. Some topics in two-person games. 
American Elsevier Publ. Comp., New York. 
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bijectie met de eigenschap dat zowel F als F inverteerbaar is. 
VIII 
Een belangrijk concept voor coöperatieve spelen waarin onderhandse uitbetalingen 
toegestaan zijn, is de zogenaamde 'Core', d.w.z. de verzameling van verdelingen 
van het totaalbedrag waarbij alle mogelijke coalities van spelers tevreden ge-
steld worden. 
Voor spelen met eindig veel spelers heeft Shapley de volgende stelling bewezen: 
de Core van het spel is niet leeg dan en slechts dan als het spel uitgebalan-
ceerd is. 
Deze equivalentie is niet juist als er aftelbaar veel spelers zijn. In dit geval 
geldt de equivalentie wel als het spel aan een bepaalde continuiteitsvoorwaarde 
voldoet. 
DAMME, E.E.C. van [1981]. Cooperative games with countably many players. Methods 
of Operations Research 40, 107-110. 
SHAPLEY, L.S. [1967]. On balanced sets and cores. Naval Res. Log. Q. li• 435-460. 
IX 
Een ruileconomie bestaat uit een verzameling van (economische) agenten die door 
ruiling van goederen betere goederenbundels trachten te verwerven. Een Walras-
evenwicht van zo'n economie is een prijssysteem tezamen met een herverdeling van 
de goederen waarmee iedereen tevreden is, d.w.z. elke agent verwerft de beste 
bundel die hij voor de gegeven prijzen kan kopen. 
Voor de situatie waarin er eindig veel agenten en eindig veel soorten goederen 
zijn, vinden we in BILDENBRAND en KIRMAN [1976] de volgende stelling met betrek-
king tot het bestaan van zulke evenwichten: 
Als de preferenties van elke agent monotoon, continu en convex zijn, dan bestaat 
er een Walras-evenwicht. 
Deze stelling kan gegeneraliseerd worden tot ruileconomieën met aftelbaar veel 
agenten en eindig veel soorten goederen waarin de totaal aanwezige hoeveelheid 
van elk soort goed eindig is. 
HILDENBRAND, W. en A.P. KIRMAN [1976]. Introduetion to equilibrium analysis. 
North Holland Publ. Comp., Amsterdam. 
x 
In geval een overledene geen testament heeft gemaakt, ontstaan bij het verdelen 
van de erfenis vaak ruzies, doordat de erfgenamen het niet eens kunnen worden. 
In het geval van gelijkwaardige erfgenamen kunnen veel van deze ruzies voorkomen 
worden door elk voorwerp in de boedel aan de hoogst biedende erfgenaam te verkopen 
en daarna de totale opbrengst gelijkelijk over de erfgenamen te verdelen. 
Voor het verkopen van de objecten verdient Vickrey's methode de voorkeur. Deze 
methode vereist dat de erfgenamen onafhankelijk van elkaar opschrijven welke 
prijs zij willen betalen en elk object wordt toegewezen aan de hoogste bieder 
tegen het op een na hoogste bod (indien meerdere erfgenamen het hoogst bieden, 
wordt met gelijke kansen geloot). 
VICKREY, W. [1961 l. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. 
J. of Finance, 16, 8-37. 
XI 
Het is gewenst dat ook aan 'verplicht verzekerden ingevolge de ziekenfondswet' 
de mogelijkheid wordt geboden zich op de voor hen meest aantrekkelijke manier 
tegen ziektekosten te verzekeren. 
XII 
De vooruitgang van de wetenschap wordt ernstig belemmerd doordat resultaten uit 
de ene discipline slecht toegankelijk zijn voor beoefenaren van een andere dis-
cipline4 
XIII 
Indien een vak bestaat uit verschillende onderdelen die voor de verdere studie 
van belang zijn, behoren al deze onderdelen op het tentamen aan de orde te komen. 
Het verdient aanbeveling het tentamen alleen dan met voldoende te beoordelen als 
alle onderdelen in voldoende mate worden beheerst. 
XIV 
Als gevolg van verdergaande automatisering zal de werkgelegenheid in de 'fitness' 
sector toenemen. 
XV 
Het betaalde voetbal heeft de grootste overlevingskans, indien het transfersys-
teem wordt afgeschaft en bij het begin van elk seizoen de spelers, met inacht-
neming van de eigen identiteit van elke club, zodanig over de clubs worden ver-
deeld, dat gelijkwaardige teams ontstaan. 
~I 
Het argument, dat autoraces van belang zijn voor het wegverkeer, wordt geloof-
waardiger indien de racecircuits van verkeersdrempels worden voorzien. 
